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 This thesis proposes and estimates a model of university scientists’ interactions 
with the private sector; in this model students are conceptualized as an important enabler 
of such interactions. The results of the study show that university scientists’ student-
related behaviors such as grant support of students and research collaboration with 
students, and student-related attitudes such as mentoring orientation positively affect the 
probability that scientists will enter interactions with industry as well as the intensity of 
such interactions. Behaviors such as teaching and advising of students are not related to 
interactions with industry. 
This study is motivated by the increased emphasis on closer relationships between 
universities and industry as a means to facilitate the commercial application of university 
research. Today, numerous policies and programs attempt to achieve such goals. As a 
result, university scientists are called on to perform many tasks which on the surface 
seem misaligned. There is substantial study of conflict between the teaching and research 
missions of universities, and a growing body of study on conflict related to university 
based commercial and technology transfer related activities. Fewer, there are studies 
suggesting that these activities are not so misaligned after all. This study falls into the 
latter category as it posits a complementary relationship between university scientists’ 
student related activities and their work related interactions with industry, research and 
otherwise. 
Speculations regarding the importance of students in university industry relations 
and indirect evidence are scattered through the relevant literature, but little or no 
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systematic empirical tests of their importance exist. This study uses data from a national 
survey of university researchers to discern the centrality of students to university-industry 
interactions. Theoretically, students are conceptualized as a dimension of university 
scientists’ respective research capacities that enable cross-sectoral processes of 
accumulative advantage and thereby help to enable their interactions with industry. As a 
component of scientists’ scientific and technical human capital, students help university 
scientists to identify and act upon on research opportunities originating in the private 
sector. Moreover, students increase the appeal of university scientists to industry agents 






Relationships between universities and industry have been extensively, but rather 
haphazardly researched. Interest has focused largely on the formal arrangements between 
the two establishments, which aim to foster and institutionalize the production of 
commercially relevant knowledge (Etzkowitz, Webster, & Healey, 1998). These 
arrangements usually concentrate on the flow of such knowledge “deliverables”, most 
commonly in the form of patents or licenses (Agrawal, 2001). While the popularity of 
such arrangements between universities and their industry partners is not surprising, 
especially given their relative novelty and policy visibility (OECD, 2002), 
overemphasizing such mechanisms does not do justice to equally if not more important, 
albeit indirect, linkages between academia and industry. 
The focus of this study is a major yet understudied component of university-
industry relations: students. What little attention has been given to the role of students in 
industry-university relations (e.g., Croissant & Restivo, 2001; Slaughter, Campbell, 
Holleman, & Morgan, 2002) has chiefly examined the impact of the industrial activities 
of the of universities and university scientists upon students. But is it possible that 
students’ interaction with industry ultimately affects the research and industrial activities 
of the faculty with whom the students are working? This thesis suggests that students 
may be important, active, component of university-industry interactions at the individual 




Why might one expect this? In the first place, there is the intuitive expectation 
that influence patterns are rarely unidirectional. More important, research (e.g., Roessner, 
Ailes, Feller, & Parker, 1998) has demonstrated the key role of students (access to 
students, recruitment of students, and student internships and cooperative programs) in 
industrial firms’ strategic choices in university collaboration. Since students are now 
recognized as a prized resource in university-industry collaboration, it is possible that 
students’ industrial activities will affect not only industrial clients and sponsors, but the 
university faculty mentors and co-researchers as well. Hence, the goal of this study is to 
describe the effect of university researchers’ interactions with their students on the 
likelihood that these researchers will enter into collaborative relationships with the 
private sector. 
The goal of this research then is to assess the relationship between university-
based scientists and their students, and the impact of that relationship on these scientists’ 
interactions with private sector companies. Framing the question in such a way allows 
this research to directly address the broader theoretical proposal of this thesis, namely 
that interactions with students may be an important explanatory factor in modeling 
university-industry interactions at the individual level. The current study thus provides a 
methodological opportunity to bridge the “interaction” and “interdependence” theories of 
academia-industry relations (Geisler, 1995). 
University-based scientists who interact with industry, both formally and 
informally, recruit students to work on industry-funded projects, collaborate with students 
on problems of possible industrial interest, as well as consider both the contributions their 
students could make to solving industrial problems and the training value of such 
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problems for the students they mentor. Scientists also assist in the placement of students 
in internships and work cooperative programs, and they mentor students regarding their 
lives after graduation, providing advice on career choices in both industry and academia. 
By engaging in such student-related activities scientists not only perform a task 
typically expected by most scientists, but also accumulate experiences and research 
capacity that over time may make them both more able to pursue and act upon industrial 
opportunities and more attractive research partners for private companies. Indeed, from 
the perspective of private companies, the role of university academics in leading them to 
new recruits is one of the most important aspects of their interaction. The students 
organizations hire after graduating have often worked with the company in some capacity 
through their academic mentor, either informally or as an intern (Feller & Roessner, 
1995). The student-related benefits for private companies are not “on hold” until students 
graduate and get possibly hired by these companies. On the contrary, gains for companies 
interacting with university scientists are often immediate as they work with students on 
tasks requiring the high level expertise possessed by advanced degree students, but not 
provided by the scientist himself: testing, prototyping, software writing, experimentation. 
In the process of such interactions companies may often receive on-going technical 
assistance and problem solving from the students, not the faculty responsible for the 
interaction. In such environment of collaborative effort then, students are not merely 
passive participants, but likely an important, necessary component of such interactions. 
The role of students in the relationships between university scientists and industry 
players is therefore of key importance, because these students do not remain students, but 
become professional scientists and engineers who work in industry, academia, or both. 
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Students thus constitute a key component of university-industry relationships insofar as 
all three entities (faculty, students and organizations) interact in a variety of processes 
such as exploratory research of mutual interest, training and technical assistance, and also 
in the process of matching graduates with advanced degrees to industrial firms in need of 
new employees with such specialized skills. 
Framing students as an active component in the interactions between firms and 
universities will help both to 1) better explain why and under what circumstances some 
university researchers interact with the private sector (while their colleagues of similar 
background and credentials do not), and to 2) assess the dynamics of the relationships 
between universities and firms. The better explanation of why some scientists are more 
likely to interact with the private sector is sought through conceptualizing students as an 
asset particularly relevant and valued by industrial partners. As a result, scientists who 
are more involved with students in various capacities are likely to be dispropoortionally 
more able to enter and sustain interactions with industry relative to colleagues less 
engaged with students. This is essentially a situation where particular dimension of the 
scientific role is likely to receive disproportionally higher rewards relative to other 
dimensions. In the context of interactions with private sector, involvement with students 
may be rewarded (in terms of recognition, collaboration and funding opportunities) 
higher relative to rewards associated with this dimension in other contexts (e.g. in the 
context of traditional academic departments). 
The problem of inequal distribution of scientific assets and outputs and the 
differential returns on such assets and outputs has been previously conceptualized as 
“accumulative advantage” (Merton, 1968), reinforcement, or both (Fox, 1983). Such 
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theories hint at the possibility that, and provide heuristics to assess situations in which 
different aspects of “doing science” may gain or lose centrality and maybe associated 
with more or less rewards. Previous research at the institutional level has shown that 
processes of accumulative advantage occur not only within, but also across the academic 
and industrial sectors (Owen-Smith, 2003). If this process holds at the individual level as 
well – as this thesis implies – then the scientists more likely to interact with the private 
sector will be the ones that have overdeveloped one particular dimension of their research 
capacity, namely the students with whom they collaborate, support through grants, teach 
and advice. This thesis considers the possibility that involvement with students, too, may 
be unequally disctibuted across scientists and that rewards on such involvement – in 
terms of interactions with industry - may vary accordingly. 
A Brief Overview of Past Research 
The theoretical and empirical background for the current research is presented in 
detail in Chapters 2 and 3. In essence, this research has examined different types of 
arrangements, the effects (benefits and downfalls) of such arrangements for both firms 
and universities, and the role of individual faculty members in promoting such 
relationships. Previous theories of complementarity and accumulative advantage will be 
particularly discussed, given that the mechanisms they conceptualize partially inform the 
reasoning underlying the current research. The major findings of this past research will 
now be briefly summarized to provide a basis for presenting in detail the goals, theory, 
specific research questions and contributions of the current research.   
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Types of Arrangements 
In sum, this research deals with the role of students in the context of university-
industry interactions at the individual level. In this context, students may play multiple 
roles and be embedded in variety of mechanisms. One such mechanism is that university-
industry interactions may provide direct inputs not only in terms of knowledge products, 
but also in terms of human capital. If so, such university-industry interactions may be de-
facto important channels through which students become coupled with private firms. 
Crucially, this is not an isolated market labor process, but one interrelated with 
university-industry interactions. No doubt, interactions between firms and universities 
vary considerably in form. In some cases, these arrangements follow closely to the 
“linear model”, in which a discovery by a university researcher is recognized by a 
business, which in turn collaborates with that scientist to exploit the finding (Pavitt, 
2006). A different potential scenario is one in which a firm contracts with a university 
researcher to execute a particular type of research (Poyago-Theotoky, Beath, & Siegel, 
2002). Another arrangement, perhaps currently the most common, is a blend between 
these two types of interactions. This relationship begins when the university research is 
still in embryonic stage, and additional work is then undertaken through collaboration 
between the researcher and industry, in which both parties engage in “experimentation” 
with the rudimentary results and explore their respective interests (Poyago-Theotoky, 
Beath, & Siegel, 2002). In this case much additional exploratory work needs to be done 
before commercial application or development even come to the agenda (Randazzese, 
1996). This type of experimentation involves the sustained cooperation of the university 
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scientist, and especially of graduate students , often involving students trained by the 
original researcher (Randazzese, 1996).  
Effect on Universities 
Some observers argue that universities in the United States have always 
maintained close ties with local industries and state economic development missions, and 
hence suggest that university-based applied research is not a new phenomenon (Crow & 
Tucker, 1999; David Mowery, 2001). No matter’ one’s take on the issue, there does seem 
to be a growing trend towards encouraging more commercially relevant research in 
universities as evidenced by the focus of the technology transfer legislation in the last two 
decades, as well as the growth of patenting, licensing and funding from industrial sources 
on US university campuses. How does this intensified collaboration interact with the 
primary role of universities, the training of skilled professionals? Is this function 
beginning to be neglected for the sake of alliances with industry? One answer to these 
questions simply states that industry and academia have always been intertwined, given 
that the most important method by which universities aid industry is by educating 
students, thereby increasing the scientific and engineering capacity of the labor pool from 
which industry selects its workforce (Leydesdorff & Etzkowitz, 1998; Williams, 1986). 
In this sense, universities and industry have been “interactive” for much longer than 
studies of boundary spanning arrangements and technology transfer presume. 
However, one result of over-emphasizing the recent growth of university-industry 
(boundary-spanning) arrangements is that evaluations of the effects of such arrangements 
tend to focus on concrete outcomes for one party or the other. In other words, the 
dynamics of the interaction is often reduced to discrete outputs and business gains of the 
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industry, or the costs and benefits for the university (Behrens & Gray, 2001). Less is 
known about the more subtle processes that may take place when universities are under 
pressure to accommodate more commercially relevant research as a part of their normal 
operations (e.g. in the everyday research lives of faculty), over and beyond the highly 
visible but limited in scale and scope arrangements such as research centers and 
university patenting and licensing.  
Are university researchers subject to conflicting demands or do they successfully 
integrate core academic functions such as student mentoring with newer roles initiated by 
the private sector? One approach to addressing this issue dichotomizes the worlds of 
academia and industry, and consequently discusses cross-sector collaboration in terms of 
“clash of cultures”, or conflicts of interest (Bray, 1990; Campbell, 1997; Campbell & 
Slaughter, 1999; Geiger, 1988; Hendee, 1990; Johns, Barnes, & Florencio, 2003; 
Korenman, 1993). The impact of such tensions on various aspects of universities has 
been widely studied. These include investigations of student identities (Gluck, 
Blumenthal, & Stoto, 1987; Hackett, Croissant, & Schneider, 1992), concerns over 
intellectual property (Blumenthal, Campbell, Anderson, Causino, & Louis, 1997; 
Kleinman & Kloppenburg, 1988; Newberg & Dunn, 2002), implications of academic 
entrepreneurship (Karen Seashore Louis, Blumenthal, Gluck, & Stoto, 1989; Murray, 
2004; Stephan & Levin, 1996), researchers’ attitudes to commercial involvement (Bogler, 
1994; Etzkowitz, 1998; Glaser & Bero, 2005; Y. S. Lee, 1996; Owen-Smith & Powell, 
2004), benefits for business and universities (Blumenthal, Causino, Campbell, & Louis, 
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1996; Fairweather, 1995), and the possible interference of industry in the research agenda 
of universities (Webster, 1994)1. 
Role of Individual Researchers 
There is a growing consensus among academics and administrators that 
university-industry collaborations allow for multiple routes to academic 
commercialization. Individual university faculty members also vary in their response to 
increased academic commercialization, and these choices, “have created a myriad of 
positions that are neither old nor new school, but instead combine characteristics of both” 
(Owen-Smith & Powell, 2004). Adjustments2 of work practices in response to increased 
industry involvement are more likely to be incremental than revolutionary. Incremental 
changes to individual and institutional behaviors in response to academic 
commercialization include diverse behaviors that form strong (and unpredictable) 
interdependencies, resulting in a tightly coupled system susceptible to generating 
unexpected consequences (L. Nelson, 1998). Individual university staff members play a 
formative, as well as a reactive role in such relationships between researcher and 
organization. Hence the behaviors of faculty members must be conceptualized not only as 
a by-product of academia-industry relations, but also as instruments of proactive 
adjustment, an autonomous driver or “shaper” of university-industry interactions. 
                                                 
1 Past research has focused largely on disciplines such as the life sciences, medical research and 
biotechnology. This is not surprising considering that these fields account for most of the commercial 




2 Note that this discussion does not condone the normative implications of the term “adjustments”, which 
would imply that university practices are static and are molded by the external environment. In contrast, 
academia is an active participant in these relationships.  
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Effect on Industry 
Within academia-industry interactions, firms appear to recognize the importance 
of acquiring trained researchers familiar with the latest research techniques, even if no 
direct transfer of technology takes place. In fact, the provision of such individuals is often 
ranked by firms as the greatest benefit provided by universities (Martin & Salter, 1996). 
This holds true even if a particular discipline as such has few direct industry applications 
(Pavitt, 2006). Thus for private organizations, interaction with universities is seen a 
means of acquiring trained professionals to sustain and expand their innovative activities.  
Existing studies support such reasoning by finding that companies typically value 
generic research skills in the new graduates, rather than the academic expertise in a 
particular field (Richard R. Nelson, 1987). “Industrial scientists and engineers almost 
always need training in the basic scientific principles and research techniques of their 
field, and providing this training is a central function of universities. Current academic 
research in a field, however, may or may not be relevant to technical advance in industry, 
even if academic training is important” (R. R. Nelson & Levin, 1986). Similarly, some 
critics of applied research in universities argue that the fundamentals of research are an 
integral part of student training. “The final, and most important justification for public 
subsidy is training in research skills, since private firms cannot fully benefit from 
providing it when researchers, once trained, can and do move elsewhere” (Pavitt, 1991). 
Usually firms cooperate with universities in the acquisition of skills and knowledge 
(Feller, Ailes, & Roessner, 2002), suggesting that they value not only specific research 




Other studies have examined arrangements between universities and organizations 
which explicitly attempt to reduce the boundaries between academic and industrial 
research. Even in this context, access to skilled graduate students is among the chief 
benefits private companies realize (Feller, Ailes, & Roessner, 2002; Roessner, Ailes, 
Feller, & Parker, 1998; Slaughter, Campbell, Holleman, & Morgan, 2002). Some firms 
even pursue long-term collaborations with the universities specifically to create 
“extended internal labor markets” for recruitment of graduates and scientists (Feller & 
Roessner, 1995; Lam, 2005).  
Previous Theories  
One could not fail to notice that previous studies, some of which discussed above, 
have not formally examined the role of students in the interaction between academia and 
industry at the individual level. They instead find and report the reported importance of 
student interactions for firms (Feller & Roessner, 1995; Roessner, Ailes, Feller, & Parker, 
1998), for university faculty (Slaughter, Campbell, Holleman, & Morgan, 2002), or  
discuss the issue in terms of the perceived effect on students (Behrens & Gray, 2001) 
(e.g., Behrens & Gray, 2001). Very few studies assess the role of students in the 
relationship between academics and industry. One notable exception, to be discussed 
later, is the work of Slaughter and colleagues (Slaughter, Campbell, Holleman, & 
Morgan, 2002). 
As stated above, the current research seeks to investigate the role of students as a 
possible important factor facilitating or even driving such collaborations, in an attempt to 
discover whether this factor can explain why some university scientists are more likely to 
interact with the private sector than are others. Currently this behavior is often attributed 
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to individual scientists’ productivity (Blumenthal, Gluck, Louis, Stoto, & Wise, 1986). 
Such attribution is plausible but also misleading because by focusing on single aspect of 
scientific “ability” one cannot discern what particular endowments or capabilities 
facilitate interactions with industry because all such variables are probably strongly 
associated with productivity yet may have different relative importance. Identifying 
patterns of student-scientist behavior – one of the most important and traditional role of 
scientists besides their role of producers of research publications – may enable the 
isolation of drivers of certain types of university-industry interaction. This research may 
thus also reveal drivers of certain goals regarding student mentoring, teaching and 
collaboration. 
The established linkage between productivity and industry interactions however 
provides an important hint: evaluating the nature of the links between “core academic” 
and “industrially relevant” behaviors may be better accomplished by models postulating 
complementarity and possible reinforcement, rather than those emphasizing 
independence, “clash of cultures” and otherwise lurking conflict. This thesis adopts the 
former, albeit less common approach, by exploring whether the student-related behaviors 
displayed by some academics may be conducive to industrial interactions. The current 
research thus tests a model which uses the concept of complementarity between faculty, 
students and private industry.  
The model assessed in the current research is partially informed by a peculiar 
phenomenon found in science and its conceptualizations. The phenomenon that provides 
a gateway into the possible conceptualization of students as assets in university-industry 
interactions is the “skewness” of the distribution of scientific inputs, most visible in the 
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distribution of publications (David, 1994). For reasons that are still poorly understood (in 
part of the great difficulty of measuring the phenomenon and acquiring the necessary 
data), scientists who manage to initially accumulate certain assets or outputs continue do 
so at disproportionally higher rates than scientists who did not yet make their mark. The 
theory of accumulative advantage shows similar mechanism in the case of recognition 
(Merton, 1968). This theory states that scientists who already possess significant 
reputational and research-capacity resources will receive disproportionally higher returns 
on such assets, relative to scientists or institutions in more disadvantaged position. 
Recently, Owen-Smith (2003) revealed that the phenomenon of accumulative advantage 
takes place not only within sectors (e.g. industry vs. academia), but also across sectors 
(e.g., universities who are more successful in producing high impact basic research tend 
to also be more successful in producing commercially relevant outcomes). He also 
provides evidence that this trend may hold at the individual level, and postulates a 
continuous interaction between faculty behaviors and industrial involvement (Owen-
Smith & Powell, 2004). In other words, interacting with industry is not something that 
suddenly alters the mindset of individual faculty members, but rather that individual 
researchers reevaluate their behaviors and strategies in the process of interacting with the 
private sector. 
While the current thesis does not attempt to apply the theory of accumulative 
advantage to the case of student involvement, this theory provides insight that allows 
conceptualizing the mechanisms through which over-developing certain aspects of the 
scientific role may result in certain rewards and advantages. Whether such advantages are 
“accumulative” is irrelevant for the current research. What is important for the current 
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conceptualization however is that investment in student interactions by university 
scientists may result indeed in certain “advantages” such as facilitated interactions with 
the private sector. 
The Current Research 
The reasoning put forward in this thesis conceptualizes students as an active 
component in the interactions between firms and universities. This thesis extends 
previous theories by claiming that interactions between industry and university students 
are a strong driver of university-industry interactions, not merely a convenient by-
product. This reasoning leads to the general hypothesis of this work which is that more 
intensive interactions with students lead to more intensive interactions with the private 
sectors. For example, interactions with students signal, among other things, engagement 
by university scientists in research with potential commercial applications. Such student-
faculty interactions are thus hypothesized to increase the capability and attractiveness 
(from the standpoint of industry), of university scientists for collaborative interactions 
with industry. 
In this proposed reasoning university students are conceived as central to 
researchers’ capacity to identify, act upon, and exploit interactions with industry. As a 
result, scientists who are more involved with students in various capacities are likely to 
be more able to enter and sustain interactions with industry (relative to colleagues less 
engaged with students). This mechanism can be interpreted as an enhancement of 
particular dimension of scientists’ scientific and technical human capital (Bozeman, 
Dietz, & Gaughan, 2001) and interactions with the private sector provide higher returns 
to developing such capacity. This may or may not be an accumulative process, however 
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this is of peripheral interest here. What is important to test however is whether such 
investments in student-related behaviors will indeed result in more intensive industrial 
interactions.   
Previous research at the institutional level has shown that excelling in traditional 
roles of universities such as high quality basic research enhances their ability to succeed 
in commercially relevant activities (Owen-Smith, 2003). The current theory proposes that 
this process should hold at the individual level, suggesting that scientists are more likely 
to interact with the private sector if they have overdeveloped one particular dimension of 
their research capacity, namely supporting and collaborating with students. This thesis 
empirically assesses whether excelling in one of the dimensions of the traditional 
scientific role – interactions with students – also facilitates excelling in interactions with 
industry. This conceptualization postulates that involvement with students represents a 
dimension of scientists’ research capacity that is particularly well suited to facilitate 
interactions with industry. From this basis it can be predicted that the presence of “more” 
of this research capacity places the scientist in a position to enter collaborative 
relationships with industry more often than scientists who are less involved with students. 
In other words, those members of the faculty who invest more in student relationships 
have both “more to offer” to industry (e.g., a pool of labor to allocate to projects of 
interest to industry, possible future employees), as well as “more to get” from industry 
(e.g., a capability to explore and act upon research “leads” from industry that are labor 
intensive and would require sufficient expertise to explore, but at low cost). 
The current research seeks to assess whether university scientists’ involvement 
with students (e.g., grant support, collaboration, teaching) influences the nature of these 
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scientists’ future relations with private sector companies. The findings should contribute 
to an explanation of why and under what circumstances some university researchers 
interact with the private sector, while their colleagues of similar backgrounds and 
credentials do not. A second purpose of this thesis is to assess the dynamics of the 
relationships between universities and firms. This should allow practical application of 
this research to the improvement of academia-industry relations. 
Research questions 
The overarching research problem addressed in this thesis is whether or not 
university scientists’ relations with students stimulate these scientists’ interactions with 
the private sector. More specific research questions generated by this are as follows. 
1) How does grant support of students relate to interactions with industry? Is supporting 
more students through grants associated with a higher probability of entering industry 
collaboration?  With higher intensity of industry interactions? Is it particularly strongly 
associated with some versus other specific types of industry collaboration?  
2) How does research collaboration with students relate to interactions with industry? Is 
research collaborations with students associated with a higher probability of entering 
industry collaboration?  With higher intensity of industry interaction? Is it particularly 
strongly associated with some versus other specific types of industry collaboration? 
3) How is teaching related to interactions with industry? Is spending more time on 
teaching, as a particular form of student involvement, also associated with a higher 
probability of entering industry collaboration?  With higher intensity of industry 
interaction? Is it particularly strongly associated with some versus other specific types of 
industry collaboration?  Or is there a tradeoff between teaching and interactions with the 
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private sector - do scientists try to minimize their teaching involvement in order to pursue 
industrial collaborations? 
4) How is interest in mentoring students related to interactions with industry? Does more 
interest in mentoring mean more aptitude in cultivating resources of interest to industry 
and thus lead to a higher probability of entering industry collaboration? Is it also 
associated with higher intensity of industry interaction? Is it particularly strongly 
associated with some versus other specific types of industry collaboration? 
5) How is advising of students related to interactions with the private sector? Are 
scientists who invest more effort in advising students also more likely to be more 
involved in private sector interactions? Are they more likely to interact with the private 
sector more intensively? Are they more likely to enter some versus other types of 
industry interactions? 
The effects of these types of scientist-student involvement are examined across a 
spectrum of industry-related behaviors.  
The contributions of the study 
The importance of the current research lies in uncovering the interrelations 
between researcher-student relationships and collaboration between the researcher and 
the private sector. The research questions are designed to investigate whether interactions 
with industry are becoming an integral, complementary part of core activities (such as 
training of students) or whether there is a trade-off between the core and industry-related 
activities of university scientists. Crucially, this research will demonstrate how two 
behaviors typically considered as antithetical may in fact reinforce one another. In other 
words, how everyday academic activities such as teaching and student mentoring may in 
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fact enhance certain types of interactions with industry. In doing so, this study will both 
inform some current policy debates regarding the desirability and feasibility of increased 
interactions with industry of US universities and will also contribute to the understanding 
of the factors that facilitate and drive such relationships. 
The conceptualization advanced and tested in this thesis suggests that student-
related behaviors of faculty are an important asset that in fact enhances scientists’ 
capacity to interact with the private sector, but are not a load that scientists “shed” in 
order to be able to pursue industrial opportunities. The results from testing this 
conceptualization have implications both for policy and theory. 
By addressing these questions this thesis will provide a better explanation of 
university-industry interactions at the individual level, in which the role of students may 
be one of a key component or a driver. In answering such questions, this research will 
also contribute to understanding the mechanisms through which university-industry 
interaction occurs at the individual level. Studying the role of student interaction within 
this context will also provide insights into the ways in which firms realize the benefits 
embodied in students. That is, this research will also indirectly aid understanding of the 
way in which graduate students can be direct inputs into firms’ innovative capabilities. 
By identifying the complementarities between a core function (e.g., teaching and 
mentoring) and a desired function (increased relations with industry) this research will 
contribute to the better understanding of interactions between individual faculty members 
and the private sector. The dominant explanation for the pattern of university-industry 
interactions (as mentioned above) is productivity. The current research proposal suggests 
that simplifying the issue down to productivity may minimize the effect of particular 
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endowments, characteristics and behaviors of university scientists that increase the 
likelihood and intensity of their collaborations with industry. In particular, involvement 
with students while a traditional role of university scientist, has been under-emphasized 
in the academic rewards system. In today’s context of increasing competition for 
industrial funds and forging closer linkages with industry, this dimension of scientists’ 
roles may enable them to be better positioned to claim and utilize the rewards resulting 
from industrial interaction. More importantly, this thesis suggests one particular 
mechanism through which university scientists’ competencies get utilize by the private 
sector. While scholarly ability as measured through publications is always important, it 
does not provide explanation of how and why interactions with industry occur. 
Involvement with students may be one such particular mechanism through which 
scientists enable interactions with the private sector. 
The findings will thus have ramifications for policy makers, and university 
administrators and those interested in technology transfer and economic development. 
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2. RELATED STUDIES 
 
Although very few studies have pursued specifically the problem of interest in 
this proposal – the implications of faculty relationships with students for the interactions 
of these faculty with industry – a larger family of studies, taken up in accord, contains the 
necessary propositions that can be weaved into a conceptualization of faculty-industry 
interactions explicitly accounting for the role of students in these interactions. 
The purpose of this review is not simply to summarize different studies having 
varying degrees of relevance to the research topic of this thesis, but 1) to demonstrate that 
the questions considered in this work have been partially, at least in passing, considered 
or implied in almost all branches of the science and technology policy literature, that 2) in 
such studies this consideration however is partial or not of primary interest and 3) that 
synthesis of the relevant propositions scattered through this literature can serve as a basis 
of a model giving explicit and systematic consideration of the role of students in the 
university-industry interactions at the individual level. As a result, the sections of the 
review below are accompanied by my own commentary pointing up deficiencies 
concerning the conceptualization of students. These commentaries I then summarize at 
the end of the chapter in a “meta-model” in which I position and formalize the 
hypotheses concerning the relationships between student- and industry-related faculty 
behaviors. Therefore at the conclusion of this chapter my task shifts from review of the 
extant literature to the (albeit selective) synthesis thereof. 
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Students as an input in private sector innovation 
Policy efforts to enhance university-industry interactions have focused mostly on 
making it easier for private companies to access and appropriate the pools of scientific 
knowledge produced in universities, while this knowledge is typically perceived in the 
form of “deliverables” to be produced and offered to industry. However, research is only 
one of the industrially relevant missions of the universities, and not the oldest one. The 
educational mission of universities is comprised by the recognition of talent, training and 
research (Schultz, 1976), with the more recent addition of economic development 
mission. 
The important government objective to provide public education aside, 
justification of publicly supported training for students is quite similar to the justification 
of supporting public R&D. Private firms need trained employees to perform their day-to-
day as well as innovative activities. Some of these activities demand firm-specific 
knowledge (acquired on-the-job), but most of them demand generic skills3 that are 
applicable in multiple settings. In such a case, in spite of the benefits associated with 
having educated employees possessing such generic skills, most firms would have  
disincentives to provide costly training for employees who may then “take” the new skills 
embodied in them and transfer to another organization - hence the term “transferable 
skills” (Becker, 1975). Becker’s conclusions was that workers, not firms receive the 
complete returns on general skills (Becker, 1975). The implications of this conclusion are 
that 1) workers should (and will) bear the costs of acquiring such general, or transferable, 
                                                 
3 “Generic” in no way is synonymous with lower level or “basic” skills. Some generic skills, such as 
mastery of certain scientific and engineering principles, deep knowledge of specific technological area, can 
be extremely sophisticated. 
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skills (i.e. they will invest in their human capital) and 2) firms will underinvest in general 
training (because of their inability to capture the full returns on it).  
While the first implication above concerns mostly individuals’ decisions 
regarding the investment in their human capital (e.g. through tuition and foregone salary 
while receiving education), the second concerns the major role of the universities as 
providers of such general training thus correcting for the market failure resulting from 
limited appropriability of returns on generic skills by firms. Becker did not consider the 
underinvestment in general skills to be a problem: neither conceptually (he implied that 
firms don’t need much general skills anyway) nor practically (several decades ago, when 
his work was published, the “knowledge inputs” in the economy were of lesser 
importance relative to nowadays). Subsequent research however has shown that firms do, 
in fact, invest in general training (Stevens, 1994), and more importantly – that the 
knowledge, skills and problem-solving capacity embodied in the new university 
graduates firms employ may be of much greater importance than any specific expertise in 
particular field (R. R. Nelson & Levin, 1986). The “active fusion” (Tomlison & Milaes, 
1999) between the knowledge brought by the worker and the one generated within the 
firm enhances both the worker’s human capital and leads to modification of firm’s 
capabilities thus enhancing its innovative capabilities (Tomlison & Milaes, 1999). 
As innovative activities in business firms have become more professionalized 
(and university research more specialized), universities now play more important role in 
providing the trained researchers for firms to perform their innovative activities (Pavitt, 
2006). The increasing importance of advanced scientific problem-solving skills combined 
with the possible underinvestment in such type of training helps to elucidate the 
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importance of graduate education in the context of university-industry relations and 
private sector innovation. While firm specific knowledge of certain processes and 
technologies is a prerequisite for maintaining employment in an organization, in the 
contemporary knowledge intensive economies, the capability of employees to acquire the 
firm specific knowledge at the first place, and then contribute to the development of 
firm’s knowledge capacity, is dependent on a system of a science and engineering 
education that prepares graduates for careers in industrial firms by equipping them with 
training in scientific principles and tools. The more advanced the knowledge of an 
employee, the greater his or her ability to meaningfully utilize external sources of 
information to use in in-firm innovations (Gibbons & Johnston, 1974). 
This means that there is a long way before individuals are molded into employees 
who can actually contribute to knowledge intensive industrial innovation. This process is 
largely borne by the higher education system. The future private employees need first to 
be recognized as possessing the minimum levels of “talent” to perform in knowledge 
occupations (and the ones who lack ability or motivation are filtered out), and then 
trained in the set of generic science skills that would make them capable of adapting to 
the requirements of the industrial firm. 
Universities, as part of their mission bear the considerable costs of this pre-
processing of the human resources used by firms. In doing so they contribute to solving 
serious and costly problems for private firms, namely 1) the lengthy and uncertain search 
process of identifying eligible employees – by recognizing “talent” (Schultz, 1976) and 
2) by providing this narrowed pool of eligible employees with the appropriate training 
and stamping them with the “stamp of approval” of the educational system (the university 
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diplomas) certifying their minimally acceptable mastery of a set of standardized 
knowledge. 
New scientific knowledge, albeit published, is not truly freely available to 
companies until is has been incorporated in the educational curriculum (Gibbons & 
Johnston, 1974). Therefore, the importance of the continuous stream of students is not 
simply in the assurance provided by the university system that they meet the minimum 
standards, but also that every next cohort of students arguably possesses more advanced 
and up to date knowledge than the previous one. Secondly, and more important in the 
context of “real time” UIRs and graduate education, interactions with university faculty 
and their students gives firms an opportunity to access the new knowledge embodied in 
students even before it is published, and much earlier than this new knowledge could be, 
perhaps, incorporated in the educational curriculum. 
The possession of a university diploma certifies that an individual is equipped 
with the minimum capacity to develop firm-specific knowledge. The diploma is a formal 
credential, which, advertised on the labor market by the recent university graduate 
looking for paid employment, arguably leads to a successful match with a firm in need of 
the knowledge resources embodied in this graduate. However, considering how broad is 
the contemporary higher education (at the undergraduate level) and considering how 
diverse the knowledge needs of companies, this process of “matching” on the labor 
market implies a tradeoff between breadth of the higher education and ability to 
contribute to sophisticated private sector innovation (which implies depth of knowledge). 
The possession of an undergraduate diploma is, in most cases, a ticket to an entry level 
position in a company, where the new employees are subject to considerable on-the-job 
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training before they reach levels of experience allowing them to contribute to innovating 
processes within the firm. 
Knowledge intensive companies, on the other hand, have labor needs not easily 
satisfied by entry level diploma holders. For example, prestigious industrial laboratories 
and small startup companies alike, need employees with advanced training, possessing 
considerably larger pools of knowledge and insight into their respective fields, mastery of 
particular technological areas, or a portfolio of advanced research skills typically not 
found in undergraduates. Such employees are generally produced by the system of post-
graduate education (at the master’s and doctoral level). Since the more advanced the 
educational degree, the more specialized the knowledge becomes, it may be argued, that 
it is increasingly more difficult to “match” graduates possessing very specialized 
knowledge in certain area, with equally small set of firms specializing in similar area (for 
example, consider an undergraduate with degree in aerospace engineering capable of 
finding employment in almost any engineering design or manufacturing business, such as 
the automobile industry, aerospace, civil engineering etc. versus a PhD level expert in 
energetic materials for whom only 2-3 possible employment options may exist that 
correspond to his level of education and capable of meaningfully utilizing his specialty). 
For the purposes of this thesis, I speculate that one of the key aspects of 
university-industry relationships involves the process of matching graduates with 
advanced degrees to industrial firms in which they find employment. I do not argue that 
this is the dominant mode through which labor markets for graduates with advanced 
degree operate, however I do assert that the extent to which graduate placements are a 
result of university-industry relationships is not a by-product of such relationships, but 
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may be an integral component of such interactions and may be expected by both sides in 
the interaction and may even drive certain types of university-industry interactions. Thus 
education is a more deliberate input in private sector innovation than is usually suggested. 
Moreover, since the work of students in the context of such interactions is a major part of 
their training, it can be argued that students in university-industry interactions are given 
the opportunity to both be identified by prospective employers and to acquire the skills 
demanded by such prospective employers in a context of a research partnership between 
their institution, scientific advisor, and a private company. As a result, university-industry 
relationships, besides accomplishing certain research goals, also assist in the process 
“scanning for and identification of talent” – something in which both the professors and 
the companies are interested. 
Albeit it is widely acknowledged that the educational mission of the universities is 
crucial for supplying the economy with the human resources needed by the private firms 
to innovate, it is much less acknowledged that the processes through which the matching 
of university graduates (with advanced degrees) and industry needs occurs is not 
necessarily on a commodified market on which graduates find companies (or vice versa) 
and the market clears quickly. This scenario is fairly unrealistic. While, of course, it is 
possible and desirable to follow demand and supply of scientists and engineers at the 
aggregate level (such studies are considered in the next section), this type of analysis says 
nothing about the mechanisms through which eligible scientists actually get coupled with 
private companies – not an unimportant problem considering that the successful match is 
costly and becomes increasingly more difficult as the degree of specialization and 
sophistication of the knowledge in question increases. At the same time, finding such 
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advanced scientists to work on innovative activities in firms is increasingly more 
important for high technology companies since they need such employees who can 
quickly identify and assemble the knowledge necessary for the firm to sustain its 
innovative products. 
It may be the case that university-industry interactions solve market failures not 
only in regard to the type of knowledge produced, but also in regard to identifying and 
training to mutual benefit, the students that both universities and private firms need to 
sustain their research activities. Thus I speculate that students might be not only a 
resource input used in accomplishing university industry interactions, but even a driver of 
such interactions, on par with other goals of such interactions. This is one of the key 
contributions of this study. 
The importance of S&T workforce for the national innovation system is widely 
recognized. Such studies, based predominantly on conventional S&E indicators, and 
sometimes on survey data, are concerned predominantly with monitoring training, 
occupational, supply and demand trends in scientific, engineering, technical and 
mathematical fields at the national, sector, or industry level (Beltramo, Paul, & Perret, 
2001; Fox & Stephan, 2001). 
S&T workforce issues 
A set of works have examined the extent universities fulfill their function to 
provide quality workforce for industry. Romer (2000) complains that while the public 
policy in US has went great lengths to encourage the private sector utilization of science 
and particularly the demand for scientists and engineers with advanced degrees, it has 
done little to ensure that the educational system encourages the supply response 
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necessary to satisfy this demand (Romer, 2000). He asserts that the educational system 
has failed to meet this demand not only in terms of “raw numbers” (at the undergraduate 
level - a claim also supported by de Grip & Willems, 2003), but also because the 
dominant forms of training and support of graduate students (especially PhDs) are geared 
exclusively towards academic employment in research universities – an institutional 
training context that “glorifies the academic career ad the expense of other scientific 
career paths” (Gaughan & Robin, 2004). Thus, considering that the production of PhDs 
has been growing through the 1990s, and that the dominant support mechanisms are the 
research assistantships, the outcome is increased supply of PhDs (“produced as a side 
effects of basic research” – Romer, 2002, p. 24) trained for research academic jobs at a 
time when the job prospects of getting such positions mostly decline (Romer, 2000).  
According to Romer, the increase of non-faculty appointments happened not 
because of the raw increase in the number of PhDs, but in spite of the narrow research 
oriented training they received, and is also partially accounted for by sharp increase in 
post-doctoral positions, as well as by increased preferences among graduate students for 
non-academic careers combined with perceptions of bleak future in academia and 
improving prospects in industry (Fox & Stephan, 2001). The same study also mentions 
that it might be the case that there is oversupply of graduates, since university scientists 
have strong incentives to recruit graduate students and post-docs to work in their labs, but 
little incentive to mentor and educate them (Fox & Stephan, 2001). Ehrenberg (1991) 
identifies that the propensity of recent PhDs to work increasingly for industry is in part a 
response to higher relative salaries in industry and also related to the types of academic 
jobs available. Most students enter graduate school with the expectation of working in the 
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academic sector, but desire such positions mostly in the research 1 universities and 
substantially less so in 4 year institutions. Considering that such top research jobs are 
scarce, industry becomes more appealing (Stephan, 1996). 
Among the variables considered in explaining early career outcomes of Ph.D. 
graduates, studies have shown mixed effects of having been supported through an 
industrial grant during the graduate study with some showing that industrial support has 
positive effects on the likelihood of obtaining permanent academic position 
(Mangematin, 2000), but also that the cost of switching to industrial career from 
academia is lower (Mangematin, 2000), while others find no effect of industrial support 
on early career outcomes (Gaughan & Robin, 2004). 
Studies of supply and demand of scientists have identified factors to explain entry 
in scientific occupation, such as salary, salary in alternative occupations (Stephan, 1996). 
Other important variables identified included cohort size, type of support while in school, 
debt level upon graduation from college (Stephan, 1996). 
National studies of S&T workforces have little to say about the employment of 
scientists and engineers except to register the general trends in the quantities of scientists 
and engineers and their distributions by qualification, activity, sector and occupation 
(OECD, 1999). Also, due to the high level of aggregation and rigidity of the S&E 
indicators, such studies fail to adequately capture multidisciplinary research and research 
occupations mobility – for example, as is often the case today, when researchers pursue 
interdisciplinary, multidisplinary and cross-disciplinary work integrating various tools, 
methods, data, concepts and theories to address complex research questions (Feeney & 
Bozeman, 2005). In fact, such indicators may hide some of the most interesting indicators 
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of processes taking place in the context of university industry interactions and affecting 
students’ career outcomes. Such indicators also prevent researchers from gathering 
adequate information on narrow or emerging fields (Feeney & Bozeman, 2005), which 
however may have great commercial potential and thus could also be developed in the 
context of university-industry relations. 
In addition to such limitations – part explained with the nature of the data, in part 
explained by their research focus - the above mentioned studies on S&T workforce 
exhibit two peculiar characteristics. First, training and educational policies in a 
technology transfer context are considered at a “system level”, as interaction of different 
system level policy variables such as “the educational system”, the “economy”, and 
“industry”. Second, and more important, the channels through which the eligible and 
trained students end up in the private sector seem to be under-researched. In fact, one 
may get the impression that universities “spit” trained graduates on the open labor 
market, where firms engaged in a search of appropriate employees “find” them.  
Studies conducted at such level, while drawing attention to very important trends 
in nation’s management of S&T human resources, do not provide sufficient insight into 
what are the circumstance in which individuals make career choices, as well as what is 
the relative importance of different constraints and opportunities they fact during their 
graduate studies. The context of graduate studies for many students increasingly is 
affected, or consists entirely of, research undertaken within UIRs. 
My proposed conceptualization of the role of students in the context of university-
industry interactions states that in many more than recognized cases university-industry 
interactions – and interactions between private companies and faculty in particular – 
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contain a component of “identification and recruitment of talent,” namely students linked 
to a university faculty, and involved in his or her research. I propose to consider students 
as an explicit variable, driving to some extent the university-industry interactions at the 
individual level, as opposed to considering it as a by-product of such interactions or as a 
mass affected by a process in which it has no role. Students are an essential link between 
university scientists and private companies, and might even be an important driver of 
certain types of university-industry interactions. For example, if students indeed have 
such a role, they could facilitate faculty interactions with the private sector, and also 
motivate the private sector to seek interactions with the universities. 
Such conceptualization brings the issue of student role in private sector 
innovation a little more down to earth, without ignoring its macro-implications. The 
conceptualization proposed in this thesis is of students not as faceless flow of graduates 
from universities to industry, but as an identifiable and therefore specific and unique 
component of university-industry interactions at the individual level. It is puzzling, 
however, that this consideration of students is also largely absent from the family of 
studies examining the problem of UI technology transfer and the university scientists’ 
interactions with the private sector outlined in the next sections. To the extent considered, 
students are considered either as a “given” or as an entity upon which UI interactions 
have “effects.” Even though such a role for students seems more than plausible, it has 
somehow escaped the attention of the studies of UI interaction.  
Policy assumptions and realities of UIRs 
The market failure paradigm (and its reincarnations ) of public support of science 
served as the basis for many interventions aimed at facilitating private sector utilization 
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of university technology or of stimulating private sector research. Since the 1980s, many 
such initiatives4 have been implemented in US. While I will not consider them in detail, 
their distinguishing characteristics are that they either 1) attempt to provide incentives to 
companies to engage in more R&D, 2) provide incentives, mandates (or both) to public 
R&D institutions to engage in technology transfer efforts, or to facilitate the university-
industry interface or 3) recognize that the use of knowledge in universities is not costless 
to firms and provide different means to facilitate the adoption of university technology by 
firms.  
These initiatives targeted issues such as intellectual property rights and 
institutional and economic incentives to undertake cooperative research. They also 
created more favorable conditions for public and private entities to “come together” and 
pursue joint research projects. The common characteristic of these initiatives is their view 
that universities support innovation in industry primarily through the production by 
universities of “deliverables” for commercialization such as patented discoveries (R. 
Nelson, Sampat, Ziedonis, & Mowery, 2004). Another assumption in such initiatives is 
that the most important channels through which university-industry interaction advances 
industrial innovation and economic growth are the formal channels of licensing and spin-
off company formation. 
This policy over-emphasis on deliverables and formal channels is indicative of a 
conceptual gap of interest for this study. This gap has to deal with the “interaction” 
component of university industry interactions (Geisler, 1995). Even though university-
industry interactions are studied extensively, in most cases the attention is devoted to the 
incidence or products or the interaction, rather on the interaction itself. It is often 
                                                 
4 E.g., Bayh-Dole act, Technology transfer act, Cooperative research and development act 
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forgotten that the interaction is not a discrete event to “ship” a specific deliverable (e.g. a 
license or prototype) to industry, but an ongoing relationship, not exhausted by a set of 
discrete transfers of knowledge. The necessary “continuity” of interactions is explained 
by the substantial recognition and absorption costs for firms, costs that are present even 
in absence of any institutional barriers to use university resources and technology – first 
to recognize commercial potential in university invention, then to assess its feasibility, 
and then to undertake the additional development work to actually commercialize it. As a 
result, even if all the conditions to ensure easy availability of knowledge to use by firms 
are met, the recognition and absorption of this knowledge by firms is still a costly 
process, and the formal channels for such absorption, while important, seem to not be 
sufficient. 
Many studies have pointed out that publicly produced knowledge, albeit freely 
available, is certainly not “free” to use. Utilizing knowledge requires that some internal 
capacity to comprehend it and actually put it to use already exists (Cohen & Levinthal, 
1990). In firms, this problem is remedied by performing internal R&D and by ensuring 
that the firm possesses qualified personnel capable of recognizing and acting upon 
technology innovation opportunities. Confirming this, Randazzesse (1996) also identified 
that the most effective technology transfer channels (as perceived by faculty and industry 
partners) are the ones involving the highest degree of human interaction (through faculty 
site visits, graduating students). Surprisingly, he also identifies that these are among the 
least used mechanisms (Randazzese, 1996). This surprise is, of course, in part due to the 
difficulty of “formalizing” inherently unpredictable process such as the ongoing 
communication between research partners. Nevertheless, the policy focus on formal 
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(albeit specifically designed) arrangements to facilitate university-industry interactions 
will fall short of success unless it recognizes and exploits, to the extent possible, the 
potential of less structured (i.e., informal and non-contractual), but extremely important 
interactions. 
Focusing on the role of students offers up an interesting middle ground to study 
the importance of the human component of technology transfer, without entering the 
realm of the fuzzy discussion of what exactly constitutes informal interactions and what 
are exactly its outcomes. While the role of students in technology transfer may be best 
understood in the context of informal faculty-industry interactions, the implications of 
students are all but intangible. As Randazzese remarked, “one of the best ways to transfer 
technology is to transfer the people associated with it” (Randazzese, 1996, p. 397).  
In the case of students, this occurs not only after these students graduate and find 
industrial employment, but also while they are students and work for faculty interacting 
with industry. In doing so they are essential in the experimentation phase of adoption of 
new technology where they can work with industry personnel on resolving technical 
problems which, while important for the commercialization of the technology, may be of 
little value and interest for the faculty member. Similar mechanism is acknowledged by 
Thursby and Thursby (2004) who found that 77% of the licensed inventions required 
some form of further faculty involvement in the commercialization, in order to make 
further development possible. 
This mechanism may be far more common than generally acknowledged. For 
example there are several ways in which universities and firms may get involved in 
cooperative research, which can be placed on a continuum ranging from a situation where 
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the firm contracts out certain research to be accomplished by the university to a situation 
where the university develops a commercial product and contracts with a private 
company to produce it (Poyago-Theotoky, Beath, & Siegel, 2002). 
However, the most common scenario may be in between these extremes and be an 
intermediate situation, when the university has conducted some basic research that has 
potential commercial applications. These applications are still in an embryonic stage, 
although the fundamental work has been made available through the official channels. 
Only a fraction of the knowledge is codified, and a lot of additional work is required to 
develop these new ideas into knowledge material actually amenable to commercialization 
and development efforts. In such cases, the necessary information is conveyed within an 
ongoing university-industry relationship, where the firm and university scientists 
exchange information while the firm attempts to commercialize the embryonic invention 
(Poyago-Theotoky, Beath, & Siegel, 2002). Again, this process is likely to require the 
involvement of the scientists inventors as well as the continuous assistance of their 
graduate students. The students may not be the primary inventors but in most cases are 
qualified to provide the assistance needed in post-invention phases. 
To sum up, most of university-industry interactions are likely to be between the 
direct funding of specific research by industry and university spin-offs, in a fuzzier area 
where both firms and university scientists jointly explore problems of mutual interest and 
where both sides get what they need. For scientist this being a (funded) opportunity to 
explore new challenging problems, while for industry this is an opportunity to acquire 
deeper insight in a technological area while solving specific technological problem 
(Slaughter, Campbell, Holleman, & Morgan, 2002). In this work environment the role of 
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students is more than likely to be crucial. In order to sustain such work environments, 
scientists and industrial partners alike need to rely on a pool of qualified personnel, 
capable of accommodating the experimental and technical work associated with such 
semi-directed searches of solutions to problem. In this experimentation stage students are 
perhaps more crucial than any other collaborators that a scientist may have as the work 
involved is perhaps valuable for the student training, but of little or no interest for 
scientist’s colleagues. Hence both the increased dependence and reliance on students for 
research in interactions with industry relative to “normal” university research. To 
paraphrase Slaughter and colleagues (2002) “one can’t be a professor unless he does 
research, and a professor cannot do research without graduate students” (Slaughter, 
Campbell, Holleman, & Morgan, 2002, p. 288), but probably one can’t even be 
considered for research partnership with industry unless he already has a stable pool of 
graduate students. While for collaborations with other scientists it may be sufficient that 
researchers simply share common interest, data and the like, the presence of students is 
perhaps a necessary condition for any interaction with industry to occur. 
Some authors identify this experimentation phase as a separate stage in the 
technology transfer process, and argue that it is critical precondition determining whether 
or not an invention will get transferred at all (Randazzese, 1996). I argue that students are 
a critical asset in accomplishing this stage because they possess the skills to solve the 
implementation problems expected in such post-invention stage and their involvement 
may be desired both by the sponsoring scientist (who may have little interest in the more 
technical problem solving activities expected in this stage) and by the firm (who has the 
double incentive of utilizing the know-how embodied in students to solve the 
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commercialization problems, and to also identify and train potential future employees in 
the process). 
Considering these features of students, it is surprising that they have not been 
devoted more space in studies of university-industry interactions. Firms are certainly 
looking for a variety of outcomes when interacting with universities, such as solutions to 
particular problems, new ideas, new directions of research, and there is nothing that 
implies that the “look up” and evaluation of promising students is not an integral part of 
this process, but a separate activity. It seems that, while not necessarily so in reality, 
according to technology transfer and UIR scholarship, students and firms meet mostly 
through career fairs and human resource offices, but not while involved in research of 
mutual interest under the auspices of a sponsoring university professor. Studies of UI 
interactions mention students only in passing. 
Technology transfer channels in UIRs 
A set of studies has highlighted the variety and importance of channels of 
technology transfer from academia and industry other than patenting and licensing or 
startup company formation. Researchers have shown that university-industry links are 
characterized with much broader set of activities (Agrawal, 2001; Agrawal & Henderson, 
2002; Cohen, Nelson, & Walsh, 2002). In particular Cohen et al. (2002), document that, 
with the usual exception of pharmaceuticals, the most important channels for transferring 
university knowledge to industry include informal interactions such as conferences and 
meetings, formal consulting, hiring graduate students and personnel exchanges (Cohen, 
Nelson, & Walsh, 2002). The process of UI knowledge transfers occurs through multiple 
channels such as personnel mobility, informal contacts, consulting relationships, joint 
 
 38
research projects, and patents; licenses and new startups represent only a portion of this 
process. 
Most studies of university industry relations are predominantly descriptive, and 
focus either on the expectations of the parties of what would they gain, or on the actual or 
perceived benefits accrued from the participation (Geisler, 2001). Overall, there is void of 
information about the nature of the industry-university interaction that occurs when the 
two informally partner in an research partnership (Hagedoorn, Link, & Vonortas, 2000). 
Such informal interactions (between universities and industry) generally aim at 
exchanges of up-to-date knowledge, problem solving, sharing of equipment and 
instrumentation, gaining access to students and faculty, the solution of specific problems 
(Mansfield & Lee, 1996). However, some observers caution that the expectations that 
academic researchers will shift their work to more applied and industrially relevant work 
is unwarranted, and more importantly – inappropriate, a view shared even by industry 
representatives themselves (Rosenberg & Nelson, 1994). Therefore, the key question of 
interest becomes not whether universities successfully meet the needs of industry by 
“working for industry”, but whether they are successful in exploiting the 
complementarities that reside by definition in these relationships. 
Some studies have identified such complementarities at the individual, informal 
level. For example, Kreiner and Schultz (1993) characterize university-industry 
interaction in the Danish biotechnology community as an informal barter economy 
wherein private companies and universities “liberally” share information per community 
norms that encourage such free flow of information (Kreiner & Schultz, 1993). 
Boardman and Bozeman (2006) draw similar findings from case study, characterizing 
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informal interaction across sectors as uncodified barter systems employing norms that 
may or may not become institutionalized with time. Slaughter et al. (2002) demonstrate 
that students are crucial component of such informal bartering, and are the “token of 
exchange” given by professors to industry in exchange of funding (Slaughter, Campbell, 
Holleman, & Morgan, 2002). 
Studies of UIRs that explicitly consider students 
The presence of students in universities (and university hosted technology-
transfer initiatives) may be the key distinguishing factor of universities relative to other 
public science and technology suppliers, such as the federal laboratories (Bozeman, 
2000). “The presence of students makes a remarkable difference in the output, culture 
and utility of research” (Bozeman, 2000, p. 636). Students are not only a “reservoir of 
cheap labor” supporting university research, but are also means of technology transfer 
through post-graduate job placements and they “often provide the social glue holding 
together many faculty scientists and the companies they work for” (Bozeman, 2000). 
While the firms seem to acknowledge that the most important outcomes of interactions 
with universities is access to students they could hire (Roessner, Ailes, Feller, & Parker, 
1998), scholars of technology transfer do not seem to give this phenomenon the direct 
attention it deserves. The underestimation of the role of students is evident in labeling 
them as partially responsible for “random technology transfer” (Nataraajan & Chawla, 
1994), while in fact their role may be quite central in university-company interactions. 
While the technology transfer literature has considered numerous “transfer media”, the 
role of students seems to have been neglected. 
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Although many studies focus on graduate student socialization, they rarely 
specifically identify graduate students involved in university-industry relations 
(Anderson, 1996, 2000; Anderson & Louis, 1994; Anderson, Louis, & Earle, 1994; 
Anderson, Oju, & Falkner, 2001). Nevertheless, a set of studies highlights the importance 
of students in university industry interactions either in terms of effects on students, or in 
terms of benefits to firms and specifically deals with students in the context of university-
industry relations. Studies from the first group raise concerns such as that industrial 
involvement leads to restrictions on intellectual property and resulting ability to publish, 
thus potentially having negative impacts on these students’ careers (Slaughter, Campbell, 
Holleman, & Morgan, 2002). More importantly however, Slaughter et al. show that 
graduate students are in fact the “token of exchange,” the “gift” from the professors to 
industry in exchange for funding support. Unfortunately, the content of this promising 
study does not match well its title. The authors focus predominantly on the implications 
of interactions with industry for the academic freedom of students (as perceived and 
interpreted by faculty) and devote only the last section of the paper on speculating about  
different mechanisms through which graduate students link university professors and 
industry. (Slaughter, Campbell, Holleman, & Morgan, 2002). 
With the above exception, only a few studies address how interactions with 
industry shape graduate student training (e.g. Bozeman & Corley, 2004; Croissant & 
Restivo, 2001; K. S. Louis, Anderson, & Rosenberg, 1995). Croissant and Restivo (2001) 
for example report that student participation in industry-related programs does not appear 
to change their skills and career decisions, but powerfully and positively elevates their 
valuation of academic values such as peer recognition and intrinsic rewards. Louis et al. 
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(1995) report that entrepreneurial behaviors at the level of the department might be 
related to scientific misconduct and research values. Bozeman and Corley (2004) report 
that faculty who have stronger industrial orientation are also more likely to be mentors 
(Bozeman & Corley, 2004). 
Conclusions and preliminary model 
If one reads them closely enough, most of the studies mentioned above provide 
(albeit in many cases indirectly or even unintentionally) a set of propositions regarding 
the role of students in the interactions between the academic and industrial sectors. What 
is needed is a model to tie these disconnected propositions, explicit and implicit, into a 
more stable network of causal paths that will in turn serve as the foundation for assessing 
the relationship between university scientists’ student-related behaviors and these 
scientists’ interactions with the private sector. The remainder of this literature review I 
devote to outlining how to use the many above discussed propositions in building a 
model to test the central question of this thesis. Therefore my task now shifts from review 
of the extant literature to the synthesis thereof. 
 The variety of studies on university industry interactions may mislead one into 
believing that there are multiple competing theories explaining the nature and the reasons 
of occurrence for inter-sector collaboration. However, a closer look reveals that the 
theories dealing with the problem can be classified in two broad categories: 
interdependence theories and interaction theories (Geisler, 1995). The interdependency 
theories focus on the impact of the external environmental factors, while the interaction 
theories explore the internal development of the relationship itself. 
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The implied causal mechanisms lurking at the back-end of the policies to 
encourage university-industry interactions tend to fall in the interdependence categories. 
The government has limited capacity to influence behavior at the micro level by means 
other than proposing institutional frameworks and sets of incentives that policy makers 
believe will steer the relevant groups into the desired direction. 
Nevertheless, evidence from within the set of interactions theories suggests that 
relationships evolve through the growth in influence of commitment, trust and 
communication patterns. Continued interactions, prior relations and beliefs, mutual trust 
and commitment result in the emergence of inter-organizational relationships, and help 
sustain the relationship once formed on the basis if such factors (Geisler, 1995). 
Obviously, no national policy can rely on prior relations and beliefs to make 
adjustments to the national innovation system. It is possible, however, to incorporate 
insights from interaction theories in designing institutional frameworks. As far as 
students are concerned, they have not been considered as components of such initiatives, 
except to the extent that certain boundary-spanning institutional arrangements (e.g. 
ERCs), contain a curriculum development component. 
 The model proposed in this thesis attempts to provide integrative framework 
combining features of interdependence and interaction theories of university industry 
interactions. The role of students in university-industry interactions is a factor that allows 
the meaningful combination of these two types of theories, that would represent more 
than the sum of its parts. Elements from many (if not most) of the above discussed 
studies, as well as new elements I introduce in the model development component of this 
study, may be incorporated into the framework.  
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The studies reviewed at the beginning of this chapter implied that, for a variety of 
market failures and societal values, universities are the best supplier of trained workforce 
to meet the human capital demands of industry. In this way, and in their other missions 
such as producers of basic research, they become worthy partners of many technology-
intensive industries, occasionally resulting in specific alliances – exactly as the 
interdependency theories would suggest. Correspondingly, the goal of much of the 
government policy in science and technology has been to provide optimal conditions for 
the inherent interdependencies between universities and industry to develop. Most 
notable among such efforts have been policies and institutional arrangements to create 
incentives for closer UI interaction as well as for the removal of some of the barriers for 
industrial utilization of the university knowledge. 
The set of studies on technology transfer pointed out that technology transfer 
interactions, more often than not, require considerable interpersonal involvement, even 
when the institutional preconditions for the interaction are present. These two types of 
findings, however, miss an underlying common denominator. Concluding that both types 
of factors matter is not yet a theory. Explicit consideration of the role of students (in the 
context of university-industry interactions at the individual level) provides an opportunity 
for logically linking these propositions. 
Students are appropriate to address the gap between interaction and 
interdependency theories. On the one hand, the academic sector addresses the market 
failure problems pertaining to private sector innovation at the societal level: it generates 
the pool of basic knowledge and the pool of human resources necessary for firms to 
innovate. In doing so it remedies the disincentives of firms to produce these key 
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innovation inputs at a socially desirable level. This type of models implicitly assumes that 
once such inputs are created by means of public support, the private sector costlessly taps 
into them. 
The interaction theories show that the process of identifying and using 
knowledge, and the process of identifying and training labor force are far from costless 
and involve the need of continuous interactions and prolonged exchanges. While the 
presence and importance of informal channels of UI interaction is widely acknowledged, 
its particular role at the system level is unclear. For example, are informal interactions 
antecedents or correlates to actual collaborative research? 
Some theorists suggest that the bulk of university-industry interactions can be 
described as an “experimentation stage” located somewhere between the recognition of a 
possible commercial application and technological problem solving (Poyago-Theotoky, 
Beath, & Siegel, 2002; Randazzese, 1996). In such interactions, university and industry 
personnel continuously communicate and jointly attempt to resolve the challenges 
associated with transforming embryonic knowledge into commercially viable technology.  
When firms interact with universities, their expectation is to make progress on 
solving such problems, develop their internal capacity, gain access to the university 
knowledge and skills, or all of the above. On the other hand, much of this “semi-basic” 
“semi-applied” work is performed by or heavily relied upon graduate students. 
Considering the high levels of uncertainty that any tangible outcome will result from the 
interaction, and considering firms’ persistent need to identify and recruit talent as a tool 
to build capacity to address such problems in the future, and the time demands that work 
for industry would put on a scientists in the absence of students, the role of graduate 
 
 45
students is better conceptualized not simply as a technical personnel, but as an asset 
motivating the firm to enter an UI interaction. An asset that, even in the case of failure of 
a specific R&D project, can be taken away either partially (by means of acquiring tacit 
knowledge on the basis of interacting with faculty or graduate students) or completely 
(by sustaining a relationship with the university scientist and establishing connections 
with possible recruits from within the students working on the project.) 
Considering these features and roles of students, it is plausible that access to 
students is an explicit motivation for firms to seek interactions with universities. This 
claim also has a theoretical value as it allows integrating the “interdependence” and 
“interaction” components of UI interaction. Since it is already known that among the 
chief reasons for firms to pursue UIRs is access to expertise and to instantaneously 
communicated research results, and since it is repeatedly found that most of university 
embryonic inventions require substantial post-disclosure involvement from the university 
side, it is all but understatement to claim (which this thesis does) that firms are 
particularly motivated to seek access to students within the frameworks of whatever 
strategies for university interactions they have. Consequently, university scientists who 
maintain larger pools of students and in generally are more involved with students will be 
more likely to interact with industry. After outlining the theoretical reasons for such a 
claim (which summarizes the central question of this thesis), the remaining chapters will 
discuss the empirical evidence whether such a claim is justified. Before stating a strong 
version of such claim, however, it is necessary to state the specific hypotheses implicit in 
such claim as well as postulate the complete system of variables. Even though this 
chapter showed numerous reasons to consider students as central to university-industry 
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interactions, a mechanism describing the role of students in UIRs is still needed. The 





This section translates the research questions set forth in Chapter 1 into specific 
hypotheses. The chief dependent variables of interest are different types of interactions 
with the private sector. The models developed below estimate the extent to which such 
industry-related behaviors are reinforced by involvement with students (e.g., through 
grant support or research collaboration). This thesis does not attempt to provide a 
comprehensive prediction of private sector involvement, but focuses on the role that 
faculty interactions with students may play in faculty interactions with the private sector. 
Nevertheless, implicit in this intent is the claim that students are an important factor in 
university-industry interactions at the individual level. 
First, I outline the specific hypotheses pertaining to the relationships between 
student- and industry related behaviors of university scientists, and then (in Chapter 4) I 
develop the full model accounting for spurious and indirect relationships. The basic 
relationship postulated in this research is that raising one’s level of involvement with 
students is associated with a raise in the likelihood that a scientist would engage in 
interactions with industry as well as with an increase in the intensity of such interactions.  
Considering that the research questions concern several student related behaviors 
(e.g. grant support, collaboration, teaching etc.) as well as different types of industrial 
interactions (e.g. co-authoring papers with industry personnel, collaborative research, 
information exchanges, etc.), the thesis will be based on the estimation of several models.  
I outline the rationale for hypothesizing a generally positive relationship between 
student involvement and industrial interactions. Then, I describe the particular 
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mechanisms through which the general underlying mechanism works in every specific 
student related behavior. 
General hypothesis - rationale 
The general hypothesis of this thesis is that more intensive involvement of 
university scientists in a spectrum of student related behaviors has direct positive effects 
on the probability that these scientists enter various interactions with industry as well as 
the intensity of these interactions.  
While the preceding chapter outlined the major role which students may play in 
university-industry interactions and showed why it is plausible that students play far more 
important role as driver of university-industry interaction than is commonly 
acknowledged, what is missing from previous study is articulation of the specific 
processes that causally link involvement with students and involvement with industry (at 
the level of the behaviors of individual scientists). A necessary next step is to provide 
justification for the general claim of this thesis that more intensive student involvement 
of university scientists causally drives, at least in part, the likelihood and intensity of 
scientists’ interactions with industry.  
The intuition behind such reasoning is that research work in academia and 
interactions with industry are becoming increasingly complementary. The trend, as 
outlined by Owen-Smith (2003), is characterized with convergence of public and private 
science. From divergent realms only two decades ago, the academic and industrial 
successes are becoming complementary. The success in one of the activities increasingly 
fuels success in the other, and vice versa. 
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Though I provide an extended review below, the general rationale underlying this 
study’s hypotheses predicting a positive relationship between university scientists’ 
student and industry interactions is that given the evidence of complementarity and 
reinforcement of success across the academic and industrial sectors, more intensive 
involvement with students is one dimension of scholarly success that also reinforces 
commercial success. Involvement with students in different capacities constitutes a 
dimension of scientists’ research capacity such that it is greatly valued by industrial 
partners and provides both more incentives and ability for industrial partners and the 
scientist himself to engage in various types of interaction, relative to scientists less 
involved with students. 
Science and technical human capital and rewards in science 
Many researchers have pointed to the puzzling phenomenon of highly skewed 
distribution of scientific outputs and assets. This is particularly evident in the cases of 
productivity and recognition: disproportionally high share of these assets is concentrated 
in small group of scientists (David, 1994). The emphasis in explaining these phenomena 
in the literature has been on the “accumulative advantage” (Merton, 1968), reinforcement 
(David, 1994), or both (Fox, 1983). 
This phenomenon of accumulative advantage, dubbed “the Matthew effect” 
(Merton, 1968) has been described as “the accruing of greater increments of recognition 
for particular scientific contributions to scientists of considerable repute and the 
withholding of such recognition from scientist who have not yet made their mark.” 
(Merton, 1968, p. 58). Some have been more specific in describing the phenomenon of 
“accumulative advantage” as the ability to leverage past success into research funding. 
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(Allison & Stewart, 1974; J. R. Cole & Cole, 1973). The pattern of increasing returns on 
productivity in terms of recognition, will then in turn allow the scientists to capitalize on 
this recognition and transform it in grant support, collaborations, and priority in cases of 
independent multiple discoveries (Fox, 1983). 
This emphasis may have been misplaced (Dietz, 2004), and moreover the 
accumulative advantage hypothesis is very difficult to test empirically (Fox, 1983). 
Instead of focusing on prestige and initial career advantages, it may be the case that 
human and social capital advantages (not just prestige and recognition advantages) 
account for success in science (Fox, 1983). Success on the other hand, especially 
nowadays, is not necessarily entirely exhausted by the number of quality of publications, 
but also relates to the extend to which scientists build, expand, upgrade and develop their 
scientific and technical human capital, defined as “the sum of researchers’ professional 
network ties and their technical skills and resources” (Bozeman & Corley, 2004).  
The importance of the STHC theory is in highlighting the central role of social 
capital to science and to demonstrate that success in science is explained not only in 
terms of human capital assets, but also in terms of tacit knowledge, know-how and social 
ties and ability to access and exploit social networks. Certain STHC endowments 
facilitate traditional outputs (e.g. publications), but they also facilitate the further 
development and accumulation of STHC. 
This mechanism is important for the argument advanced here because it 
emphasizes that some specific dimensions of individual scientists’ STHC (and not just 
their publication record) can explain different ‘successes’ (for example, further enhanced 
publication productivity, but also enhanced ability to form cross-sector and cross-
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institutional ties). (e.g., productivity and resulting reputation and research capacity), but 
not general ability of motivation explain the variance in opportunities for interaction and 
grant support of scientists. Avenues towards recognition may be more diverse and 
involving wider cross-section of scientists abilities and endowments than implied by the 
accumulative advantage hypothesis.  
Nevertheless, the “skewness” phenomenon and its conceptualizations and 
explanations (e.g. the Matthew effect or the reinforcement hypotheses) are important in 
directing research attention that indeed not all, but only some of the outputs and the 
activities of scientists are “truly” rewarded. The importance of the STHC theory is to 
provide concepts and evidence that the set of assets or endowments rewarded in different 
circumstances may be broader, and it also provides insights that the nature of rewards 
may be broader as well to include merely the further development of one’s STHC. In 
terms of the present argument this is important because the conceptualization of students 
put forward here is that 1) students represent important dimension of scientists STHC 2) 
such that it enhances these scientists ability to identify and act upon industrial 
opportunities and also makes them more attractive partners for industry colleagues. 
Whether this launches a mechanism of reinforcement or accumulative advantage 
is irrelevant. What is essential however is that the mechanism hypothesized here fits an 
existing conceptualization of scientists’ technical and human capital that provides explicit 
treatment of how “non-prestige” endowments result in future rewards. Such rewards 
include not only general enhancement of scientists’ capacity to “do science” (in ways 
encompassing not only their scientific ability, but also their social ties and tacit 
knowledge as acquired and modified in their respective social networks), but one such 
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rewards is the further enhancement of the scientific and technical human capital itself. 
Involvement with students fulfils both of these goals as it contributes to ability of 
scientists to interact with industry both directly (through constituting a pool of resources 
particularly appropriate to research involving industry partners) and indirectly (for 
example, by expanding and consolidating the social networks of scientist which may 
result in further future interaction opportunities.) 
This thesis does not imply that involvement with students is the primary 
explanation of scientists’ interactions with industry, but it does imply that students are an 
asset, returns on which (in terms of industrial interactions), may be relatively higher than 
returns on other typical assets, such as publication productivity, or “general” scientific 
ability and motivation. This thesis does not claim that this link constitutes a particular 
case of “accumulative advantage”, but it uses and insight from the accumulative 
advantage theory that directs research attention to the fact that very specific and definable 
assets determine success, but not general interest and ability. If students are one such 
assets, marginally higher involvement of scientists with students will also result in 
marginally higher involvement with industry. 
Recognition – derived from scientists’ scholarly contributions (published work) - 
is so important in science because the recognition from the community of scientists is tied 
to the key rewards valued by scientists, such as salary and job tenure, and access to 
human resources and physical facilities that scientists need to produce published results 
(David, 1994). For the scientists as individuals recognition may be an end in itself 
(intrinsic rewards to science), but for their colleagues and stakeholders, the recognition is 
a ticket issued to scientists who have accumulated measurable contributions and research 
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assets. Recognition is not an ethereal layer of appreciation slowly growing around a 
scientist simply as a by-product of his devotion to science, but is the de-facto 
acknowledgement of his or her ability to stock up particular assets such as particular 
contributions, skills, linkages etc. Even though the behaviors expected from scientists are 
very diverse, and feature numerous activities numerous activities, besides research (e.g., 
teaching, committee and administrative work, teaching advising), when it comes to the 
distribution of rewards, scientists who had had the poor fortune (or judgment) to 
emphasize behaviors diverting them from publication, are typically left behind. They still 
may be good scientists – in some respects even better ones than that scientists only 
engaging in the bare minimum of non-publishing activities, but unless they keep up in the 
top publishing percentiles of their disciplines, they will be punished with less 
opportunities and recognition in the future. 
An implicit institutional assumption that supposedly negates the above possibility 
is that the better scientists will be better in all they do – which would lead one to expect 
that scientists who publish more will be better teachers, collaborators, administrators etc. 
There may be some merit in this assumption. However, valid or no is not the issue here: 
the academic reward system rewards very particular contributions, and not one’s overall 
“scientific citizenship”, best exemplified by the “publish or perish” adage. The 
implication for the current study is that the Matthew effect is one of a metaphorical 
gateway directing attention to inputs and outputs to science that matter in particular social 
context (but not ones presumed by ideal type conceptualization of science as a pursuit of 
knowledge etc.). As indicted above, the hypothesis tested here does not imply that 
interaction with students trigger accumulative advantage or reinforcement mechanisms. 
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This may or may not be the case – the problem is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
However, this study claims that students are a component of scientists STHC that may 
lead to greater recognition from industrial partners (and as a result – more interaction 
with industry), for scientists who have relatively overdeveloped this dimension of their 
research capacity. 
Recognition in itself is not such an asset. Recognition is the reward to scientists 
who possesses assets that “matter” (typically publication productivity). This thesis 
suggest that, after all, assets that lead to differential recognition and opportunities may 
not be so one-dimensional, and in some context – like interactions with industry – feature 
some other aspects of being a scientists, such as the interactions with students. 
Interactions with industry contain a “recognition” component. Even if a scientist 
proactively and independently, for whatever reason, seeks to enter some kind of 
interaction with industry, his usefulness for such interaction will be assessed by the 
possible industrial partners. The scientist’s ability to make the interaction meaningful for 
the industrial partner will be assessed. Alternatively, how do industrial partners chose 
particular scientists to collaborate with, among the many scientists with similar interests 
and expertise? Which one of the many scientists in a big aerospace department who work 
on combustion will enter interactions with industry relative to his colleagues with similar 
expertise and credentials? 
Scholarly success in a particular field as measured through publications will 
certainly weight in such decision (by industrial partners). However, it is unlikely that it 
will determine whether or not the interaction will occur. In fact, since many university-
industry interactions are informal, the relevant assets in such relationships are likely to be 
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more diverse and to relate to more aspects of the role of a scientists rather than mere 
publication record. The role of students as input in research and university industry 
interactions implies that faculty’s involvement with student may in fact be such an asset 
contributing to recognition and utilization from industrial partners. 
The explicit delineation of the dimensions along which university based 
researchers compete (but not implicitly assume that “all that matters is publications”) is 
warranted by the directions in which the science enterprise has evolved (David, 1994). 
With this in mind, focus on publications may have been not only an inherent measure of 
what matters in science, but also a function of the dominant mode of support and 
competition in science such as the large-scale, peer-review dominated government 
support science. Newer trends however suggest increased competition for funds, most 
visible in fields with high team size and resource-equipment requirements. Another, 
much more recent trend, is the closer incorporation of interactions with industry in the 
university research. It is only plausible that scientists and institutions would adjust in 
accordance to the constraints, opportunities and rewards of this newer institutional 
environment. One such adjustment may be a shift in the relative importance of the 
different aspects of scientists’ research capacity, for which mere publication productivity 
is not necessarily the only proxy anymore. If so, differences in distribution of different 
assets (e.g., involvement with students) while previously unimportant may lead to 
differential outcomes in some arenas of new academic competition (e.g. interactions with 
the private sector). 
In this thesis, the various types of interactions with industry of interest are de-
facto examples of particular mechanisms through which recognition from industrial 
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partners takes place. No scientist will be sough after for information about research or 
provided such information, offered consulting opportunities, collaborated with on 
commercializing technology or co-authoring papers unless he or she possesses reputation 
and research capacity of relevance for these industrial partners. These forms of 
interaction therefore are a form of recognition, and the primary hypothesis of this work is 
that what drives this recognition is not necessarily mere productivity of the scientist in his 
or her field, but also the extent to which he possesses the capacity to work with students 
thus creating for himself and environment in which to meaningfully explore the research 
or collaboration opportunities with industry. In the context of grants, this means that as 
indicators of past successes, they will predict future interactions with industry, which is 
demonstrated by Bozeman and Gaughan (2006). 
Scientists’ research capacity is a fuzzy concept and may incorporate various 
heterogeneous elements. It includes not only scientist’s formal credentials, but also his or 
her collaboration experiences, tacit knowledge, etc. acquired over one’s scientific career. 
This constellation of assets is conceptualized as a “scientific and technical human capital” 
(Bozeman, Dietz, & Gaughan, 2001) and emphasizes the heterogeneity of assets 
scientists may employ to further develop their research capacity and their careers. If the 
components of a research capacity are heterogeneous and if the recognition can come in 
many forms (or at least grant funding is increasingly accessible through a variety of 
diverse sources), then it is plausible that some aspects of research capacity are better 
suited for some forms of acknowledgement (or grant funding) than others. The 
implication of this possibility for the present work is clear: if industrial firms are one such 
sort of grant funding, then the relevant question is what aspects of university scientists’ 
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research capacity are relatively more likely to be valued more by industrial partners. 
What is the mechanism through which such advantages may take place? 
At least part of the explanation relates to choices made by scientists in their 
careers. The most crucial of these choices are the “scientific races,” or the particular 
problem fields that young scientist would enter – “the winner-take-all character of 
scientific contests dictates that scientists choose the contests they enter with care” 
(Stephan, 1996). Young scientists, in particular, must be careful in choosing their 
scientific contests if they are to successfully signal their ability or resource worthiness 
and set in motion processes of accumulative advantage.  
Students as investment in research capacity 
Another important set of choices scientists consider is strongly dependent on their 
choice of problem field: the choice of how to allocate their grant support. How scientists 
allocate the grant funding they acquire is dependent but perhaps not completely 
determined by their disciplinary and problem affiliation. Scientists may exhibit 
preferences for different types of research (e.g. on the basic-applied spectrum), may 
employ different collaborative strategies, and most importantly – may choose to 
relatively over-develop different dimensions of their research capacity and resources. For 
example, for some fields and some scientists it may be more important (given their 
scientific goals) to equip and maintain a lab. For others, it may be more important to 
establish collaborative links. Yet another possibility, the one that is the focus of this 
study, is that of a scientists attempting to pursue a broad portfolio of research and 
relying on multiple students and post-docs to accomplish the work (past the idea 
origination, promotion and funding stages). In sum, there are numerous ways for a 
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scientist to channel the research support he receives – he may choose what aspects of his 
or her research capacity to enhance by means of grant support. One such aspects that may 
or may not be chosen as important to enhance is students. More importantly for this 
argument, the level of involvement with students is not entirely predicted by structural 
(disciplinary or institutional) characteristics, but also depends on the individual scientist’s 
motivations, research preferences, and research strategies. 
In the last chapter I outlined plenty of reasons for considering students as an 
active component of UIRs, and as an asset for the university scientists contemplating 
interacting with private companies. Students, although in passing, are acknowledged as a 
key resource in the production of research. The resource requirements for producing 
science involve access to substantial equipment, and the assistance of numerous graduate 
students and post-docs (Stephan, 1996). The particular role and importance of students 
for the research process, however has not been well documented. The general conclusion 
is that in most fields, students are a necessary component of research (Stephan, 1996).  
Other than this acknowledgement, there is no evidence regarding the particular 
role of students in certain research outputs. While not focusing on research products per 
se, this thesis estimates the effect of students on the likelihood of certain research 
arrangements, in particular ones involving university-industry interaction. This intent is 
grounded in the observations made above that the research capacity of a scientist is in 
fact a 1) heterogeneous concept and may consist of various, differently emphasized parts, 
that 2) different funding entities may value different components of research capacity 
differently and hence base at least in part their judgments regarding the “grant 
worthiness” of a scientist on the extent to which the scientist possesses the research 
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capacity particularly valued by the specific funder. Lastly, the preceding chapter showed 
that there are a number of reasons to suspect that access to students is among the chief 
incentives for industry to engage in university-industry collaborations, even when the 
goals of collaboration are specific. 
Students are a dimension of research capacity particularly valued by industrial 
partners in UIRs and hence that university scientists more heavily involved with students, 
de facto possess research capacity that makes it much more likely for them to enter and 
sustain interactions with the private sector relative to their colleagues of similar 
disciplinary background and credentials but who interact less with students. If this 
reasoning is valid, than a formal test would reveal that higher involvement with students 
is associated with higher level of interactions with industry. 
General productivity and scientific reputation are insufficient such factors to 
explain interactions with industry, since all else equal, any funding source would of 
course prefer scientists with longer and stronger publication record. In the context of 
university –industry relations, involvement with students, at the very least is better (than 
the productivity) measure of general capacity explaining scientists entrance in such 
relationships. At best, this is a dimension of research capacity not fully explained by 
general productivity and may have direct effects of its own. 
Regardless of which of the above two scenarios is at work, the reasoning behind 
the main hypothesis does not change. The overarching hypothesis of the present work is 
that more intensive involvement with students in different capacities constitutes a 
dimension of scientists’ research capacity such that it is greatly valued by industrial 
partners and provides both incentives and ability for industrial partners and the scientist 
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himself to engage in various types of interaction. Hence the positive hypothetical 
relationship between student involvement of scientists and the resulting higher likelihood 
of entering interactions with industry and the higher intensity of such relationships. 
Industry may value students particularly strongly relative to other assets or 
outcomes in university industry relationships. I broadly interpret the intensity of different 
types of university scientists’ involvement with students as indicative of an important 
dimension of their research capacity: to be successful disseminators of new knowledge 
(teaching), to be successfully capitalizing on their scientific reputation and skills (grants 
support of students), to be successfully embedded into various professional networks 
which they expand (interest in mentoring of students), and to be active generators of new 
ideas and utilizers of research opportunities (research collaboration with students). The 
importance of this particular dimension of research capacity however is amplified the 
above discussed fact of it being integral to core functions of universities in general and by 
the particular role that students play in the interactions between universities and industry. 
Hypotheses 
Then general reasoning outlined below holds across different specific student 
related behaviors. In the hypotheses below I define the expected relationships between 
key aspects of the faculty-student relationships and faculty interactions with the private 
sector. The faculty-student relationships considered in these hypotheses are: 
- teaching activities (average hours per week spent teaching) 
- advising (average hours per week spent advising students for curriculum and 
job placement) 
- mentoring orientation (degree of interest in mentoring graduate students) 
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- grant support of students (number of students supported through grants or 
contracts on which the university scientist is a PI) 
- research collaboration with students 
The interactions with private sector (dependent variables) are measured through 
10 variables - 9 dummy variables: one for having any working relationships with private 
company during the past 12 months, and 8 for specific types of interactions, and one 
continuous variable – percentage of research time spent working with researchers in the 
private sector. I also use a summary measure of scientists’ industrial involvement – the 
industrial involvement scale proposed by (Bozeman & Gaughan, 2006). 
Each hypothesis below should be interpreted as an illustration of a particular 
instance of how particular type of involvement with students may in effect constitute a 
source of accumulative advantage by increasing the likelihood of the scientist to enter 
interactions with industry as well as the intensity of such interactions. 
H1: University scientists who support more students through grants are more likely to 
interact with industry. 
In accordance with the general hypothesis that students represent a dimension of 
scientist’s research capacity particularly relevant for the pursuit of research interactions 
with the private sector, the core of the hypothesis remains that the larger pool of students 
a university scientist supports (hence has at his or her disposal), the more likely is that he 
or she is better positioned to successfully engage in interactions with industry.  
Considering the general emphasis on conceptualizing students as dimension of 
research capacity, supporting students through grants represents a direct investment in 
such research capacity. Performing research involving the maintenance of a pool of 
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students delivers the basic preconditions for engaging in collaborative research with 
industry. Researchers who support more students through grants effectively invest in 
maintaining a pool of human resources that they could easily deploy to tackle various 
research problems. This type of flexibility as well as the type of work most likely to be 
performed by students (e.g. experimental, prototyping, software writing and testing), is 
what both makes the university scientist capable of acting on industry related 
opportunities. But this is what also makes him an attractive partner for industrial 
collaborators: the presence of students to advise on equipment issues, write and 
troubleshoot software, perform tests and experiments is likely to be crucial at the 
“experimentation stage” (Randazzese, 1996) in university industry interactions. 
The graduate student stipends are the responsibility of the university scientist. 
Success in securing grant funding is one of the major criteria to evaluate the performance 
of faculty. However, how faculty allocate their grant money is not rigidly specified in any 
way and is mostly, but not only, a function of the types of research problems they chose 
to engage in. While certain problem field choices naturally come with requirements for 
expensive equipment, others involve maintaining a lab pursuing long-term research, yet 
others involve handling a portfolio of projects allocated among stable graduate student 
and post-doc workforce. However, there is also a “personal work style” component to 
these choices. For example, scientists of equal credentials, reputation and 
accomplishments may differ considerably in research preferences, even if working in the 
very same field. Consider the scientist who pursues a large portfolio of collaborative 
projects with other universities that require limited labor requirements but high creativity 
requirements, and thus he only maintains a small pool of PhD students, versus the 
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scientist pursuing very narrow research agenda dealing with problem solving, 
simulations, testing - activities for which he relies on a large pool of graduate students, 
for example. Unlike research preferences, number of students supported is easily 
measurable, and this hypothesis states that the mere presence of more students enhances 
the scientist’s likelihood of entering interactions with industry and the intensity of such 
interactions. Whether or not number of students I a proxy of type of research being done 
is irrelevant for this hypothesis. Moreover, controlling for disciplinary affiliation, 
productivity and grant success will suffice to isolate the direct effect of students. 
Auxiliary hypothesis 
H1A: Number of master’s students (as opposed to doctoral) supported is a weaker 
predictor of industrial interactions. 
At a first look, considering that master’s student more likely than not have 
industry-related career aspirations (Behrens & Gray, 2001) while PhDs are more likely to 
be groomed for academic positions one could think that support of masters students will 
be more strongly associated with interactions with industry. One could argue, in many 
ways masters’ students may be a more appropriate workforce for certain industrial 
projects – projects which require problem solving capabilities and application capabilities 
but not necessarily knowledge of the cutting edge research in a field.  
This reasoning however is faulty from the standpoint of the arguments advanced 
here. If industrial companies are motivated by accessibility to highly trained human 
capital with advanced knowledge, the presence of doctoral students is likely to be of 
much greater importance than the presence of masters students, who are typically hired 
on entry level positions and are available in greater supply on the labor market. Thus it is 
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expected that doctoral students will have stronger impact on industrial interactions in all 
of the models. 
H2: University scientists who collaborate with more graduate students will also be more 
likely to interact with industry. 
One justification for this hypothesis is the fact that graduate students are often the 
ones who conduct the research once its objectives and parameters of the research are 
specified (Behrens & Gray, 2001). Moreover, Bozeman and Corley (2004) report that 
scientists who have stronger industrial orientation are more likely to have mentoring 
orientation in their collaboration strategies, a behavior also predicted by the number of 
graduate students they collaborate with (Bozeman & Corley, 2004). With this in mind, I 
suspect that university scientists who are more active collaborators with graduate students 
will also be more active in collaborations with the private sector, but perhaps for some 
and not other types of collaboration. Lastly, more intensive collaboration with graduate 
students may be indicative of scientists’ ability and propensity to generate and pursue 
new research opportunities for which he can easily recruit and work with graduate 
students – fact that is also probably valued by industrial partners.  
The literature on scientific productivity suggests that scientists who collaborate 
with each other are more productive, often times producing “better science” than are 
individual investigators (Stephan, 1996). Moreover, collaborative work also is more 
likely to be based upon funded research and more likely to be experimental rather than 
theoretical. Thus collaborating with students will seem to be a function of research 
particularly relevant for industry because 1) presence of funded research is a prerequisite 
for being able to work with students (typically hired to work on a project since it’s the 
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scientists’ responsibility to secure student stipends through grants) and 2) students are 
much more likely to be involved with experimental work – usually technical and thus 
easier to delegate to scientists who are still in the process of receiving their training, 
rather than scientists’ peers. Hence the expectation that collaborating with students will 
also be associated with more active interactions with industry. 
H3: The more time university scientist spends on teaching, the more likely he or she 
engages with private sector researchers. 
I hypothesize that this is a quadratic relationship – at least “ideally”, up to a 
certain point better researchers are also better teachers5. There is little empirical support 
for this hypotheses however, and more often than not studies find negative relationship 
between the two rather than complementarity (Fairweather, 2002; Fox, 1992), even 
though academics would like the public to believe otherwise. Nevertheless, I tentatively 
hypothesize that the relationship between teaching and industrial interactions (including 
research) may be positive in this case for two reasons. First, if teaching and research are 
indeed integrated, this is more likely to be true in the case of graduate education, where 
the path of new discoveries from the lab to the classroom is much shorter (for example, a 
scientists could easily incorporate his recent work into graduate seminars, versus the 
more time consuming and complicated process of updating the standard undergraduate 
curriculums). Secondly, if across-the-board positive association between student- and 
industry related behaviors holds, it may be the case that it could show up in the case of 
teaching as well. Besides, interactions with industry often enhance curriculum 
                                                 
5 Teaching and research are seen as mutually reinforcing. From this perspective, the best scholars are the 
best teachers; the best teacher is a scholar who keeps abreast of the content and methods of a field through 
continuing involvement in research and who communicates knowledge and enthusiasm for a subject to 
students. (Fairweather, 1996, p. 100) 
 
 66
development and facilitate the renewal and development of university courses (Stephan, 
2001). Therefore, it is plausible to hypothesize that motivated teachers are also motivated 
researchers who use numerous sources – including interactions with industry – to update 
and improve their courses. 
After a certain threshold however, it is likely that the amount of teaching and 
interactions with private sector will be negatively related. The negative part of the 
relationship is quite obvious based on the fact that in typical research extensive 
universities faculty who can afford to teach less are the ones who bring large government 
or industrial grants in the department and are able to “buy out” of teaching on a regular 
basis. 
This is a tentative hypothesis in that oftentimes teaching is considered both by 
institutions and individuals as “necessary evil”, or a “minimum justification of existence” 
for institutions and faculty, or alternatively – some observers are worried that the desire 
to enhance relationships with industry and to improve teaching are inherently in conflict 
(Fairweather, 1989). There is no unambiguous evidence that this is the case except one 
found in the relationships between teaching, research and pay (Fairweather) anecdotal 
and one from the academic folklore. Moreover, a central assumption of academic life is 
that research and teaching are (or ideally – should be) correlated (Bowen & Schuster, 
1986).  
This tentative relationship will not necessarily hold for all types of interactions 
with industry. As Fairweather (1989) notes “business-university partnerships are not 
inherently contradictory to academic instructional goals. Depending on the specific 
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nature of the relationship, instructional goals can be supported, harmed, or left 
undisturbed” (Fairweather, 1989). 
H4: Faculty who place more emphasis on mentoring graduate students are more likely to 
interact with industry in any capacity. 
Faculty who invest more into mentoring and cultivating students, de-facto also 
invest in expanding and consolidating their social networks, which is a major 
precondition for sustaining and expanding their industrial contacts and interactions 
(Rahm, 1994).Two points underlie this hypothesis. First, faculty who mentor at all in any 
meaningful fashion will tend to be more experienced senior scholars and thus will have 
acquired some scientific reputation so that they could actually offer something to their 
protégés as well as can afford not to worry too much that mentoring may be time taken 
away from their own reputation building activities. Second, faculty who invest more time 
in mentoring students invest – purposefully or not – into building an informal network 
that is usually sustained and utilized upon students’ graduation – whether or not these 
students go into academia or industry. Rahm (1994), for example, reports that 80% of the 
scientist interacting with industry indicate that former students working in industry 
sometimes or often contact them regarding firm needs (Rahm, 1994). Therefore, 
mentoring may be a good approximation for such network building activities and I 
hypothesize that the greater involvement in mentoring of students, the greater the 
likelihood that interactions with industry will occur in the future. Lastly, Bozeman and 
Corley (2004) have already identified that mentoring behaviors of scientists are predicted 
by stronger industrial orientation (Bozeman & Corley, 2004). Mentoring will not 
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necessarily correlate with all types of industry interactions, however, the above reasons 
suffice to introduce this general hypothesis. 
The above propositions represent the core of my argument about the positive 
effects of university scientists’ involvement with students on these scientists’ interactions 
with the private sector. I will test these hypotheses by means of a set of models, each 
focusing on a particular dependent variable (e.g. specific type of interactions with 
industry). This set of models will incorporate the relevant career and institutional controls 
in order to obtain unbiased estimates of the effects of the student related behaviors on 
interactions with industry. Before doing so, however, these basic relationships need to be 
placed in the context of the key variables that affect scientist careers and behaviors. 
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4. MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
 
 The basic proposition of this work is that more intensive involvement with 
students is a driver of interactions between university scientists and private sector 
companies. Depicted below is the basic expected directionality and sign of causality, 
where STUDENTS denotes the full spectrum of student-related behaviors, and 




Figure 1. Basic causal model 
 
 
Such a simple model, of course, is too unrealistic. The faculty interactions with 
industry and with students will be explained by many additional factors (for now all such 
other influences are lumped into the error term). Some of the variables that affect 
probability of engaging in interactions with industry as well as the intensity of such 
interactions, will almost certainly affect interactions with students. For example, 
productivity enhances scientists’ capacity to interact with the private sector, but it also 
determines the extent to which a scientist would be able to attract, retain, and support 





impact on his productivity. Not controlling for such influences will produce useless 
estimates. 
The question of non-spurious correlation necessitates careful model development 
to account for the chief factors that may affect both interactions with students and 
interactions with industry. Below I identify some of the arguably most relevant variables 
for the model and discuss them one by one in relation with the other components of the 
model. Such key variables describing important dimensions of scientists’ careers are 
productivity, collaboration and grants, all of which in accord determine scientists 
attitudes and behaviors (S. Lee, 2004). 
The model does not aim to provide comprehensive explanation of interactions 
with the private sector, but to allow for isolation of the direct effects that student related 
behaviors may have on industrial interactions. 
Productivity 
One important variable likely to influence both interactions with students and 
interactions with industry is scientist’s productivity. Productive scientists are both more 
capable of attracting and retaining more students and are more capable of entering 
research interactions with industry. Since productivity is in fact a proxy for scientist’s 
ability to be a “good scientist”, measures of productivity are related to almost all 
variables relevant in modeling scientist behaviors, and this poses several methodological 
problems but also opportunities. 
First, productivity has direct effects on probability of interacting with industry. 
Productivity is de facto the dominant current explanation of interactions with industry. 
For example, Blumenthal (1986) reports that university scientists who interact with 
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industry are more productive, devote more time to teaching, and spend more time in 
professional activities, implying a causal link from industrial involvement to these 
activities. This specific study concludes with “the most obvious explanation for this 
observed relation between faculty accomplishments and industry support is that 
companies selectively support talented and energetic faculty who were already highly 
productive before they received industry funds” (Blumenthal, Gluck, Louis, Stoto, & 
Wise, 1986). 
Productive scientists will be more likely not only to enter interactions with 
industry, but also to attract and retain more students. On the other hand, maintaining a 
pool of students to work with will also have positive effect on scientists productivity 
(Dundar & Lewis, 1998; Gorman & Scruggs, 1984). Here, however it is not of prime 
importance to estimate the precise reciprocal relationship between students and 
productivity6. Productivity directly affects interactions with students, directly and 
indirectly affects interactions with industry. These relationships are depicted below. 
 
 
Figure 2. Causal model Step 2 - Productivity 
 
                                                 
6 There is little doubt that interactions with students will enhance one’s ability to publish more and faster, 
however, the causal primacy clearly lies in productivity: one needs to already have attained certain level of 
productivity and prestige in order to be in a position of cultivating and exploiting a pool of students that 







Productivity is related to students and interactions with industry, as well as with 
grant activity (next section). Productivity relates to almost all scientific behaviors and 
activities, however this is no a priori reason to suspect that it will again emerge as the 
most important explanatory variable in the model. The reason to be suspicious of 
productivity is that it could be mistaken for a major driver of faculty-industry 
interactions, which is not necessarily the case. There is little doubt that all other factors 
equal, more productive scientists will have greater chances of interacting with industry. 
Such a reasoning is valid, however such a relationships, mistaken for parsimonious 
explanation is also tautological - better scientists are better scientists in all they do, 
including interactions with industry. While this has major implications for S&T policy 
makers and university administrators, this is not an adequate explanation of industrial 
involvement of individual scientists.  
Even if productivity increases the likelihood of industrial interactions, this is a 
trivial finding that does not generate additional information, but merely registers that 1) 
even productive scientists apparently have something to gain from industry, 2) that all 
else equal, industry would prefer to fund or interact with more productive scientists or 3) 
that in cases of new fields with emerging commercial potential, the industry will simply 
“hire away” what few experts exist in academia (Stephan, 2001). 
Retroactive attribution of interactions with industry to productivity hides the 
possibility that both are a part of the same concept (e.g. scientific “ability” – a finding 
confirmed in registering the presence of cross-sectoral accumulative advantage). Such 
situation, when there is a single dominant explanatory of all observed differences is a true 
conceptual bottleneck as it by definition prevents the generation of a useful theory of 
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interactions with industry: keeping motivation, financial gains, ability etc. constant, 
registering that more productive scientists are more likely to interact with industry 
explains nothing as it shrinks the space between cause and effect so much that the final 
predictive statement (more productive scientists are more likely to interact with industry) 
becomes either truism or a circular statement. 
In my model productivity, while probably a precondition for industrial 
interactions, is a variable whose influence is mediated by other variables. In particular, I 
hypothesize that students will be such mediating variable: in estimating the complete 
model, whatever effects productivity alone has on industrial interactions, these effects 
may be diminished after including interactions with students in the model. The 
hypotheses outlined in the previous chapter, postulate that, at the very least, students are 
and intervening variable between productivity and industrial interactions. Including 
productivity in the model will also allow estimating if involvement with students has 
direct effects in interactions with industry, independent of productivity, collaborations, 
and grants. 
At the aggregate, scientists’ productivity is typically measured by the number of 
peer-reviewed publications in scholarly journals. While such aggregate measure has its 
limitations, it is an adequate approximation of the ability of individual scientists as it 
measures the number of successfully produced and accepted by the scientific community 
knowledge contributions, in the form of articles. Scientists’ contributions are multifaceted 
and heterogeneous. Nevertheless, their primary responsibility is the production of new 
knowledge in the peer-review controlled outlets of the scientific community. Number of 
publications - simple counts of the papers written (and published) by the scientists in 
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question – are appropriate measure of scientists’ ability to their job of producing new 
knowledge. The publication – the “paper” – is the tangible product of the research the 
scientist engage in, and their work is unfinished, and in some ways indeed non-existent, 
unless they disclose it to the community of peers for review, application and extension in 
the form of a “paper” (David, 1994). Moreover, the basic counts-of-publications measure 
of scientific productivity is strongly correlated with measures of quality as measured by 
peer appraisals (David, 1994). In sum, given the centrality of publications to the reward 
system in science and the structure of the publication as a document disclosing more or 
less discrete scientific contribution in one’s field, it is justified to follow the numerous 
studies that have used publication counts as measures of productivity in the present one 
as well. Specifically, this thesis considers only (unweighted counts of) publications in 
peer-reviews scientific journals.  
Productivity also relates to grants and collaborations, respectively discussed in 
next sections. 
Grants 
Procuring grants to conduct research is a prerequisite for sustaining publishing 
activity, but before that - a function of productivity. Publication productivity is the 
precondition for acquiring scientific reputation, and as such – the primary explanation of 
securing grant funding (e.g., Liebert, 1977). 
There is also reciprocal relationship – the grants enhance the ability to publish, 
since they provide the resources without which any further results to publish will have 
nowhere to come from (Ballou, Mishkind, Mooney, & van Kammen, 2004). As with the 
possible reciprocal relationship between involvement with students and productivity, in 
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the context of the research questions posed here and due to the peculiarities of the data 
the exact nature of this reciprocal relationship is not relevant. The data on grants, 
interactions with students and with industry is cross-sectional. The productivity data 
however covers scientist’s entire career. Current grants cannot predict past productivity, 
while the opposite is true (Liebert, 1977). 
 
 
Figure 3. Causal model Step 3 - Grants 
 
 
 Of direct interest is the independent effect of grants (measured as number of 
grants, government and industry funded, the scientist currently has) on number of 
students supported and collaborated with, and on interactions with industry. Bozeman 
and Gaughan (2006) found that grants, especially industrial ones, increase the likelihood 
of industrial interactions. (They also identifies that grants are antecedent to industrial 
interactions but not just another type of interaction). 
Grants will have direct effect on interactions with students. First, grants are 
precondition for executing one’s research by securing the necessary resources, and 








researcher, most research-related interactions with students are most likely to occur 
within the context of researcher’s grant-funded research. Second, grant-supported 
research is in general team-based, and some funding agencies explicitly require that the 
research they fund contain collaboration, education and training components. 
I make no particular claims regarding the expected effects of number of grants on 
involvement with students, except that the relationships will be positive. The data 
provides information about the number of grants the researcher is currently funded from, 
by grant source, but not about the magnitude (dollar amount of grants). While grants are a 
predictor of number of students supported by research assistantships, the grant amount 
would have been a better predictor of the number of students employed, simply because 
there is predictable relationship between available funds and students that can be 
employed. However, in regard to general scientific behaviors, (e.g. collaboration, 
productivity patterns) the grant amount is not nearly as important as whether or not the 
researcher has grants at all (Kingsley, Bozeman, & Coker, 1996). Additionally, the 
variations in grant amounts are perhaps strongly related to the discipline dynamics and 
resource needs rather than anything else.  
In sum, incorporating grants in the model has several methodological 
implications. First, grants are a major predictor of number of students. The absence of 
amount data transform the grants variable (in terms of students) into a control variable 
rather than chief causal driver. As a result, grants will have positive effect on student 
involvement, however the estimates will hide possibly large variance in these effects.  
Second, grants (especially industrial ones) will have strong impact on industrial 
interactions. Grants are not simply a function of productivity, but the presence of grants, 
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especially external ones, is a good measure of quality of research. In fact, presence of 
external grants is standard variables in evaluations of the quality and impact scientific 
research (Melkers, Welch, Kingsley, & Ponomariov, 2006). Grants, therefore, similarly 
to publications are also a measure of scholarly “ability” – indication of past successes that 
contribute to ability to enhance other dimensions of research capacity such as 
involvement with students, as well as have direct impact on interactions with industry. 
Controlling for presence and number of grants also helps to address the possibility 
of reciprocal relationships between interactions with students and interactions with 
industry. While this thesis claims that the direction of the causality is from interactions 
with students to interactions with industry, one could claim interactions with industry 
impact one’s interactions with students. However, if any such impact exists, it will occur 
mostly through grant funding from industry. Bozeman and Gaughan (2006) have 
established that it is the presence of grants that encourage interactions with industry, but 
not the other way around. Therefore, given the expected positive effect of industrial 
grants on student involvement, involvement with students may partially reveal the 
mechanism through which industrial grants facilitate further industrial interactions.  
 Besides productivity and students, grants are also related to scientist’s 
collaboration patterns, as discussed in the next section. 
Collaborators 
 Number of scientist’s collaborators may be an important factor related to 
productivity, grants, interactions with students and industry. There is likely a direct effect 
of scientist’s number of collaborators on his or her interactions with industry. First, 
scientists who collaborate more, all else equal, perhaps exhibit greater general propensity 
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to enter collaborations of any kind, including collaboration with industry as well as 
collaboration with students. 
 Second, collaborative research is more likely to be grant funded and experimental, 
thus more likely to involve both more interactions with students and with industry. Third, 
scientists who collaborate more are also generally more productive (Price & Beaver, 
1966). There is also a reciprocal relationship between collaboration and productivity. On 
the other hand, productive scientists are also more likely to collaborate (Luukkonen, 
Persson, & Sivertsen, 1992), but this possibility is not of interest here because of the 
structure of the data and its peripheral importance for the research questions in the study. 
 Collaboration, besides being predictor of productivity, is also indicative of a 
general behavioral pattern of strategically coordinating one’s research efforts with others. 
The dominant motivations behind collaboration are special competences of the co-author, 
or that the co-author has special data and equipment (Melin, 2000).7  
Collaboration will also have direct and indirect (through productivity) effects on 
grants and on student involvement. Scientists who collaborate more are typically more 
productive, and scientists who are more productive typically enjoy disproportionally 
large grant support than less productive colleagues. On the other hand, scientists who 
collaborate more will perhaps support larger network of contacts and will be able to 
assemble parts of it to pursue further funding opportunities. Scientists may team up to 
develop grant proposals, which is another scenario of the positive effect of collaboration 
on grant funding. Besides, scientists who are more inclined to collaborate may enter more 
                                                 
7 It should be mentioned that beyond the self reported (in surveys) evidence and speculations on the “true” 
effects of collaboration on productivity, these linkages, albeit plausible are not causally proven. It might 
well be that collaboration patterns are more heavily determined by the disciplinary and institutional context 
in which a scientist are working, but not the result of strategic behavior or individual characteristics. 
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collaborations of any kind, including collaborations with industry. At the same time, 
scientists who in general collaborate more, are perhaps also more likely to have more 
student collaborators as well as to support and mentor more students, thus indirectly 








In addition to the above crucial causal drivers behind the relationship of interest, 
there are several key control variables that intervene in the relationships specified above. 
Years since completing the PhD 
This variable is preferred instead of biological age as it more accurately captures 
the “time spent in business” by a university scientist. Some scientists receive their PhDs 









age. Age is a mandatory control since many of scientists’ credentials such as 
productivity, collaborations and ability to secure grant funding evolve and accumulate 
with age (S. Lee, 2004). 
Gender 
The role of gender in science is quite mysterious. Some studies argue that women 
have harder time breaching into male dominated formal academic structures and informal 
networks (J. R. Cole, 1981). Women collaborate less with collaborators external to their 
organization and tend to have lower collaboration rates overall (Kyvik & Teigen, 1996). 
If so, it is plausible to expect negative effects of gender on collaboration, productivity, 
grants and on student interactions. Some studies have found direct negative impacts of 
gender on productivity (Fox, 1983). The latter finding however is not stable as some 
studies find no differences between male and female scientists (Clemente, 1973; J. Cole 
& Zuckerman, 1984). For the purpose of the current model, I speculate that women will 
collaborate less (both with peers and with students) and gender will have both direct and 
indirect negative effects on the probability of interacting with private sector companies 
and on the intensity of such interactions. Also, since universities have been hiring women 
at accelerated rate during the last decade or so, it is also plausible that gender will be 
negatively associated with the probability of being tenured. The intricacies of the impact 
of gender in scientific careers aside, of primary importance here is that gender will have 
negative direct and indirect impacts on involvement with students and on involvement 




Controlling for disciplinary affiliation is critical. As a control variable, 
disciplinary affiliation “bundles” the structural differences of the working context of 
scientists and affects almost all of the variables discussed above. Different disciplines 
have different funding requirements, different structures and processes of scientific 
investigation, different peer selection processes. Such structural characteristics of 
disciplines affect proxies of productivity, as different disciplines are characterized with 
different ease and rate of publishing. For example, experimental scientists collaborate 
more than theoretical scientists (Gordon, 1980). Applied scientists also collaborate more 
(Katz & Martin, 1997), since applied research is more interdisciplinary and requires 
wider range of skills. 
Grant funding patterns also vary by discipline. At different points in time some 
disciplines may simply be originators of “hot topics” that draw the attention of policy 
makers and funders and thus result in large funding amounts available in a particular 
field. On the other hand, different disciplines have different resource and equipment 
requirements – peculiarities usually reflected in the typical grant awards.  
Publishing patterns and productivity vary among disciplines. For example, 
experimental scientists have more publications than theoretical scientists (Hargens, 
1981), perhaps a function of the level of routinization in a discipline (Fox, 1983). 
Number of journals per discipline, journal acceptance rates and co-authorship patterns 
also vary by field.  
Accounting for all such causal influences demands specific measurable contextual 
discipline-level data (e.g., objective measure of “experimental vs. theoretical”, 
quantitative data on research expenditures, journal acceptance etc.). Such data is however 
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not easily available and the studies mentioned above provide only schematic and partial 
pictures of the disciplinary impacts on scientific behaviors. Instead, such diverse field 
effects, albeit not directly measured, are approximated by (and controlled for) by the 
discipline control variable. As with any control variable, disciplinary affiliation as such 
cannot be a causal driver behind the other variables in the model, but it is an imperative 
to control for the above specified relationships in the context of disciplines. I do not 
specify any causal hypotheses regarding discipline (besides the obvious that scientists 
from engineering disciplines are more likely to interact with industry). In this 
interpretation discipline is not a causal driver, but only an approximation of the 
circumstances that may increase the likelihood of such behavior, being affiliated with 
specific discipline, albeit crucial, is just a control variable, unless specific discipline level 
contextual data is used. 
Besides a control variable for the general models, discipline is also a variable that 
will directly impact the number of students with which a scientist interacts. Since 
different disciplines are characterized with different publishing, collaboration and 
funding patterns, it is only plausible that they will be characterized with different patterns 
of student-related behavior, hence the direct causal path from discipline to students in the 
model. The general expectation is that researchers in more applied disciplines, such as 
engineering disciplines will interact more intensively with students than colleagues from 
more theoretical disciplines, such as physics. 
The same expectation applies regarding the direct effect of discipline on 
interactions with industry: scientists from engineering and bio-lie sciences will be 
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disproportionally more likely to interact with industry than scientists from more 
theoretical disciplines (such as mathematics). 
Affiliation with a research center 
Affiliation with a research center will be positively correlated with each of the 
dependent variables. This hypothesis is justified in light of respondents who indicate 
affiliation with university research centers. Many research centers, such as ERCs, as NSF 
mandates that these centers collaborate with industry. The primary justification for the 
creation of research centers is that they provide environment for easier inter-disciplinary 
and inter-sectoral research – conditions that are not easily satisfied in the traditional 
academic departments. As a result, scientists affiliated with such centers (not necessarily 
NSF funded) may be more inclined to collaborate with industry than scientists who are 
not since in general such boundary-spanning institutions are created to facilitate 
interdisciplinary and collaborative research – potentially easier to adapt and respond to 
industry collaboration. Prior study has identified that this may be the case, as well as that 
center affiliated researchers a re more likely to interact with students in terms of research 
collaboration and grant support (Gaughan & Bozeman, 2005). 
Work experience in industry 
Spending part of one’s career in industry has interesting mixed effects on his or 
her scholarly profile. It has been shown to increase the ability to produce commercially 
relevant outcomes such as patents (Dietz & Bozeman, 2005), but to somewhat negatively 
affect overall productivity in terms of number of publications (Dietz & Bozeman, 2005; 
Lin & Bozeman, 2006). However, industry experience also results in greater number of 
students supported (Lin & Bozeman, 2006). Hence, the expectation that in this model, 
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industry experience of any kind will positively affect interactions with students, as well 
as the probability and intensity of interactions with industry. 
Post-doc 
Having had a post-doctoral position will likely have negative effect both on 
involvement with students and on interactions with industry. One past study have 
revealed a peculiar effect of post-doctoral positions on future productivity – a negative 
one (Dietz & Bozeman, 2005). If such effects are indeed robust and present in this data, 
this negative effect will show up in regard to students as well. On the other hand, in the 
majority of cases, post-doctoral positions are apprenticeship positions preparing the 
recent graduate specifically for careers as university researchers, hence perhaps pushing 
them further away from other applications of their degrees, such as work in industrially 
relevant research context (Romer, 2000). Lastly, having been in a postdoctoral position 
perhaps also indicates a self-selection, or particular motivation to pursue a “classic” 
scientific career versus more diverse or flexible one. 
Basic-applied research preferences 
 Valuation of different types of research may have different effects on interactions 
with industry and with students. In particular, scientists who devalue more applied 
research with focus on commercial applications, may be, for example, more likely to 
work with smaller teams or alone versus scientists who do not place negative valuation 
on the more applied work. In this study, respondent’s subjective judgement of the 
inherent value of “basic” versus “applied, commercially relevant” research is used to 
gauge the effect of such valuations on their propensity to enter research contexts that are 




There will be differences in regard to interactions with students and with industry 
depending on the tenure status of scientists. First, tenured scientists are ones who have 
proven their ability to contribute to their discipline, and have done so through sufficient 
publications and grants. Hence tenured scientist will be both more productive, will have 
more grants and will interact with more students relative to their not yet tenured 
counterparts and as a result – be more likely to enter interactions with industry. 
Second implication of the tenured status is the relatively more freedom that 
tenured scientists may perceive that they have to pursue research-related interactions with 
industry. More applied research is oftentimes viewed by junior-level scientists as time 
and effort taken away from potentially academic career-advancing activities such as 
publishing single-authored papers in the discipline’s main journals and as a result these 
junior level faculty may shy away from industry relevant research (Peters & Etzkowitz, 
1990). Industry-related research may not be valued as highly as mainstream fundamental 
research in the tenure and promotion decisions, hence the expected lesser likelihood of 
non-tenured scientists to engage in interactions with industry.  
Conclusions and complete model 
Clearly, other causal paths are possible (and interesting) to consider. However, the 
model below represent the core of my argument regarding the effect of interactions with 
students on interactions with industry as placed in the context of the other major factors 
that may influence both. In short, the model postulates that there is direct effect from 
interactions with students to interactions with industry, beyond and above the effects of 
productivity, collaboration behaviors, grant success, discipline, prior industrial or post-
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doctoral experience, gender, tenure status and characteristics of the institutional 
environment. While other variables are certainly possible to intervene in these 
relationships, the variables incorporated in the model will account for most of the 
variance in the dependent and the endogenous variables. 
 
 
Figure 5. Final causal model 
 
 Since involvement with students and some of the crucial career variables are 
endogenous, the key relationships will be tested by means of the following path models: 


























































The analysis that follows will proceed with brief description of the data sources 
and measurement, descriptive statistics, and step-wise estimation of the path models. 
These steps are considered in separate chapters. 
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5. DATA AND METHODS 
 
 The variables for this study are derived from two types of data sources. To 
compile data about individuals’ characteristics, career, and productivity paths I use 
survey data, merged with CV data. The sections below briefly describe the sources of the 
variables. 
2004 RVM survey of US scientists and engineers 
The data for this project are collected under the auspices of the 2005 Research 
Value Mapping Survey of Academic Researchers (RVM 2005), a project funded by the 
National Science Foundation and U.S. Department of Energy, under the direction of 
Barry Bozeman, School of Public Policy, Georgia Tech.8 
The survey targeted tenured and tenure-track university researchers employed in 
doctorate granting research extensive institutions, as defined by the Carnegie 
Classification (Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 2004), though for 
alternate research purposes some EPSCoR university and HBCU faculty were included. 
The sample was stratified by university, academic discipline, academic rank, and gender. 
The resultant sampling frame contained 5,916 individuals. The survey was executed in 
accordance with Dillman’s (2000) “tailored design method.”, featuring pre-contact letter, 
reminder post-cards and follow-up mailings of the survey. The survey was terminated 
after three mailings, with an overall response rate of thirty seven percent. 
After removing from our sample sociologists (to compare engineers to a reference 
group of non-engineering, “hard” scientists) and faculty employed at EPSCoR 
                                                 




universities and HBCUs (to compare faculty working at Carnegie research extensive 
universities only), I employ in this study a final N of 1,647 university researchers. The 
response rate for this subgroup of the survey sample is 37 percent as well. 
The non-response bias analysis indicated the following: male university scientists 
were less likely to respond to the survey, as well university scientists from biology, 
mathematics, computer engineering and electrical engineering. However, the magnitude 
of this bias is low (all correlations between stratification variables and non-response are 
less than 9%). 
The wave analysis (simple comparison between the mean values of the variables 
for respondents who responded in wave 1 versus the ones who responded later (in wave 
two or three), indicated that people who responded early are no systematically different 
on any of the variables, with very few exceptions.9 
The sample for this study was stratified. It targeted the population of tenured or 
tenure-track scientists employed in the nation’s 150 research extensive universities 
(Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, 2004). Members of the research 
team compiled a complete list of the population, from which then they drew a sample. 
First, the research team stratified the population by discipline, and developed 13 sampling 
                                                 
9 Respondents who responded in later waves were slightly more likely to rank as important reasons to 
collaborate “desire to work with researchers whose skills complement my own”, and the quality of previous 
collaborations, slightly more likely to indicate more time spent working with researchers in nations other 
than US and with researchers in other universities, slightly more likely to agree that they enjoy research 
more than teaching, more likely to allocate more time on research (both related and not related to grants or 
contracts), less likely to be Asian or black (and more likely to be white), more likely to be US or 
naturalized US citizen, and more likely to be physicists. These differences are significant at 0.5 level or 




frames10. The population lists were compiled on the basis of the university catalogs of the 
150 universities in question. Complete population lists were created for the 13 disciplines 
of interest for the study. Each list was printed, and coded to allow for stratification as 
follows: 1) stratify by rank (Rank stratification from NSF “Full-time ranked doctoral 
science and engineering faculty at 4 year colleges and universities, by academic rank, 
age, sex, race/ethnicity, and disability status: 1995.”; 2) Stratify by gender (Select women 
with certainty, men randomly. (if enough women, they were selected randomly; e.g. in 
biology). The goal of this development was to achieve samples of 200 male and female 
scientists from each discipline. 
CVs of the 2004 Survey Respondents 
 Along with completing the questionnaire, the survey respondents were asked to 
provide their CVs. They were given the option to either send a paper copy back with the 
survey, provide a link to a web-page from where to download it or send it as an 
attachment to the project email. The response rate for the CVs (proportion of the actual 
survey respondents who provided their CVs) was 49.1 percent. Of the 1024 individuals 
who provided CVs, 393 sent their CVs by emails, 233 provided links for download, and 
398 sent back paper CVs along with their surveys. To obtain the remaining CVs, the 
research team performed web-searches as it was speculated that most academicians have 
their CVs available online.  
 The CVs are excellent data source, particularly appropriate for providing 
relatively standardized and complete information regarding individuals’ career 
experiences (Dietz, Chompalov, Bozeman, Lane, & Park, 2000). For this study, CVs are 
                                                 
10 The disciplines are the following: Biology, Computer Science, Mathematics, Physics, Earth and 
Atmospheric Science, Chemistry, Agriculture, Sociology, Chemical Engineering, Civil Engineering, 
Electrical Engineering, Mechanical Engineering and Materials Engineering 
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the source of two variables: the scientist’s publication productivity and the presence of 
industrial experience. Whenever possible, the publication counts were cros-referenced 
with the Web of Science database. 
At the time of the completion of this work, the collection of data for these 
variables was not entirely completed. Publication numbers were collected for 1008 
observations. For the remaining 635 observations publication data was imputed based on 
a regression model of observed publication data on disciplinary affiliation, gender, career 
age, postdoctoral status, interaction with industry of any kind, and number of graduate 
student supported through grants. The imputation procedure was the multiple 
imputation11 method as outlined by Royston (Royston, 2004). The missing industry 
experience values were imputed by means of “hot deck” imputation12 (Sande, 1983). 
Since these two variables are of peripheral importance, in all models the results are 
reported with and without them to establish the sensitivity of the central parameters of 
interest. 
Variables and measurement 
 The operationalization of the variables discussed in Chapter 4 is provided below, 
along with the variable names that will be used in the description of results. 
Dependent variables: Industrially relevant behaviors 
 This thesis attempts to assess the effect of students on a broad spectrum of 
industrially-relevant behaviors, as well as on the general propensity of scientists to 
                                                 
11 The multiple imputation techniques is based on estimating multiple predicted values of the imputed 
variable and draws a random sample of these estimates. Multiple imputation is currently considered to be 
superior to any other imputation method for imputing continuous variables (Royston, 2004) 
 
 
12 Hot deck imputation is one of the earliest imputation techniques where values of missing data are 
extrapolated on the basis of the values of the non-missing variables. This method is especially appropriated 
for binary or categorical variables (Sande, 1983) 
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interact with the private sector. As a result, the models will feature dependent variables 
for each specific industrially relevant behavior, as well as summary measures of industry-
related activity. 
Measures of specific industry relevant behaviors 
 The survey asked whether or not the respondents engaged in several specific 
industry-relevant behaviors during the past 12 months. The variables below are binary, 
coded 1 if the respondent has engaged in a behavior during the period of interest, zero 
otherwise: 
• INDSCINF (Persons from a private company have asked for information about 
my research and I have provided it) 
• SCINDINF (I contacted persons in industry asking about their research or 
research interests) 
• CONSULT (I served as a formal paid consultant to an industrial firm) 
• STUDPLACE (I helped place graduate students or post-docs in industry jobs) 
• WORKIND (I worked at a company with which I am an owner, partner or 
employee) 
• PATENTED (I worked directly with industry personnel in work that resulted in a 
patent or copyright) 
• TECHTRSF (I worked directly with industry personnel in an effort to transfer or 
commercialize technology or applied research 
• COAUTHOR (I co-authored a paper with industry personnel that has been 
published in a journal or refereed proceedings) 
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General measures of industrial involvement 
 Besides the above measures of specific interactions with the private sector, I will 
also utilize more general measures: 
• ANYINT (coded 1 if the respondent has been involved in any interaction with a 
private sector company, zero otherwise) 
• INDSCALE (industrial involvement scale, weighted, summarizing the intensity of 
respondent’s involvement with the private sector.) 
The weighted industrial involvement scale was developed by Bozeman and 
Gaughan (2006) on the basis of the same data, in order to facilitate a richer and more 
parsimonious analysis. The scale is not purely additive because of the large differences in 
the means and variances for the different types of involvement. As a result, the scale is 
created on the basis of the distributions of the specific types of interaction with industry 
and using the inverse percentages as a weight. The inverse weights for all interactions 
were summed for every individual researcher (based on the behaviors he or she actually 
engaged in), creating an industrial involvement scale – a single variable summarizing the 
intensity of the industrial involvement for a scientist relative to the other respondents in 
the sample. This is a convenient way to allow for parsimonious analysis of the relative 
intensity of industrial involvement across scientists. The scale is not intended to measure 
any latent variables, but is simply a device for summarizing the scope of industrial 
involvement of respondents. Therefore, the estimates for the industrial involvement scale 
should not be interpreted substantively, but could serve only for relative comparisons of 
the effects of the independent variables of interest. 
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Independent variables: student related behaviors 
 The independent variables for this thesis encompass the full spectrum of 
scientists’ student-related behaviors. This section describes these behaviors in terms of 
the specific variables that will be used. 
• GRANTMA (A count variable, indicating the number of Master’s students 
currently supported through the scientist’s grants) 
• GRANTPHD (A count variable, indicating the number of PhD students currently 
supported through the scientist’s grants) 
• GRANTGRAD (A count variable, indicating the total number of graduate – 
Master’s or PhD – students currently supported through the scientist’s grants) 
• GRADCOL (A count variable, indicating the total number of graduate students 
with which the scientist has had research collaborations during the past twelve 
months 
• GRADMENT (A 4-point Likert scale, indicating how important is “Interest in 
helping graduate students” in the scientist’s decisions to collaborate, ranging from 
1 (not important at all) to 4 (very important) 
• TEACHGRAD (A continuous variable indicating the average number of hours 
per week that the respondent typically devotes to teaching graduate students, 
including preparation time and meetings outside class) 
• TEACHUGR (A continuous variable indicating the average number of hours per 
week that the respondent typically devotes to teaching undergraduate students, 
including preparation time and meetings outside class) 
 
 95
• TOTTEACH (A continuous variable indicating the average number of hours per 
week that the respondent typically devotes to teaching overall, including 
preparation time and meetings outside class) 
• ADVISE (A continuous variable indicating the average number of hours per week 
that the respondent typically devotes to advising students about curriculum and 
job placement) 
Control variables 
• GENDER (Binary variable coded 1 if the respondent is male, zero if female) 
• TENURED (Binary variable coded 1 if the respondent is tenured, zero otherwise) 
• CARAGE (Count variable indicating the number of years since the respondent 
received his or her PhD degree) 
• POSTDOC (Binary variable coded 1 if the respondent has held a post-doctoral 
position in the past, zero otherwise) 
• TOTCOL (Count variable indicating the total number of collaborators – not 
including students – with whom the researcher has had research collaborations in 
the past twelve months 
• PUBSTOT (Total career productivity, measured as total number of publications in 
peer-reviewed scientific journals. As indicated above, the missing data for this 
variables is imputed on the basis of multiple imputation with 10 iterations. 
• CENTAFF (Binary variable if the respondent is affiliated with university research 
center, zero otherwise) 
• TOTGRANTS (Count variable indicating the total number of grants that the 
respondent currently is supported by) 
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• INDGRANTS (Count variable indicating the total number of grants from 
industrial sources that the respondent currently is supported by) 
• GOVGRANTS (Count variable indicating the total number of grants from 
governmental sources that the respondent is currently supported by) 
• BASIC (A 4 point Likert scale indicating whether the respondent agrees with the 
statement “Worrying about possible commercial applications distracts one from 
doing good research”, where 1 indicates “strongly disagree” and 4 – “strongly 
agree” 
• INDEXP (A binary variable coded 1 if the respondent has had any form of full 
time industrial employment throughout his or her career, zero otherwise. As 
indicated earlier, the missing values for this variable were imputed y means of hot 
deck imputation). 
• Discipline: The models will incorporate dummy variables for each of the 13 
disciplines, abbreviated as follows: 
o BIOL (Biology, binary variable) 
o CS (Computer science, binary variable) 
o MATH (Mathematics, binary variable) 
o PHYS (Physics, binary variables) 
o EAS (Earth and atmospheric sciences, binary variable) 
o CHEM (Chemistry, binary variable) 
o AGRI (Agriculture, binary variables) 
o CHE (Chemical engineering, binary variable) 
o CE (Civil engineering, binary variable) 
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o EE (Electrical engineering, binary variable) 
o ME (Mechanical engineering, binary variable) 
o MTE (Materials engineering, binary variable) 
Statistical methods 
 The proposed analysis is too complicated to allow answering all research 
questions in a single model. Instead, a sequence of analysis steps will be followed to 
assess the relationships of interest. 
Descriptive analysis 
 The next chapter will provide an initial overview of the data and will focus on 
identifying the general between group differences (i.e. scientists who interact with the 
private sector vs. scientists who do not) in terms of the measures of different student-
related behaviors. For some of the key group comparisons I will perform t-tests to gauge 
whether the observed differences are statistically significant. 
Path modeling 
 Since the model development chapter identified several spurious relationships, it 
is crucial to identify the causal effects as they emerge through the interactions between 
the exogenous and intervening variables in the model. To asses these paths and to isolate 
the direct effects of interests, these causal path will be tested in terms of a set of 
regressions to gradually build the full model. This estimation is appropriate given the 
goal of the study, which is to estimate 1) the presence and 2) the relative importance of 
any effect of student-related behaviors on interactions with industry. The models feature 
not only continuous, but also binary and count variables for which other estimation 
techniques would be more appropriate. However, in order to be able to interpret and 
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assess the system of paths, the assumptions that the relationships are linear must be 
maintained. More importantly, in the case of binary dependent variables this means that 
linear probability models (versus, for example – logit models) will be estimated. 
Considering the intent to gauge the relative importance of student –related behaviors 
rather than specific substantive changes in the marginal probabilities, this linear 
estimation is also appropriate.  
Tobit model of industrial involvement scale 
 While the primary goal of this study is to assess the relative importance of student 
related behaviors on industrial activity, the path modeling does not provide estimates that 
could be interpreted substantively. In order to obtain substantively meaningful estimates 
for the final model of industrial involvement, tobit model will be utilized to more 
precisely estimate the effects of the independent variables on the industrial involvement 
scale. Tobit estimation is the most appropriate in this case because the dependent variable 
is censored. The OLS estimates will likely understate the positive relationship between 
the variables while the tobit estimates allow for more precise estimation of the 
relationships for the non-censored observations, while also estimating the effects of the 
independent variables on the probability that the dependent variable will have non-zero 
values. 
 The next chapter is devoted to the descriptive analysis.  
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6. DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
 
General sample characteristics 
This chapter provides an overview of the data in general as well as of the general 
differences in student- and industry-related behaviors of the survey respondents. 
This sample is composed of 1643 respondents. Of them, 51% are women, 73% are 
tenured (respectively, 27% are not tenured but on tenure track). Half of the respondents 
have held post-doctoral position in the past, and the average time since the completion of 
their doctoral degree is 16 years. These results are depicted in Table 1 in the appendix. 
Student-related characteristics 
In terms of grant support of students, it is more common for scientists to support 
doctoral versus masters’ students. Less than the half of the respondents support one or 
more masters’ student through grants, while 66% support one or more doctoral students 
through grants. The ranges and distributions of the numbers of masters or doctoral 
students are similar – the highest number of masters’ students supported by individual 
researcher is 20 and the highest number of doctoral students supported is 25. This 
discrepancy for supporting doctoral students is also revealed in the averages – while on 
the average respondents in this sample support less than one masters’ student, the average 
number of doctoral students supported is two (Table 2). 
Research collaboration with students is somewhat more common than grant 
support and twice as intensive as grant support: 86% of the scientists have collaborated 
with one or more graduate students, and the average number of graduate student 
collaborators is four (Table 2). 
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For the scientists in the sample, on average, interest in helping graduate students 
is a consideration when deciding to enter research collaborations: the average score on 
the four point Likert scale is more than three – a crude evidence of perhaps both 
academic stewardship towards students as well as some indication of professional 
exchanges where the student provides labor in exchange of opportunities. 
On average, scientists devote sixteen hours per week to teaching, of which about 
nine hours to undergraduate teaching and about six hours to graduate teaching. This 
number seems consistent with the hiring expectations in the research universities where 
appointments are predominantly research based, with some teaching expectation (Table 
2). Lastly, scientists devote about two hours a week to advising students about curriculum 
and job placement. 
Industry related behaviors 
 Interactions with industry are common: 52% of the respondents in the sample 
have had some kind of interaction with private sector companies during the past twelve 
months (Table 3). Of course, there is great variation exists regarding what types of 
interactions scientists typically engage in (and the different types of interactions imply 
very different demands on scientists’ time). The most common type of interaction is 
being contacted by a private company regarding one’s research - 37% (Table 3). This 
proportion is high but not surprising, considering that contacts with scientists are in fact 
the second most common source of information after official scientific publications 
(Gibbons & Johnston, 1974) and considering that some of the interactions do not 
necessarily tax heavily researcher’s time. The next most common interactions are 
assisting with student placement in industry (25%), proactively seeking contact with 
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private companies and inquiring about their research (19%), and formal paid consulting 
(18%). 
 Other common industry-related behaviors are working with industry personnel 
directly on commercializing technology and co-authoring papers with industry personnel 
– 15 and 16 percent of the respondents correspondingly. The least common industry-
relevant behaviors are having worked with industry on work that has resulted in patents 
(5%) and working with industry in entrepreneurial capacity as an owner, partner or 
employee (3%). Obviously, there is a large portfolio of mechanisms of interaction with 
the private sector ordered on a hypothetical continuum where the most common 
behaviors are informal ones, followed by more structured interactions (such as co-
authorship, and ending with rare, but formal and intensive involvements in 
entrepreneurial or patenting capacity. 
Student involvement of scientists and interactions with industry 
 Even though numerous interesting between group comparisons can be made, of 
primary interest here is the involvement with students for the scientists who do and do 
not interact with industry. Comparing the involvement of faculty in different student 
related behaviors according to whether or not they had any interaction with industry 
reveals no statistically significant (t-test results shown in Table 4) differences between 
these two groups in advising students and teaching graduate students. However, scientists 
who interact with industry are significantly more likely to be more involved with students 
in all other capacities: they have more masters’ students supported through grants (1.23 
vs. 0.51), more doctoral student supported through grants (2.5 vs. 1.5), they collaborate 
with more students (5.7 vs. 3.4), have higher interest in mentoring students, and devote 
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an one less hour to undergraduate teaching (9.12 vs. 10.34 average hours per week). 
When looking at the total number of graduate students supported through grants, the 
scientists who interact with industry support twice as many students than the scientists 
who do not (3.77 vs. 2). 
 At the level of this simple comparison, the differences regarding grant support of 
masters’ and doctoral students, research collaboration with students, mentoring 
orientation towards students are in the hypothesized direction – the scientists who are 
more involved in this behavior are also the ones who interact with industry. The 
differences in graduate teaching and student advising, insignificant at this simple 
comparison are unlikely to surface as statistically significant in any of the further models. 
The relationship between undergraduate teaching and interactions with industry is 
opposite to the initial expectation. These initial comparisons are too rudimentary for 
analysis, but imply that the further pursuit of the hypothesized relationships is legitimate. 
Student involvement of scientists by discipline 
 Discipline is one of the key control variables in the model, and one likely to be 
associated with major variances in student related behaviors. Figure 6 illustrates the 
means of master’s, doctoral, and total number of graduate students supported through 
grants, as well as the mean number of students with whom scientists collaborate in 
research. This figure (as well as appendix Table 5 for the full spectrum of behaviors), 
show major between-discipline differences.  
 Scientists in Biology, Mathematics, Physics, Chemistry, on average support 
almost no master’s level students, while supporting considerable numbers of doctoral 
students. There is a “gap” between doctoral and masters’ students supported in all 
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disciplines. Agriculture, Civil and Mechanical engineering are the only disciplines where 
scientists support roughly the same number of masters’ and doctoral students.  
 The highest levels of research collaboration with students are observed in 
Computer science, Physics, and the engineering disciplines. In the cases of computer 
science and engineering disciplines the reason perhaps has to do with the type of research 
conducted in these disciplines, involving a lot of technical and development work, while 
in Physics, the complexity of the experimental work demands large number of students. 
 In all engineering disciplines the average number of graduate students supported 
through grants is similar – on average, scientists in Chemical, Mechanical, Electrical, 
Mechanical and Materials engineering support about four students, with materials 
engineers supporting the most. Computer scientists support one less graduate student on 
average. Scientists in physical and life sciences support two or less than two graduate 
students on average. 
In all disciplines scientists collaborate with more students than they support 
through grants. However these gaps are narrower for the engineering disciplines and 
wider for the physical and life sciences. This implies that the collaboration with students 
in the engineering disciplines is more likely to occur within the context of grant funded 
research responsibility of the scientists, while in physical and life sciences the research 
collaboration is to a greater extend an artifact of the research involvement of students in 
basic research – some if it large scale and institute or center (but not PI) based, as a part 
of their training.  
These variations in involvement with students indicate that controlling for the 
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Figure 6. Mean student grant support and collaboration by discipline 
 
 Another interesting inter-disciplinary variation in regard to students is the 
mentoring orientation in Biology and Mathematics. While scientists from all other 
disciplines, on average, agree or strongly agree that helping graduate students is a 
consideration in their decisions to collaborate, scientists from Biology and Mathematics 
on average disagree that this is a consideration in their collaborations. (With this attitude, 
it is not surprising that scientists in these disciplines also exhibit the lowest levels of 
collaboration with students.) 
Interactions with industry by discipline 
 Scientists from different disciplines exhibit different propensities to engage in 
industrially relevant behaviors. Figure 7 shows that scientists from the engineering 
disciplines are more likely than scientists from physical and life sciences (except 
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agriculture) to interact with the private sector. The greater propensity to interact with the 
private sector of some disciplines applies to all, not some types of interactions: scientists 
from the engineering disciplines are more likely to interact with the private sector in all 
capacities. This is most easily illustrated by comparing the mean scores of the industrial 
involvement scale by discipline. The distribution of the summary measures of industrial 
involvement is similar, but not identical to the distribution of key student related 
behaviors (compare with Figure 6). As such, it supports the intuition that the two types of 
behaviors may be related but also emphasizes that the relationships will be structurally 
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 Even in the disciplines with lowest industrial involvement, some scientists would 
still interact with the private sector. Do the patterns of these interactions differ from the 
behaviors typical for the discipline overall? The chart bellows implies that relative 
intensity of involvement of scientists who actually are involved with the private sector 
closely resembles the relative differences between disciplines. That is, the disciplinary 
context determines not only the overall level of involvement with the private sector for 
scientists in discipline, but is also influences the intensity of involvement for scientists 
who are involved with private sector companies in some capacity. The single exception 
from this resemblance is Physics, where scientists who interact with the private sector do 
so more intensively than implied by the overall industrial involvement of the discipline. 
In the case of physics however this is not necessarily surprising considering the great 
number of currents in physics, some of which (typically) with no direct commercial 
application at this time (e.g. particle or theoretical physics), while other have sustained 
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Figure 8. Means of industrial involvement scale by discipline, conditional on having 
interacted with the private sector 
 
Interactions with students and industry by tenure status 
 Tenured and non-tenured scientists differ in their student involvement. Tenured 
scientists spend less time on teaching, but the difference is on average about an hour less, 
which may simply reflect that tenured scientists are more experienced and efficient 
teachers that do not need as much preparation. 
 Tenured scientists are more likely to support more doctoral and masters’ students 
through grants, as well as to collaborate with more students. Tenure and non-tenured 
scientists spend roughly the same amount of time advising students and do not differ 
much in their mentoring orientation towards students. These results are depicted on Table 
7 in the appendix. 
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 The differences between tenured and non-tenured scientists are more substantial 
in regard to industry related behaviors (Table 8). Most importantly, while 45% of the 
non-tenured scientists have had any interaction with the private sector, more than the half 
(53%) of the tenured scientists have had interactions with private sector companies. 
Tenured scientists are more likely to have been contacted by private companies regarding 
their research, but about as likely as the non-tenured scientists to seek out information 
about the research of industry scientists. Tenured scientists are about twice as likely to 
have served as formal paid consultants to private sector companies, and twice as likely to 
have assisted with placement of students in industry jobs. Tenured scientists are also 
more likely to work directly with private sector personnel on commercializing 
technologies, as well as to co-author papers with industry scientists. 
 The brief overview of the general distributions of some key variables of interest 
showed some initial evidence that most of the hypotheses set forth in Chapter 3 may have 
some empirical support. The simple descriptive imply that faculty more involved with 
students in various capacities (especially in terms of grants support, research 
collaboration and mentoring orientation) are also more involved with industry. This 
section also showed that various other variables (e.g. discipline, tenure status) structurally 
possibly affect both interactions with industry and interactions with students. The 
complex interplay between these and other variables cannot be grasped at the level of 
simple descriptive statistics. While this chapter set the stage for the test of hypotheses, the 
next chapters formally assess the hypothesized relationships in the context of the full 
model set forth in Chapter 4. 
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7. PREDICTING STUDENT INVOLVEMENT 
 
 Chapter 4 indicated that in order to estimate nay direct effects that students may 
have on interactions with industry, I need to understand the role of students in the context 
of key indicators of scientific behaviors, most of which will affect both involvement with 
students and interactions with industry. The key such variables were number of 
collaborators, publication productivity and grants. Not considering these variables would 
overstate the hypothesized effects of students. The purpose of this chapter is to isolate the 
effects of these variables on different student related behaviors and to set the stage for 
estimating the full model (Chapter 8). 
 In the path models considered here, collaboration, productivity, grants and the 
different types of interactions with students are endogenous. The models also utilize a 
number of exogenous variables most notably discipline, collaborators, postdoctoral and 
industrial experience, tenure status, career age, basic-applied research preference. The 
path model follows the set of equations outlined in Chapter 4, and repeated here for 
convenience.  

































The sections below discuss the determinants of each endogenous variable separately. In 
all of the models, the reference disciplinary category is Biologists. 
Collaboration 
 Since the motives for collaboration are not of direct importance for this study, I 
only examine collaboration to the extent it is determined by the exogenous variables in 
the model. The estimation results are presenter in model 1 in Table 9. 
 There are no systematic inter-disciplinary differences in typical number of 
collaborators with two notable exceptions: scientists in Physics and Earth and 
Atmospheric sciences on average have ten more collaborators than scientists from other 
disciplines. This is probably an effect of the disproportionally greater resource and 
equipment requirements in these fields resulting in ever increasing team sizes. 
 Scientists who are tenured, on average, have  four more collaborators than 
scientists who are not tenured. This is to be expected, as tenure is the formal indication 
that a scientists has achieved the minimum level of recognition in his or her field through 
original research, and as the accumulative advantage hypothesis predicts, this is 
associated with improved reputation which in turn leads to easier access to funding and 
collaboration opportunities. Tenured scientists are both more sought after collaborators 
and more able to establish, enter, or maintain collaborative relationships. 
The number of collaborators tends to diminish slightly with age, and scientists 
who are affiliated with research centers on average have four more collaborators. The 
latter is not surprising as many of these institutions have as one of their primary goals to 
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facilitate and increase collaboration, and as this model implies they might be doing just 
that. 
Productivity 
 Consistent with most prior studies, collaboration positively affects productivity. 
The relationship is weakly quadratic (see Table 9). As expected, the relative impact of 
collaboration is positive and statistically significant. Contrary to some of the findings of 
prior studies (Dietz & Bozeman, 2005), having held a post-doctoral position has positive 
impact on productivity. This is perhaps in part explained with the productivity measure 
used here (total career productivity measured as total number of publications, single or 
multiple authored by the respondent) and in part with the data (representative sample of 
US scientists vs. sample of center based scientist in the Dietz and Bozeman study). 
Postdoctoral positions are typically apprenticeship positions in a research group, and 
more often than not the post-doctoral researchers will get credit (in terms of co-
authorship) even if they did not independently produce a paper. Secondly, especially in 
some disciplines (e.g. physics, bio-life), post-doctoral positions become the norm rather 
than the exception, become lengthier in duration and thus probably “absorb” some of the 
publications that scientists could have – hypothetically – produced in tenure track 
positions. 
 Gender and tenure status have has positive effect on productivity of scientists. 
Male scientists on average have eight more publications and tenured scientists have 13 




Figure 9. Effect of collaboration on productivity (standardized coefficient) 
 
Grants 
 The chief determinants of grants funding (besides the inter-disciplinary 
differences) are collaboration, and productivity, as expected (Table 10). The relative 
importance of productivity is greater than the one of collaboration. (The relationship 
between collaboration and productivity and grant funding is certainly more complex than 
the one utilized in this model and includes reciprocal influences which however are of 
peripheral importance here and thus are not considered.) 
 Tenured scientists are also more likely to have more grants, and so are center 
affiliated scientists. Post-doctoral and industrial experience do not appear to have any 







Figure 10. Direct and indirect effects of collaboration and productivity on grants 
(standardized coefficients) 
 
 Does the same dynamics apply to all types of grants (e.g. government versus 
industry)? Estimating the effects of collaboration and productivity on government and 
industry grants respectively (Table 10) suggests the answer is no. Collaboration and 
productivity have no statistically discernible effect on having industrial grants. Tenure 
status remains a statistically significant predictor of industrial grants, but is a stronger 
predictor of government grants, rather than industrial grants. 
More importantly here, the notable insignificance of productivity and the weaker 
influence of tenure - perhaps one of the chief marks of success in science, imply that the 
landscape of competition in academia indeed may be changing. These results suggest that 
success in securing government funding is dependent on traditional indicators of 
scholarly success, or reputation. However, such assets seem to be of lesser or no 
importance in regard to industrial funding. This implies – as this study argues - that the 
assets that matter in this new context do not always necessarily overlap with what is 
approximated by productivity and academic rank, thus additional research in 









 Center affiliation positively affects the ability of scientist to get both government 
and industry grants. As expected, having been a post-doc has somewhat negative effect 
on industrial grants. 
 
 
Figure 11. Direct and indirect effects of collaboration and productivity on grants by 
grants source (standardized coefficients) 
 
After isolating the key interrelationships among the chief endogenous independent 
variables, now it is time to assess how they impact student related behaviors. 
 
Predicting student involvement 
 In this study, the above relationships, albeit interesting in their own right are of 
direct interest only insofar they may spuriously affect the relationship of faculty with 
students and with industry. To prevent such possibility, it is necessary to decompose 
these effects. A first step is to estimate the direct effects of the key endogenous variables 
on student related behaviors. The most notable relationships are discussed below. 
 Productivity is not related to the time devoted to graduate teaching, but is 
negatively related to undergraduate teaching. This finding generally reflects the idea the 










empirically verified (Fox, 1992). At the graduate level, the lack of statistically significant 
relationship implies that maybe scientists do not give up (or “buy out”) of teaching in 
order to pursue research. At the graduate level, through seminars and advanced classes 
scientists can incorporate their research results most easily into their teaching – if they are 
equally motivated to be involved both in research and teaching. Undergraduate 
curriculums however tend to be more standardized and in some cases undergraduate 
classes are entrusted to more junior faculty (who are thus not yet as productive as their 
senior colleagues who are in better position to pursue teaching of subjects of genuine 
interest to them). 
 Productivity is also positively associated with supporting PhD students through 
grants, as well as research collaboration with graduate students (Table 11). This is to be 
expected, as the more productive a scientist is, the more he or she can make of 
collaboration, and the more others (including students) have reasons to collaborate with 
him. Additionally, the impact of productivity on number of students supported through 
grants is not entirely “absorbed” through grants, and persons who are more productive are 
able to support more students through research, not necessarily grant funded. 
 Government grants have discernible (more than one hour per week on average) 
negative effects on total amount of teaching as well as on undergraduate teaching, but 
have no statistically significant effect on graduate teaching. Industrial grants, on the 
contrary, have no statistically significant effects on teaching whatsoever. This finding 
speaks both to higher education researchers concerned with the possibility of industry 
displacing training activities in universities, and the researchers concerned with the 
tension between the requirements for research productivity and teaching excellence. To 
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the former, it may indicate that concerns that more intensive industrial involvement will 
interfere with core activities of universities such as teaching, are not necessarily 
warranted. To the latter, it may indicate that while the ideal of combining teaching and 
research might be holding at the graduate level, the reward system in academic 
departments and in particular the pressures to conduct research and publish (or perish) 
may be leading to overemphasis on research at the expense of undergraduate teaching 
and thus may result in the scientists giving up some teaching time for being able to push 
even harder on their research. This relationship is not surprising considering that many 
grants allow “buying out” of teaching. This certainly helps to “get the job done” in 
research, but these results imply that trading off teaching for research is de-facto 
institutionalized in the current system. 
 Government grants and productivity are the strongest predictors of the number of 
PhD students that a scientist supports through his or her grants (Figure 12). Their 
importance is less pronounced in the case of master’s level students supported through 
grants (Figure 13). Government grants are a stronger predictor of number of doctoral than 
number of master’s student supported through grants. The same is true for industrial 
grants, but the absolute and relative magnitudes of the effects are smaller. Government 
grants also positively affect research collaboration with students. 
 The combined effect of productivity and government grants on number of PHD 
students supported through grants and on number of graduate student collaborators 
implies that advanced degree students are safely integrated with the research process: if 
the more productive scientists are the ones who support more students (direct effect), and 
are also the ones who are much ore likely to have government funding which in turn 
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allows them to support even more students, this implies close connection between the 
scientist’s own research pursuits and his or her ability to extend them into funding entities 
sanctioned research agenda and his ability to utilize doctoral students as inputs in this 
self-reinforcing process. This dynamics does not seem to apply for master’s student – 
productivity has weak impact on number of master’s students supported through grants, 
and the effect of government grants is weaker as well (Figure 12 and Figure 13). 
 Similar dynamics seems to be in place in regard to industry grants as well: 
industry grants have independent effects on number of doctoral and master’s students 
supported as well as on graduate student collaboration. In addition, unlike government 
grants, industrial grants are also associated with stronger mentoring orientation of 
scientists. This is important finding to mention in the context of the forthcoming models 
as even though industrial grants are weaker predictor of number of students supported or 
collaborated with, if industrial grants are received in the context of interactions where 
involvement with students is an expectation, it may be indeed the case – as this model 
implies – that industrial grants stimulate attitudinal changes such as greater explicit 
consideration of the mentoring of the students with which the scientist works. 
 The single strongest predictor of number of students with whom the scientists 
collaborate in research is the total number of collaborators (not including students). This 
shows that scientists who collaborate intensively have propensity to enter collaborations 
in general, collaborations with students included. The next strongest predictor of 
collaboration with students is the number of government grants – also not surprising 
given that some funding entities explicitly require the incorporation of training or 









































Figure 14. Predictors of graduate student collaborators (standardized coefficients) 
 
 
 It does not seem that mentoring orientation or interest in helping graduate students 
is affected by the variables in the model. Three notable exceptions include tenure status, 
industrial grants and gender. Being tenured expectedly increases one’s interest in helping 
graduate students, not least because unless a scientist is tenured, there is probably not too 
much he or she can offer in terms of mentorship, being a junior scientist himself. The 
positive impact of industrial funding on mentoring orientation however is more curious. 
There are numerous plausible ways to interpret this relationship. The argument advanced 
here privileges one particular possibility namely that industrial funding implies a close 
relationship with the industrial partners and hence, good knowledge of their needs and 
concerns. This knowledge, combined with knowledge of the student (employment or 
training) needs and knowledge of employment or training opportunities that may arise in 
















better navigate these opportunities for their own, the scientists and industry’s benefit, as 
well as may facilitate the undertaking of particular actions (e.g. assisting with student 
placements). 
 The negative impact of gender on mentoring orientation has no obvious 
explanation. Male faculty are less likely to agree that interest in mentoring graduate 
students is a factor in their decisions to collaborate than their female colleagues. This is 
curious as in the context of the debate regarding the disadvantage position of women in 
science one could expect that female scientists, by being subject to more pressures and 
disadvantages are less likely to invest energy in mentoring students. On the other hand, it 
may be the case that in fact one structural disadvantage experienced by females is 
increased teaching and student involvement loads, which may interfere with their 
research pursuits. However interesting, this relationship is of no central interest for this 
study. 
Total effects of productivity, collaboration and grants on interactions with industry. 
 A last stepping stone before estimating the real direct effects of involvement with 
students on interactions with industry is examining the total effects of collaboration, 
productivity and grants on industrial interactions. Since these variables obviously 
influence student related behaviors, it is also important to record their total effect on 
industry related behaviors. These results will be a useful benchmark to compare with the 
estimates in the final model – after including student related behaviors in the model. The 
standard coefficients indicating the total effects of these key variables are presented 
below. The dependent variable is the industrial involvement scale, and the coefficients on 
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productivity and grants reflect the effects after accounting for the effects of collaborators 
on both of them. 
 
Figure 15. Total effects of collaborators, productivity and grants on industrial interactions 
(standardized coefficients) 
 
 In the context of this study, the total effects represent little interest on their own. 
The true test of the hypotheses set forth in the previous chapters will come after assessing 
how these total effects change (if at all) after including the variety of student-related 
behaviors in the model.  
 This chapter provided preliminary insights on the possible effects of key career 
variables on interactions with industry and how students may intervene and modify these 
relationships. The next chapter is devoted to isolating the specific direct effects that 












8. EFFECTS OF STUDENT INVOLVEMENT ON INTERACTIONS WITH 
INDUSTRY 
 
 The previous chapters laid the groundwork for answering the key question of this 
thesis: whether or not more intensive involvement with students of university scientists is 
also associated with more intensive interactions with the private sector. The results 
reported in the previous chapter, albeit not of primary interest for this question, were an 
essential step towards building an empirical model isolating the unique direct effects that 
involvement with students might have, outside of any spurious paths from productivity, 
collaboration or grant support through industry. The sections below present the findings 
from the full model, starting with the summary measure of the industrial involvement – 
the industrial involvement scale and then considering the relative strength of the observed 
effects (if any) on the cases of the specific industry related behaviors. 
 Table 12 presents the estimates from the full model, featuring all of the student 
related behaviors. After controlling for productivity, collaboration, grant funding, and the 
set of control variables, grant support of students, research collaboration with students, 
and mentoring orientation towards students positively affect interactions with industry. 
There is no statistically significant relationship between teaching and advising and 
interactions with industry. This non-finding implies that it may be the case that concerns 
with industrial activity displacing teaching functions may be unwarranted. The null 
hypothesis of “no effect” of teaching on industrial interactions cannot be rejected at any 
conventional significance level. The lack of statistically discernible relationship implies, 
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at the very least, that it is not a common strategy to off-load teaching and advising 
responsibilities in order to pursue industrial opportunities, as some have feared.  
 What is the relative strength of the significant effects, and what to the differences 
mean in the hypotheses set forth in Chapter 3? The figure below presents the standardized 




Figure 16. Direct effects of interactions with students on the industrial involvement scale 
(standardized coefficients) 
 
 Supporting students through grants is the type of student interaction most strongly 
associated with interactions with industry, and the effect of supporting doctoral students 
is stronger than supporting master’s students. These results provide initial support for the 
core hypotheses of this thesis. There is also a sort of “gradient” effect in the impact of 
student related behaviors on interactions with industry: the ones that involve the most 
direct investment from the side of university scientists (e.g. grant support of students) 
also have the strongest effect on industrial interactions, and the weaker the “investment”, 












Not only the estimated on key student-related behaviors are positive and 
statistically significant, but they also weaken or altogether remove the effect of some of 
the other variables in the model. In particular, the effects of publication productivity and 
collaboration stop being statistically significant, the total effects of grants are reduced: for 
government grants from .142 to .059 and for industry grants from .256 to .222. While the 
reduction in the total effect of industrial grants is negligible, suggesting strong 
independent effects not shared with the student related behaviors, the effect of 
government grants is reduced by ~60% suggesting that whatever total effect government 
grants had, the majority of it is channeled through involvement with students. Before 
moving to detailed discussion of such results, we should first consider in more detail the 
particular effects of student related behaviors. 
 Looking at the standardized coefficients simply shows the direction and relative 
strength of the expected effects. But what do these effects mean substantively? Table 14 
shows the estimates and the marginal effects from a tobit model with the industrial 
involvement scale as a dependent variable. Tobit estimation is appropriate in this case as 
the dependent variable contains a large number of observations censored at zero. The 
table also shows the decomposition of the tobit coefficients. 
 The student related behaviors affect the probability of an observation having a 
non-zero value of the industrial involvement scale. In other words, the student related 
behaviors and attitudes positively affect the probability that a scientist will enter any 
interaction with industry. The changes in this probability are as follows: supporting one 
more master’s level student through grants increases the probability that a scientist would 
enter any interaction with industry by 2.1 percentage points. Supporting one more 
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doctoral student through grants increases the probability of entering any interaction with 
industry by 2.4 percentage points. One point increase in the Likert scale indicating 
mentoring orientation towards graduate students increases the probability of interacting 
with industry by 5 percentage points. Collaborating with one more graduate student 
increases the probability of interacting with industry by a third of a percentage point. 
 These marginal effects reflect the influences that can be attributed directly to 
interactions with students, over and above what is spuriously explained by the other 
variables in the model. Do these effects have any economical significance? Answer to 
this question makes sense only in comparison with the estimated effects of some of the 
other variables in the model. For example, looking again at Table 14, we can see that 
these effects are substantial compared to other important predictors such as gender 
(increasing the probability of any interaction by 6 percentage points), center affiliation 
(increasing the probability of any interaction by 8 percentage points), and an additional 
government grant (increasing the probability of any interaction by 3.8 percentage points. 
 Obviously, these estimates are not to be used to achieve specific “target 
probabilities” of interaction with the private sector by urging the faculty to have more 
students. Nevertheless, these comparisons show that effects are “real”, but not merely 
statistical artifacts with little substantive significance. 
 Of all four student related variables, supporting doctoral students seems to have 
the strongest effect on the probability of interactions with industry as well as on the 
intensity of these interactions, followed by support of master’s level students, mentoring 
orientation and collaboration with graduate students. These effects reflect the summary 
impact of interactions with students on interactions with industry, but hide potentially 
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important information: perhaps interactions with students have different relative 
importance for the different types of interactions with industry. To estimate such 
possibility, I also estimate linear probability models for every specific interaction as a 
dependent variable (Table 13). The chart below (Figure 17) represents the (statistically 
significant) standardized coefficients to allow better comparisons of the relative impact of 
students on different types of industrial interactions. There are apparent differences, 
meaningful in the context of the theory advanced here. 
 Among all specific industry related behaviors, the strongest association is 
between the number of PhD students supported through grants on the probability that the 
scientist has engaged in working directly with industry personnel on commercializing or 
transferring technology. That this is the most pronounced effect of a student related 
behavior is important in the context of the hypotheses tested here as it speaks to two of 
the major arguments for positive relationship between student involvement and industrial 
interaction. First, numerous studies have shown that in technology transfer activities, the 
sustained involvement of faculty and students is essential (Poyago-Theotoky, Beath, & 
Siegel, 2002; Thursby & Thursby, 2004). Second, this type of behavior matches the 
situation in which the scientist and the industrial partners explore the possible 
commercial applications of a new invention that is too rudimentary to be “in 
development” (Randazzese, 1996). Third, the presence of students is the asset that 
enhances the ability of the scientist to enter this particular type of interaction (relative to 
his colleagues with the same credentials, but otherwise working with less students) – 
which indeed is the central proposition of this study. 
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 This is not the only estimate that supports this line of reasoning. The next 
strongest estimates relate to other behaviors most likely to occur in an “experimentation 
stage” of technology transfer activities (Randazzese, 1996), namely information 
exchanges between university scientists and industrial partners. Number of doctoral 
student supported also strongly relates to information exchanges, both ones initiated by 
private firms and ones initiated by the scientist, as well as to co-authoring papers with 
industry personnel. The effect of doctoral students supported through grants is stronger in 
cases where industry partners have initiated requests, which in the context of the 
argument of this study I interpret as additional evidence that industrial partners are 
motivated by the “student capacity” of university scientists and the presence of such 
capacity is positively related with industrial interactions. 
 To a slightly lesser extent, number of doctoral students also affects to industrial 
activity in entrepreneurial capacity and to patenting activity. The role of master’s students 
supported through grants in all these interactions seems to be much smaller, with the 
exception of patenting, where the effect of master’s students is relatively stronger than 
the one of doctoral students. This is an indirect evidence that in general, interactions with 
industry are more likely involve relatively advanced research work, not merely routine 
one (e.g., testing, simulations etc.), that can be easily delegated exclusively to master’s 
level students. 
 In the case of specific behaviors, collaboration with graduate students is not 
statistically significant predictor of any industry-related behavior except assisting with 
placement of graduate students. This directs attention to one component of scientist-
student interactions that has been unjustly excluded from the initial hypotheses, namely 
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certain reciprocity of these relationships. While faculty “utilize” students as inputs in the 
research process for various purposes, students are not completely passive actor in such 
relationships, but can enter strategic relationships with faculty by providing research 
assistance (even unfunded) in exchange to collaboration, networking and job 
opportunities, as implied by these results.  
Research collaboration with students had no independent statistically significant 
effect on any of the other types of interaction with industry, but substantial effect on 
placement of students in industry jobs. This implies that research collaboration with 
students is a two way street in which not only the scientist may realize some benefits, but 
also students. They may seek collaboration opportunities with faculty in order to gain 
access to these faculty professional networks and use the effort they contribute to the 
scientist’s research as an entry ticket to some of the opportunities these networks provide. 
The estimate on graduate student collaboration provides some, albeit of course indirect 
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Figure 17. Relative impact of student related behaviors on different types of interactions 
with industry (standardized coefficients) 
 
 Mentoring orientation is an attitude that apparently has differential impacts in 
regard to specific industry related behaviors. While it is significantly and positively 
related with the intensity of industrial interactions and the likelihood of entering such 
interactions, it is not related with scientist’s requests for information from the private 
sector, working with industry in entrepreneurial capacity, patenting and 
commercialization and technology transfer efforts. A closer look reveals that the types of 
interactions that are not related to mentoring orientations also represent working contexts 
less likely to facilitate mentoring behaviors – it is easier to mentor students in the process 
of coauthoring papers, guiding them through problem solving activities initiated by 
industry, advising and assisting them with placement in industry jobs, than in working for 
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industry, patenting efforts, and direct efforts to commercialize technology – where stakes 
other than research and training come into place. 
 Consulting activities are the single type of interactions with industry that does not 
seem to be strongly affected by involvement with students, except for mentoring 
orientation and grant support of doctoral students. Formal paid consulting is perhaps the 
least interactive form of interaction possible: regardless of how the consulting assignment 
occurred, at the end, it boils down to the solution of a specific problem by the university 
scientist for a fee. It is an application of the toolbox of the discipline mastered by the 
scientist to industrial problems. This type of interaction does not necessarily involve 
mutual collaboration and exploration, and more often then not occurs in fixed terms 
(problem specification, duration, expected deliverables). As such, it does not seem to 
represent a work context in which there is much room for student involvement. Yet, 
scientists who exhibit higher mentoring orientation are more likely to enter such 
interactions, as well as scientist who support more doctoral students. Even though 
minimal, student involvement still has impact on ability to interact with industry through 
consulting. 
 Lastly, it should be noted that not only the involvement with students relates 
differently to the different types of interaction with industry, but the goodness of fit of the 
model varies greatly depending on what type of interaction is considered. For the 
industrial involvement scale the variance explained is substantial (the R-squared 
coefficient is a respectable .35). Similarly, the fit of the linear probability models 
explaining information exchanges, student placement, technology transfer or 
commercialization activities and co-authoring is arguably substantial (Table 13). 
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However, the explained variance for behaviors such as working in industry in 
entrepreneurial capacity and patenting is relatively smaller – up to twice as small as the 
proportion explained for the other types of interactions (Table 13). 
 The present data allows little more than that to be said about these types of 
interactions. Incidentally, interactions with industry in entrepreneurial capacity as well as 
academic patenting are the types of interactions most commonly considered in the 
technology transfer literature. Yet, they are both least common (only 4% and 6% of the 
university scientists engage in such behaviors as indicated in Table 3), and least 
“explainable” in terms of typical academic career variables. These two facts combined 
imply that the overemphasis on such types of behaviors may not be justified considering 
their not so often occurrence and relatively random nature. The relatively poor fit of the 
models implies that it is not common descriptors of university scientists that explain such 
behaviors, but a set of some other – systematic or random – unknown factors. Whichever 
the case, this implies that extensive study of this behavior alone is unlikely to render 
insights regarding larger scale general trends in university-industry interactions at the 
individual level, unless other industry-related behaviors are considered as well. 
Other effects 
 Several other factors affecting interactions with industry, albeit of peripheral 
interest to this study deserve mention and are interesting in their own right. First, personal 
research preferences play role in interactions with industry: scientists who devalue 
applied research and equate basic research with “good” research are both less likely to 
enter any interactions with industry, and even if they do, less likely to intensively 
collaborate with the private sector. It should be noted however that such preferences do 
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not have any statistically significant effects on any of the student-related variables (Table 
11). 
 Having bee in a post-doctoral position also decreases the probability of entering 
any interaction with industry (by 9.8 percentage points), and the intensity of such 
interactions for the scientists who have had some interaction with the private sector. 
Having been in a post-doctoral position however also does not impact any of the student-
related behaviors, except for a negative statistically significant effect on number of 
master’s students supported through grants.  
 Center affiliation is positively associated with the interactions with the private 
sector – it both increases the probability of entering such interactions (by 8.6 percentage 
points) and the intensity of the industrial interactions. Center affiliation is also positively 
associated with supporting doctoral students through grants, and negatively associated 
with teaching (implying “teaching buyouts”). The total effect of center affiliation 
decreases by about 30% after including student-related variables (from .095 to .07), thus 
implying that at least a portion of the positive effect of center affiliation on industrial 
interactions is due to student interactions. 
Summary 
 Interactions with student via grant support, research collaboration and the 
presence of mentoring orientation towards students in university scientists have positive 
independent direct effects on the likelihood of entering interactions with industry and 
increase the intensity of such interactions. Teaching and advising of students have no 
statistically discernible effects interactions with industry. Interactions with students are 
accountable for considerable portions of the total positive effect of government grant 
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funding on interactions with industry, and seem to be mediating variables between 
publication productivity and collaboration, and interactions with industry as upon 
including student related variables in the model, collaboration and productivity stop being 
statistically significant. 
These direct effects result support four out of the initial six hypotheses of this 
work. While the research questions attempted to estimate the effects of the full spectrum 
of student-related behaviors, the ones that surfaced as present and significant at the end of 
the analysis are the ones most closely related to the theoretical argument advanced here. 
After examining the effects of institutional characteristics (In Chapter 7), the discussion 






 The estimated positive direct effects of key student related behaviors and attitudes 
(e.g. grant support, collaboration, and mentoring orientation) have several theoretical and 
policy implications.13 The theoretical implications discussed in this chapter directly 
pertain to 1) the discussions of the possible consequences of the closer integration 
between the academic and industrial sectors; 2) the implications of the findings for 
conceptualizing scientific work and careers and 3) to theoretical conceptualizations of the 
technology transfer processes between academia and industry at the individual level. 
Industry and academia – concerns over interference 
 The concern over the possible interferences of industry into academia is perhaps 
at least as old as the explicit policy attempts to bridge the gaps between the two that have 
arguably intensified since the 1970s. Some researchers were worried that the incentive 
structures and organizational structures of both were incompatible (Campbell & 
Slaughter, 1999; Johns, Barnes, & Florencio, 2003) and the increased industrial funding 
and involvement in university research would sooner or later have detrimental effect on 
core academic functions and values (David, 2004). One specific area of major concern 
concerns the radical differences in intellectual property regimes (David, 2004). While in 
science openness and prompt publication of all new discoveries is the norm, industrial 
interests are better served by secrecy and protection of intellectual property. In fact, the 
need for secrecy is so strong, that societal mechanisms such as the patent system were 
                                                 
13 While theoretical and policy implications easily overlap, they are considered in separate chapters, The 
current chapter is devoted to theoretical implications, and the next one discusses implications for policy 
 
 135
devised to stimulate disclosure of inventive information in exchange of temporary 
monopoly. 
 Others were concerned that “academic capitalism” can radically alter the values 
of scientists and further displace the core functions of universities. Of particular concern 
is the possibility of scientists, always looking for ways to fund their research would 
become de facto servants to industrial interests, doing what they have to get the research 
dollars, even if this means neglecting some other roles such as teaching and training 
(Anderson, 2001). 
 The findings reported in this work speak predominantly to the latter group. The 
estimated positive direct effects of interactions with students not only do not confirm 
these fears, but imply that different dynamics may be in place. First and foremost, the 
models estimated imply that scientists do not give up essential activities in order to be 
able to pursue industrial opportunities. If anything, their ability to excel in such activities, 
relative to their peers enhances, but does not diminish their ability to interact with 
industry. 
 Non-findings in general are not meaningful, but in this case the absence of 
statistically recognizable relationship14 between teaching and advising activities and 
interactions with industry also speaks to the above concerns. Teaching involvement (as 
measured through time devoted to in-class teaching and preparation), is one of the easiest 
things to downplay in one’s workweek (up to the obvious limitations of scheduled in-
class time) in order to devote as much time as possible to research, and especially to 
industrially relevant research. Yet the results reported here do not support such reasoning: 
there is no significant relationship between teaching and industry interactions. Even the 




most formal commitment to industry – in the form of receiving industrial grants, 
presumably extended in exchange of expected effort and deliverables – do not seem to 
affect the level of teaching and advising involvement of university scientists. 
 More important here however are the “real” findings, namely the direct positive 
effects of grant support of students, research collaboration with students and mentoring 
orientation on probability of entering industrial interactions and on the intensity of such 
interactions. These student interactions positively affect interactions with industry over 
and above any direct and spurious effects of key scientists’ characteristics such as 
academic rank, age, collaborations, publication productivity and grant funding. 
 But why and how exactly interactions with students enhance interactions with 
industry? Looking back at the theory of accumulative advantage and to a general theory 
of university-industry technology transfer helps elucidate a plausible scenario. 
Assets and rewards in academic careers 
 The basic justification of the hypotheses tested in this thesis was that certain 
dimensions of the complex role of being a scientists (for example, training and support of 
students) may be valued and rewarded by the industrial sector at least as much, if not 
more, as other measures of scholarly success, such as publication productivity. This 
hypothesis was informed by the phenomenon of differential returns and unequal 
distribution of assets and outputs in science. The basic mechanism is that some 
dimensions of the scientific outputs are simply valued and rewarded more than others. 
Traditionally, this has been the publication productivity 0 the single most important 
determinant of success in science. However, the arena of academic competition is 
changing with the increased emphasis on industrial interactions, and one of the 
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consequences of this changed competitive landscape may be increased valuation of other 
aspects of the scientific role. 
 The increased integration of public and private science orientations on US 
campuses may have indeed “fractured the status-based stratification order governing 
achievement in the public science arena and altered the conditions for competition” 
(Owen-Smith, 2003, p. 4). One consequence of such process would be the enhanced 
ability of scientists to undertake different paths to academic success – paths that do not 
diminish or replace the importance of scholarly productivity, but provide more diverse 
ways to attain it. 
 By and large production and publication of knowledge is arguably the most 
important role of scientists. Nowadays publication productivity is still the primary proxy 
of scientific ability, and the single most important indicator of scientific achievement. 
However, it is no longer the only one. Other dimensions of the scientific role have gained 
more attention and valued relatively more than previously. The social context in which 
science is embedded has changed appreciably. The most notable changes include the 
introduction of numerous non-scientific stakeholders in the process of managing science, 
and more importantly – change in the expected deliverables, nowadays expected to 
include appreciable impacts, or at least relevance (e.g. contribution to competitiveness 
and private sector innovation). Combined, these trends have altered the landscape of 
academic competition (for credit, but also let’s not forget funds). Being commercially 
successful is not anathema but a major achievement. New research institutions have 
emerged that place more complex demands on scientists, and sometimes scientists need 
to compete for funds with institutions emphasizing commercially relevant research. 
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In this context, roles previously non-essential for success in science (albeit 
formally required), may have become important in new ways for success in this new 
environment. Considering that training and research are closely integrated in the system 
of higher education, the importance of students may have risen to occupy the place not of 
mere raw material for academic careers (any leftovers or “not good enough”s of which 
used by industry), but the place of a direct input to private sector innovation, sought 
directly from the universities in the process of interactions with university scientists, but 
not something simply purchased on the labor market.  
Obviously, the mere quantity of students one supports or collaborates with cannot 
“cause” interactions with industry. Let’s perform a thought experiment. What is left over 
from a university industry interaction at the individual level if we keep all else equal, but 
subtract any student interaction? We’ll be left with a university scientist and industrial 
partners presumably sharing a common interest. We will have some general 
understanding that the research expectations of both parties complement each other. If all 
of these conditions are present, however, but there are no students in the mix, nothing 
will happen. There may be occasional conference contact, phone call, but no sustained 
interaction. The institutional orders and working contexts in academia and industry, and 
there is little to bridge them. No self-respecting scientist would “do industry’s work” – in 
which case his scientific credentials could indeed suffer, and no industrial partners could, 
or could afford to gain a true entry point to the research performed by the scientist except 
in highly formalized settings such as contract research or in research centers. 
The theory advanced in this thesis, and backed up by the results, implies that the 
presence of students may be a bridging component helping establish, maintain and 
 
 139
expand university-industry collaborations at the individual level. In this role, students 
become an essential component of the technology transfer processes and an important 
factor that deserves careful conceptualization in the research on UIRs. Interactions 
between university scientists and industry are often organized around the mutual 
exploration of a rudimentary finding which may or may not be commercialisable. The 
industrial and university partners participate in this exploration or experimentation stage 
(Poyago-Theotoky, Beath, & Siegel, 2002; Randazzese, 1996) to get a better grip of the 
problem and assess its commercial potential or to gain insights for new research. This 
work often involves on-site or personal consultations, a lot of experimentation, testing, 
and simulations: work too advanced to be entrusted to ad hoc technicians, but too 
mundane and too much for a scientist to accomplish himself. The presence of students 
constitutes a dimension of scientists’ capacity to identify, act upon and exploit problems 
of potential interest to industry, and to explore them in collaborative setting. 
The presence of students also may be an independent motivation for industrial 
partners to pursue such interactions by 1) being qualified personnel to accomplish the 
exploratory work characterizing such arrangements and 2) by being immediate and future 
capital gains for the participating firm. Even interactions with no particular deliverable 
may be beneficial for industry if what the firm gets is access to competent potential 
employees that can be courted and hired. While speculations regarding such scenario 
have been popping occasionally in studies of technology transfer (Behrens & Gray, 2001; 
Randazzese, 1996; Slaughter, Campbell, Holleman, & Morgan, 2002), quantitative test of 
the plausibility of this scenario has not been accomplished to date. This study partially 
fills this void in the literature. 
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Since students are a research input in scientists’ own research, the sheer quantity 
of students funded through scientists; grants or with whom the scientist collaborates will 
have impact on the probability and intensity of interactions with industry. While most 
scientists have some students in their supervision with whom they partner in the process 
of their research, scientists with – literally – more students will be better (relative to 
colleagues with same credentials otherwise but less involved with students) positioned 
both to accomplish their scholarly goals and also to be able to afford to look for problems 
and opportunities such as the ones provided by interactions with industrial partners. 
Since the landscape of academic competition has evolved in realms beyond the 
“ivory tower” regulated exclusively by the peer review process to include capacity of 
demonstrating appreciable effects of one’s research – including commercial success, or 
sustained ability to make contributions to such success – the role of the relevant 
dimensions of scholarly ability have evolved as well. This thesis argued that involvement 
with students, while as old as the university system itself, is a dimension of the scientists’ 
research capacity that is suited for competing in an arena characterized with increased 
acknowledgement and pursuit of research interactions with industry. The scientist better 
endowed with such capacity will have greater chances of recognizing and acting upon 
industrial opportunities as well as will be more sought after by industrial partners. These 
interactions may result in further commitments, including grant funding and contract 
research, resulting in opportunities to utilize and train more and more students, thus 
perpetuating the cycle. 
These findings perhaps tell us something about the organization of science in 
general. It is unlikely that intensive involvement of scientists with students enhances 
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these scientists’ interactions with the private sector and nothing else. Perhaps the 
interactions with students are a feature of the scholarly life that results in better science in 
general. The contemporary higher education system, especially its US version, is fairly 
formalized and attempts to standardize and production of scientists on the basis of 
standardized curriculums, course sequences, exams, etc. These are very important 
educational innovations, which however, should not be thought of as replacements of the 
close interactions between scientists and students – an absolutely essential feature of 
advanced education. One broad implication of my findings is that industry and academia 
may be indeed connected at a fundamental level – at the level of advancing science as a 
process of joint discovery of mentors and their students. In this process, industry maybe 
is not an intruder, but one more arena where this process of discovery could take place. If 
so, the connections between science and industrial innovation are already more intimate 
than implied by merely registering that industry does utilize scientific knowledge. 
If a common scenario of university-industry interaction involves exploratory work 
where university and industry partners complement their interest in a phenomena by 
exploring its scholarly and commercial implications in a setting where students play vital 
role, then it is plausible that students represent a dimension of scientists’ research 
capacity suited for effectively navigating in such circumstances, by serving the goals both 
of the scientist and the industrial partner. If such mechanism is in place, one indication of 
its presence would be a positive relationship between involvement with students and 
involvement with industry. The results reported in this thesis suggest that such direct 
relationship is plausible. This of course does not make the claim suggested here “true”, it 
only fails to refute it just yet. Nevertheless, this is a reason for optimism, not 
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methodological despair. In the Popperian conceptualization of scientific advancement no 
scientific statement could be assumed true with certainty, it can only be falsified with 
certainty. The present results fail to falsify the claims made here, which means that they 
are conditionally plausible until further tests demonstrate results contrary to predictions 
or derive better alternative explanations. 
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10. POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
 Similar to the problem of complementarity versus competition between research 
and teaching (Fox, 1992), the problem of mutuality or conflict between core university 
functions (especially training) and interactions with industry, has organizational and 
policy implications. These issues have become increasingly controversial, as whether or 
not educational and research activities, and interactions with industry is by no means 
obvious, well understood and certainly not resolved.  
 The main result of this thesis provides incremental contribution towards an 
understanding of university-industry interactions as activities that complement each 
other, but not necessarily interfere with each other. Since the question of how to 
reorganize and adjust the university system to better integrate it with the increasing 
knowledge needs and problems of the industrial innovation, this finding provides some 
additional policy guidelines on how to better pursue such a goal. 
One more tool in the university-industry policy toolbox 
 The main result of this thesis, with both theoretical and policy implications, is the 
enhanced understanding of the factors that drive university-industry interactions at the 
individual level. This thesis assesses the relative importance of arguably the key variables 
describing scientist’s behaviors. The results shown here generally demonstrate that the 
same behaviors that are usually associated with scholarly success (such as productivity, 
grant funding, collaboration) are also associated with engaging with the private sector. 
More importantly, the results imply that one particular, and previously neglected 
component of scientists behavior – the interactions with students – in itself is an 
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important catalyst of interactions with industry. Interactions with students have direct 
effects on interactions with industry, and mediate the effects of productivity and 
collaboration and government funding. 
 Such finding regarding the nature of university-industry interactions in itself 
provides a possible tool for interventions and it can have multiple uses. This new 
understanding leads to multiple possible policy implications, and can inform policy 
relating to university-industry relations and higher education policy in general. These 
implications are enumerated below. 
Rethinking the emphases in S&T policy legislation 
 The possible contributions of the findings of the study to the recent S&T policy 
debates are best illustrated by linking these results to the current practice in the field. 
What existing policies and programs exist to facilitate and intensify the interactions of 
university scientists with the industry? In what ways, if any, do they relate to or consider 
the students in university-industry interactions? Most notable among the US national 
level policies is the sequence of technology transfer related legislation enacted in the last 
twenty years.15 
                                                 
15 These landmark laws include the Stevenson-Wydler Technology Innovation Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-480) 
which mandated that federal labs set aside technology transfer budgets and establish procedures so that 
external parties could access lab technology; the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 (P.L. 96-517) which allowed 
universities to obtain titles to patents developed with federal funds; the Small Business Innovation 
Development Act of 1982 (P.L. 97-219) which required agencies to provide special funds for small 
business R&D related to agencies missions; the Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-502), 
which required that technology transfer activities are considered a responsibility of federal lab employees, 
and used in employee evaluations. This law also allowed federal laboratories to enter CRADAs as well as 
to negotiate licensing arrangements for laboratory inventions. Other legally sanctioned policies include 
Executive Order 12591 of 1987, which required laboratories to identify and encourage individuals to serve 
as liaisons between federal labs, universities and the private sector. Another important law is the Omnibus 
Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-418), which emphasized the need for public-private 
cooperation in realizing the benefits of R&D and established centers for transferring manufacturing 
technology as well as the Industrial Extension Services. The National Competitiveness Technology 
Transfer Act of 1989 (P.L. 101-189) extended to the government owned and contractor operated 
laboratories the same ability to enter CRADAs and provided additional provisions for protection of 
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 This legislation, albeit seemingly diverse and all-encompassing, is in fact 
characterized with common underlying logic and a handful of very specialized goals and 
assumptions. In particular, all these laws seek to increase the rate of transfer of academic 
research advances to industry and to facilitate the application of these research advances 
by firms as part of broader efforts to improve national economic performance. Most of 
these policies “focus on the codification of property rights to inventions, and rarely 
address the broader matrix of university-industry relationships that span a broad range of 
activities and outputs.” (D. Mowery & Sampat, 2006, p. 210). 
 This diagnosis is troubling considering the broad spectrum of university industry 
interactions. One particular component of this broader matrix – the training and 
educational component in technology transfer activities is almost entirely missing from 
this legislation.16 This does not need to be the case. After all, the behaviors and incentives 
for the academic institutions are more feasible to influence by the government, as 
opposed to less understood behaviors such as informal interactions between university 
and academia, which could hardly be legally sanctioned. 
The main policy implication of this work is that national science policy should 
worry less about transferring deliverables to industry, and more about strengthening the 
educational system. The results reported here further indicated that “deliverables” 
                                                                                                                                                 
intellectual property. The American Technology Preeminence Act of 1991 (P.L. 102-245) further extended 
and formalized the guidelines for protecting intellectual property and sanctioned its exchange among 
CRADA participants. These are the key laws on the topic, Other laws or amendments of these laws have 
been passed in the 1990s. They include the National Department of Defense Authorization Act for 1994, 
(P.L. 103-160), National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1995, (P.L. 104-113), Technology 
Transfer Commercialization Act of 2000, (P.L. 106-404) 
 
 
16 For example, the keyword “students” is found in total of only 19 instances and the keyword “education” - 
in 188 instances - under titles 15 (Commerce and Trade) and 35 (patents) of the US code, which contain the 
technology transfer and patent legislation sections respectively. These are surprisingly low number of 
mentions, considering that these are the results for the entire titles, not just for the specific chapters 
pertaining to technology innovation (Title 15, Chapter 63) or patenting (Title 35, Chapter 43). 
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behaviors, such as patenting and entrepreneurship are not well explained with traditional 
measures of scholarly success, which implies that over emphasis on such behaviors on 
the policy arena may lead to unpredictable shifts in scientists behaviors and possible 
undesirable behaviors. 
The legal and institutional infrastructure to facilitate technology transfer from 
universities to industry is already in place. My results imply that any further efforts in this 
direction may be inefficient at best, and detrimental at the worst. Stories of commercial 
successes of university inventions abound, but their occurrence is too random and 
unpredictable to serve as a basis for national S&T policy. Instead, focusing on incentives 
to even better integrate the commercial utilization of what universities already do best 
and the most of, may be more sustainable and more appropriate in the future. 
 In addition to the mentioned legislation, there is also a broad spectrum of 
programs and tools attempting in their different ways to bring closer the academic 
research and industry. Some of these are federal or state initiatives implemented as part 
of the respective agencies’ missions, and some of them are triggered or encouraged by 
the above legislation. 
 In the first category one could find a very diverse set of partnership programs 
(Coburn & Berglund, 1995). Some of the most notable ones include the NSF supported 
research centers, university based research parks, university based technology incubators, 
and different state level technology initiatives such as research parks, centers of 
excellence, extension programs etc. In the second category, one could observe the 




 The various types of technology partnerships and boundary-spanning institutions 
attempt different strategies to establish closer links between universities and industry. 
More important in the current argument however is that none of them – with some 
important exceptions discussed below – has anything to do with students, with the 
training and education mission of universities. The priorities of these programs are 
heavily skewed towards technology development, technology financing, and industry 
problem solving while educational and training activities are far less, if at all emphasized 
(Coburn & Brown, 1997).Whether or not this should be the case of course depends on the 
particular goals and circumstances of such institutions. However, considering that 
universities are linked to most of these initiatives, and considering the results from this 
work, as well as indirect evidence from studies devoted specifically so such institutions, 
it may be prudent to consider mechanisms to involve educational and training 
components in such institutions. For example, even in the case of perhaps the least 
interactive (by design) institutions such as the technology incubators whose chief purpose 
is to provide basic business infrastructure for startups, one of the most important benefits 
reported by firms participating in university incubators is the access to university faculty 
and students (Lewis, 2001). Others have pointed out that research on technology 
incubation focuses exclusively on facilities, while neglecting the “true” needs of the 
clients of the incubator (Hackett & Dilts, 2004). 
 The results reported here that incorporating student-related components in such 
program may increase their attractiveness for industry and overall efficiency. If 
boundary-spanning programs and institutions are popular and grow in importance, and if 
there is direct and indirect evidence that firms are motivated by access to qualified human 
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capital, then the training of next generation scholars in the university setting should 
perhaps incorporate exposure to industry-relevant research and to provide training in the 
norms and peculiarities of the technology transfer process. Since this study showed that 
interactions with industry are not the realm of marginalized scientists who could not 
otherwise “make it”, and since it demonstrated that an important component of these 
scientists’ ability to interact with the private sector, it then follows that it may be 
warranted to promote more intensive integration of student training with university 
relevant research, as a tool to promote such behaviors in future scientists. Once 
graduated, such students will be “less foreign” to an environment of intersection of 
academia and industry. 
Implications for boundary spanning institutions that focus on education: NSF ERCs 
 NSF’s ERCs deserve particular attention in the discussion of the findings of this 
study. The reason is that before the inception of the ERC program in 1984, student 
education and training has not been typically addressed by the various centers programs. 
Important part of the mission of the ERCs is to “revolutionize engineering research and 
education by focusing more on interdisciplinary problems, building closer ties between 
industrial and academic research, and providing a different, more hands-on education for 
engineering undergraduate and graduate students” (Bozeman & Boardman, 2004). This 
explicit focus on education is one of the reasons why these institutions are indeed 
considered to be “revolutionary” (Bozeman & Boardman, 2004). 
 The results in this thesis provide evidence that such policy may be sensible and 
effective. The results presented here imply that the educational component of ERCs is not 
merely an add-on to the program goals (to perhaps bribe and put at ease university 
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administrator and to more easily attract university scientists to affiliate with such 
centers), but an integral and important component of the institutional design to attract and 
retain industrial partners willing to invest in working relationship with university 
counterparts. The ERC program pays not only lip service to the need for sustaining and 
improving the relevance of the engineering education, but the goal of the ERCs is to 
provide continual interaction of academic researchers, students, and faculty with their 
industry peers. With this emphasis, it should come as no surprise that firms explicitly 
note that some of the chief benefits derived from interactions with ERCs is the access to 
qualified students (Feller, Ailes, & Roessner, 2002; Feller & Roessner, 1995). 
 Since the center affiliations reported in the survey encompass far more, and more 
diverse boundary-spanning institutions such as the ERCs, the results of this study - 
combined with the rationale of the ERC program – imply that increased emphasis on 
student involvement may be beneficial for other types of center programs as well. Since 
the positive relationship between student and industry involvement is registered while 
keeping affiliation with center constant, this implies first student involvement amplifies 
the already positive effect of center affiliation on interactions with industry. Further, this 
implies that center programs can take advantage of processes that occur “naturally” and 
channel such student interactions in ways best matching the center mission. Albeit 
research centers have slightly negative effects on teaching (Gaughan & Bozeman, 2005), 
they seem to have positive effects on graduate student grant support, which is one of the 
behaviors associated with increased industrial interactions as reported here. If so, then at 
least some of these centers seem to be successfully harnessing and amplifying these – 
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specific to graduate education – training and interaction functions towards 
accomplishment of their specific institutional goals. 
 Another important advantage of such institutional environments is that they 
provide conditions for scientists to pursue research goals and strategies such as 
interdisciplinary and more applied research, which are not always as easily pursued in the 
environment of the traditional academic departments. Among other things, this allows 
scientists in various positions to take advantage of resources and support system to allow 
them to compete and advance their careers in arenas not limited by the rigid status-based 
system of academic competition based exclusively on peer review. While this system has 
proven effective, it is also characterized with emphasis on rigid career paths and 
deliverables that may pose structural barriers for “non-traditional” scientists (for example 
– women and minorities) to succeed in academia. Centers may be one way to reduce or 
circumvent such structural limitations and to enhance the chances of relatively 
disadvantaged groups such as women: recent study has found a “gender equity” effect of 
centers that reduces the gender based research disadvantages (Corley & Gaughan, 2005). 
If such “equity effects” are a characteristic of such centers, then another possible 
implication of this study is that the relatively strong emphasis on student training may be 
a way to facilitate, support and sustain scientists’ involvement with students (through the 
assistance of the center resources and infrastructure), by at (indirectly) relaxing the 
pressure to “publish at all costs”, one unfortunate side effect of which in some cases may 
be the relative neglect of training and mentoring obligations. 
 If NSF wishes to increase the commercial orientation of its centers and their 
relevance to industry, the future actions of the centers and NSF should take into 
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consideration the importance of the students as assets in these relationships. The current 
ERC evaluations include measures such as percent of industrial partners who have hired 
ERC student or graduate (Parker, 1997), however there is great variability in the 
proportion of partners reporting this outcome by center. Considering the consistently high 
rankings of the importance of students, and considering that more ERC partners report 
this outcome rather than outcomes such as improved products or processes, this is an area 
of ERCs operations that deserves sustained attention. From the student side of the 
equation, the most important benefit from working in ERCs for graduate students is the 
ability to work and establish contacts with industry (Parker, 1997). 
 One could question whether it is worth it to create specialized institutional forms 
that to some extent seem to replicate processes that occur naturally (e.g. the positive 
relationship between students and industry involvement holds regardless of center 
affiliation). The answer is affirmative, found both in the assumptions of the ERC program 
and one of its evaluations. One of the assumptions of the ERC program is that ERC 
activities of student build on and are complementary to the traditional graduate education. 
When asked to rank the relative importance of ERC and non-ERC activities on their 
careers, students who have graduated report positive effects of both, but in different 
aspects. The ERC activities positively impacted their careers in the program’s intended 
ways by enhancing students; ability to work in interdisciplinary teams, to communicate 
ideas, and ability to solve problems under time and money constraints (Parker, 1997). 
Thus, while traditional graduate education positively impacts the industrial careers of 
students (as also implied by the results presented in this text), the research centers target 
and develop skill areas that are also important for industry but less emphasized in 
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traditional graduate education. Centers do not come to replace the university education. 
They however provide some shortcuts for faster and more flexible response to particular 
needs originating in industry. Satisfying such needs however is not in conflict with, but 
complementary to standard education. 
 Another policy implication has to deal with the dominant mechanisms of grant 
funding and support of science. Upon the inception of the ERC and related center 
programs, the academic community voiced concerns that these new institutional forms 
will “take away” the funding previously given to individual researchers (Bozeman & 
Boardman, 2004). My results suggest that no attempts should be made to tilt the funding 
balance in favor of the center-based research. Such institutions should exist and be 
developed in conjunction, not instead of the PI-initiated, small science funding model. 
My models identified independent positive effect of government grants on interactions 
with industry. Further, I also identified that the majority of this impact is meditated by 
student involvement. This implies that government funding may have nearer term (albeit 
still indirect) effects on private sector innovation than merely the published knowledge 
resulting from such funding. That is, government funding, as implied from results 
reported here is certainly not merely a tool to satisfy researcher’s intellectual curiosity, 
but it aids in the fulfillment of the training missions of universities and thus also aids 
interactions with the private sector. 
Implications for the academic recruitment and retention 
 One concern sometimes voiced among higher education scholars is that the 
reward system of the traditional, department based academic science may discourage 
scientists, especially junior ones, from pursuing industrially relevant research (Geisler, 
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1989). Since the work of Blumenthal and colleagues (Blumenthal, Gluck, Louis, Stoto, & 
Wise, 1986), evidence has been mounting that industrial interactions are not the realm of 
marginalized scholars, but on the contrary – of ones who generally perform as scientists 
at least as well, if not better than colleagues who are not industrially involved. 
Considering the positive association between industry interactions and productivity, 
collaboration, grants – and now with this study – student involvement, it seems that 
reasons to consider possible adjustments of the academic rewards system, and 
particularly the criteria used in tenure and promotion decisions, are increasing. Such 
possible adjustments certainly do not imply a departure from the basic criteria for 
evaluating scientific merit – the amount and the quality of scholarly contributions 
published in peer-reviewed outlets whish is and should remain the major measure of 
scientific contributions. However, other important roles and missions that scientists must 
fulfill such as training, and increasingly more so – public service and evidence of 
meaningful impacts of scholarly work, should not suffer from being perceived as 
distraction from “what really matters”. The mounting evidence regarding the 
complementarity between traditional and the more diverse contemporary perceptions of 
what science and scientists “should do”, implies that more well rounded evaluations, 
taking into consideration broader range of impacts and contributions of scientists would 
be appropriate. 
 Such changes are only partially a matter of policy, as they have to do with deeply 
embedded norms of the academic community. Nevertheless, norms and communities 
respond to incentives. Certain incentives and institutional emphases could indirectly 
influence these evaluation processes, without the risk of causing major and unpredictable 
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changes. For example, albeit the number of students graduated, mentored and 
collaborated with is considered a part of almost all faculty evaluations, the relative 
emphasis on this dimension varies tremendously across departments in the research 
extensive universities. Some schools place greater emphasis on mentoring and training 
activities (sometimes such emphasis is so prominent, that scientists feel compelled to list 
this type of contributions in the front of their CV, even before their publication and 
scholarly record). In other institutions, the consideration of training and mentoring 
activities is less important. More research is needed on the particular determinants of the 
variances in emphasis on training and student-related activities, but it is a justified policy 
concern to attempt measures to ensure sustained commitment of faculty to student 
development. 
Most importantly from policy point of view is that changes as the ones suggested 
above will not necessarily go against the traditional beliefs shared by the academic 
community. The finding that not only interactions with industry are not achieved at the 
expense of core missions, but strengthened by them allows shifting evaluation emphasis 
towards more traditional university roles without ignoring the desired closer integration 
with industry. 
The use of these findings can be difficult to promote “across the board” in tenure 
and promotion decisions because of the above mentioned important role of the norms and 
standards of the academic community, many of them not sanctioned institutionally. 
However, even such norms changes given the proper policy incentives. Given that the 
emphasis of policy makers and university administrators place on fostering linkages with 
industry is unlikely to diminish in the foreseeable future, one indirect way for universities 
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and departments to position themselves better for such interactions could be more explicit 
consideration given to the record of student involvement of new job candidates. While 
involvement with students does not “guarantee” involvement with industry, departments 
contemplating ways to increase their connections with the private sector, but wary of 
dramatic changes, may wish to consider in their hiring decisions the student involvement 
of job candidates as indirect ways to possibly enhance their industrial connections 
without having to “bend over” in order to accommodate more drastic arrangements. 
So what's the optimal role for students in the process of university industry 
collaboration? How best do you balance education with collaborative research without 
sacrificing the integrity of either? It seems best to err on the side of caution, to prevent 
capture that some assert is happening. In the context of the present findings, above all, 
this means not to overstate them. The major policy implication of this work is that 
universities do contribute to private sector innovation chiefly indirectly, through doing 
what they do best: academic research and instruction. My results reaffirm that these 
activities spill over onto private sector firms through numerous mechanisms., and some 
of the important inputs into private sector innovation may be immediate and direct and to 
occur in the context of individual scientists’ interactions with private companies. 
Another implication of this work is that too aggressive an attempt to increase the 
commercial relevance of academia by mandating or selectively encouraging more applied 
work or deliverables “for industry” would be ill-advised. Ironically, with few exceptions 
this has been the case in the US science policy in the recent years. If for no other reason, 
such policies are questionable since they devote resources to promoting marginal outputs 
of universities that represent miniscule part of their core missions while not considering 
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how similar or better results could be achieved by careful emphasis on what universities 






Table 1. Summary statistics of the sample by gender, tenure status, career age and post-
doc experience 
Variable Obs Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Male 1643 .49 .5 0 1 
Has held post-doctoral position 1610 .5 .5 0 1 
Tenured 1643 .73 .5 0 1 




Table 2. Descriptive statistics - student related behaviors 
Variable Obs Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Number of masters students supported 
currently by grants 
1643 0.88 1.50 0 20 
Number of doctoral students supported 
currently by grants 
1643 2.02 2.55 0 25 
Number of graduate students collaborated 
with on research during the past 12 
months 
1646 4.53 7.96 0 220 
Agrees that Interest in helping graduate 
students is important in my decisions to 
collaborate 
1615 3.18 0.82 1 4 
Average hours per week devoted to 
teaching undergraduate students 
(including preparation time and meeting 
outside class) 
1642 9.67 8.35 0 50 
Average hours per week devoted to 
teaching graduate students (including 
preparation time and meeting outside 
class)" 
1641 6.37 6.31 0 84 
Average hours per week devoted to 
advising graduate and undergraduate 
students on curriculum and job placement 
1641 2.47 3.02 0 30 
Average hours per week devoted to 
teaching (including preparation time and 
meeting outside class) 
1641 16.12 10.29 0 96 
Number of graduate students (masters or 
doctoral) supported currently by grants 
1646 2.9 3.15 0 40 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics - industry related behaviors 
Variable Obs Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Any kind of interaction with industry 1616 0.52 0.50 0 1 
Was contacted by industrial company 
about his or her research and has 
provided it 
1643 0.37 0.48 0 1 
Contacted industrial company about their 
research or research interests 
1643 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Served as a formal paid consultant to an 
industrial firm 
1643 0.18 0.39 0 1 
Helped place graduate students or post-
docs in industry jobs 
1643 0.25 0.43 0 1 
Worked in industrial company as a 
partner, owner or employee 
1643 0.04 0.18 0 1 
Worked directly with industry personnel 
in work that resulted in a patent or 
copyright 
1643 0.06 0.23 0 1 
Worked directly industry personnel on an 
effort to commercialize technology or 
applied research 
1643 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Co-authored a paper with industry 
personnel that has been published in a 
journal or refereed proceedings 
1643 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Industrial involvement scale 1643 1.08 1.44 0 6.62 
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Table 4. Mean comparisons of student related behaviors between scientists who interact 
with industry and the ones who do not (t-tests, 2-tailed) 












Number of masters students supported 
currently by grants 
0.51 1.23 0.72 *** 
Number of doctoral students 
supported currently by grants 
1.48 2.55 1.06 *** 
Number of graduate students 
collaborated with on research during 
the past 12 months 
3.37 5.67 2.30 *** 
Agrees that Interest in helping 
graduate students is important in my 
decisions to collaborate 
3.06 3.29 0.24 *** 
Average hours per week devoted to 
teaching undergraduate students 
(including preparation time and 
meeting outside class) 
10.32 9.09 -1.23 *** 
Average hours per week devoted to 
teaching graduate students (including 
preparation time and meeting outside 
class)" 
6.42 6.34 -0.08 NS 
Average hours per week devoted to 
teaching (including preparation time 
and meeting outside class) 
16.75 15.44 -1.31 *** 
Average hours per week devoted to 
advising graduate and undergraduate 
students on curriculum and job 
placement 
2.40 2.56 0.16 NS 
Number of graduate students (masters 
or doctoral) supported currently by 
grants 
1.99 3.78 1.78 *** 




Table 5. Means of student-related behaviors by discipline 
 grantma grantphd gradcol gradment teachugr teachgrad advise totteach grantgrad 
BIOL 0.25 1.49 2.80 2.89 10.45 5.61 2.13 16.06 1.74
CS 0.96 2.11 5.49 3.10 8.69 7.92 2.93 16.62 3.07
MATH 0.13 0.85 1.30 2.77 11.19 7.21 1.85 18.40 0.98
PHYS 0.21 1.78 5.23 3.18 10.13 5.11 2.13 15.24 1.99
EAS 0.79 1.21 4.23 3.30 9.34 7.73 2.77 17.07 2.00
CHEM 0.27 2.98 4.22 3.12 10.06 6.09 2.03 16.15 3.24
AGRI 0.84 0.86 3.13 3.22 7.10 4.54 2.83 11.64 1.70
CHE 0.97 3.33 4.96 3.36 11.55 5.46 2.19 17.00 4.29
CE 1.80 1.97 5.65 3.30 8.92 7.32 2.67 16.25 3.76
EE 1.43 3.02 6.44 3.37 9.43 6.50 2.68 15.92 4.45
ME 1.45 1.78 4.93 3.14 10.65 6.53 2.81 17.18 3.24
MTE 1.17 3.44 5.37 3.29 9.09 5.80 2.38 14.89 4.62
 
 
Table 6. Means of industry-related behaviors by discipline 
 indscinf scindinf consult studplace workind patented techtrsf coauthor 
BIOL 0.13 0.07 0.09 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03
CS 0.39 0.22 0.17 0.30 0.03 0.05 0.20 0.18
MATH 0.03 0.01 0.07 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03
PHYS 0.13 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.07
EAS 0.21 0.07 0.11 0.11 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.07
CHEM 0.27 0.09 0.15 0.21 0.01 0.02 0.14 0.08
AGRI 0.54 0.26 0.23 0.29 0.03 0.07 0.35 0.18
CHE 0.55 0.32 0.26 0.35 0.05 0.11 0.30 0.23
CE 0.55 0.23 0.32 0.46 0.07 0.05 0.14 0.21
EE 0.42 0.33 0.22 0.33 0.09 0.06 0.23 0.23
ME 0.64 0.32 0.23 0.39 0.04 0.12 0.22 0.23




Table 7. Means comparisons of student related behaviors by tenure status (t-tests, 2-
tailed) 






Number of masters students supported 
currently by grants 
0.74 0.93 0.19 ** 
Number of doctoral students supported 
currently by grants 
1.50 2.22 0.72 *** 
Number of graduate students collaborated 
with on research during the past 12 months 
3.75 4.84 1.09 ** 
Agrees that Interest in helping graduate 
students is important in my decisions to 
collaborate 
3.02 3.24 0.22 *** 
Average hours per week devoted to 
teaching undergraduate students (including 
preparation time and meeting outside class)
10.00 9.58 -0.42 NS 
Average hours per week devoted to 
teaching graduate students (including 
preparation time and meeting outside 
class)" 
6.75 6.25 -0.50 NS 
Average hours per week devoted to 
teaching (including preparation time and 
meeting outside class) 
16.75 15.83 -0.92 * 
Average hours per week devoted to 
advising graduate and undergraduate 
students on curriculum and job placement 
2.22 2.58 0.35 ** 
Number of graduate students (masters or 
doctoral) supported currently by grants 
2.24 3.15 0.90 *** 




Table 8. Means comparisons of industry related behaviors by tenure status (t-tests, 2-
tailed) 






Any kind of interaction with 
industry 
0.45 0.53 0.08 *** 
Was contacted by industrial 
company about his or her research 
and has provided it 
0.31 0.40 0.09 *** 
Contacted industrial company about 
their research or research interests 
0.18 0.19 0.01 NS 
Served as a formal paid consultant to 
an industrial firm 
0.11 0.21 0.10 *** 
Helped place graduate students or 
post-docs in industry jobs 
0.16 0.29 0.13 *** 
Worked in industrial company as a 
partner, owner or employee 
0.02 0.04 0.02 ** 
Worked directly with industry 
personnel in work that resulted in a 
patent or copyright 
0.04 0.06 0.02 NS 
Worked directly industry personnel 
on an effort to commercialize 
technology or applied research 
0.11 0.18 0.07 ** 
Co-authored a paper with industry 
personnel that has been published in 
a journal or refereed proceedings 
0.12 0.16 0.05 ** 
Industrial involvement scale 0.80 1.18 0.38 *** 




Table 9. Determinants of collaboration and productivity OLS regression results (non-
standardized coefficients) 
 (1) (2) (3) 

















Biology -0.173 4.869 8.959 
 (4.892) (4.678) (7.898) 
Mathematics -0.616 -4.421 -2.200 
 (5.053) (4.628) (8.150) 
Physics 10.822** 24.545*** 24.529*** 
 (4.673) (4.473) (7.324) 
Earth and Atmospheric 
Sciences 
9.863** 13.192*** 12.072* 
 (4.538) (4.171) (6.708) 
Chemistry -0.124 25.560*** 23.951*** 
 (4.785) (4.529) (7.600) 
Agriculture 1.532 6.695 6.361 
 (4.813) (4.374) (7.119) 
Chemical Engineering -1.342 18.040*** 20.397*** 
 (4.918) (4.437) (7.387) 
Civil Engineering -0.080 5.066 7.204 
 (4.529) (4.080) (6.518) 
Electrical Engineering -0.353 4.263 4.652 
 (4.880) (4.386) (7.368) 
Mechanical Engineering -1.584 3.127 5.198 
 (4.685) (4.247) (6.854) 
Materials Engineering -0.592 47.952*** 39.887*** 
 (5.250) (4.775) (7.910) 
Tenured 4.842* 12.956*** 9.507* 
 (2.742) (2.962) (4.980) 
Male 3.158 8.875*** 8.162*** 
 (2.080) (1.874) (3.158) 
Number of years since 
completing the PhD 
degree 
-0.252** -0.217 0.602 
 (0.116) (0.375) (0.646) 
Affiliated with university 
research center 
4.533** 1.958 -1.742 
 (2.133) (1.930) (3.159) 
Years since completing 
the PhD degree squared 
 0.050*** 0.033** 
  (0.008) (0.014) 
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 10.916*** 10.907*** 
  (2.029) (3.317) 




 0.375*** 1.006*** 
  (0.080) (0.220) 
Has had industrial 
experience 
 -0.130 -0.209 
  (1.857) (3.302) 
Squared number of 
collaborators 
 -0.000*** -0.001*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant 4.350 -9.052** -17.095** 
 (3.802) (3.952) (6.742) 
Observations 1599 1591 807 
R-squared 0.02 0.45 0.33 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 10. Determinants of grants by source - summary OLS regressions, non-
standardized coefficients 
 (1) (2) (3) 









Male -0.024 0.012 -0.036 
 (0.052) (0.023) (0.047) 
Biology -0.335*** -0.214*** -0.121 
 (0.129) (0.058) (0.115) 
Mathematics -0.734*** -0.223*** -0.511*** 
 (0.129) (0.058) (0.115) 
Physics -0.359*** -0.207*** -0.152 
 (0.124) (0.055) (0.110) 
Earth and Atmospheric Sciences -0.237** -0.203*** -0.035 
 (0.116) (0.052) (0.104) 
Chemistry -0.224* -0.158*** -0.067 
 (0.126) (0.057) (0.113) 
Agriculture -0.477*** -0.073 -0.404*** 
 (0.120) (0.054) (0.107) 
Chemical Engineering 0.173 0.077 0.096 
 (0.123) (0.055) (0.110) 
Civil Engineering -0.232** -0.145*** -0.087 
 (0.113) (0.051) (0.101) 
Electrical Engineering 0.138 -0.021 0.159 
 (0.121) (0.054) (0.108) 
Mechanical Engineering 0.181 0.059 0.122 
 (0.117) (0.052) (0.104) 
Materials Engineering 0.249* -0.075 0.323*** 
 (0.135) (0.061) (0.121) 
Tenured 0.453*** 0.071** 0.382*** 
 (0.069) (0.031) (0.061) 
Number of years since 
completing the PhD degree 
-0.028*** -0.003** -0.025*** 
 (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) 
Affiliated with university 
research center 
0.440*** 0.082*** 0.358*** 
 (0.053) (0.024) (0.048) 
Had post-doctoral appointment 0.010 -0.058** 0.068 
 (0.057) (0.025) (0.051) 
Total number of research 
collaborators (not including 
graduate students) 
0.001** -0.000 0.001** 




Table 10 (continued) 
 
Total number of peer-reviewed 
journal articles (imputed) 
0.006*** 0.000 0.005*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Agrees that worrying about 
possible commercial 
applications distracts one from 
doing good research 
-0.051* -0.012 -0.039 
 (0.027) (0.012) (0.024) 
Has had industrial experience 0.015 -0.014 0.029 
 (0.051) (0.023) (0.046) 
Constant 1.327*** 0.255*** 1.072*** 
 (0.116) (0.052) (0.103) 
Observations 1548 1548 1548 
R-squared 0.21 0.08 0.19 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Table 11. Determinants of student-related behaviors - summary OLS regression results, non-standardized coefficients 


























































































Male -0.049 -0.254 -0.643 -0.690 -0.119*** 0.044 -0.222** -0.179 0.385 
 (0.338) (0.163) (0.438) (0.509) (0.044) (0.074) (0.109) (0.131) (0.324) 
Biology -2.947*** -0.799** 1.980* -0.978 -0.195* -0.466** -0.428 -0.894*** -2.032** 
 (0.837) (0.404) (1.084) (1.261) (0.109) (0.183) (0.270) (0.324) (0.804) 
Mathematics -0.908 -1.127*** 1.829* 0.908 -0.218** -0.468** -0.399 -0.867*** -2.756*** 
 (0.840) (0.405) (1.088) (1.266) (0.109) (0.184) (0.271) (0.325) (0.807) 
Physics -3.226*** -0.737* 2.473** -0.765 0.118 -0.579*** -0.633** -1.212*** -1.369* 




-0.404 -0.066 1.480 1.063 0.183* -0.064 -1.135*** -1.199*** -2.534*** 
 (0.753) (0.363) (0.975) (1.134) (0.098) (0.164) (0.242) (0.291) (0.722) 
Chemistry -2.184*** -0.855** 2.690** 0.495 0.040 -0.570*** 0.281 -0.289 -1.361* 
 (0.818) (0.395) (1.060) (1.233) (0.107) (0.179) (0.263) (0.316) (0.785) 
 
 168
Table 11 (continued) 
 
Agriculture -3.332*** -0.126 -2.468** -5.815*** 0.138 0.071 -0.933*** -0.862*** -2.162*** 
 (0.777) (0.375) (1.007) (1.171) (0.101) (0.170) (0.250) (0.301) (0.746) 
Chemical 
Engineering 
-2.756*** -0.761** 4.252*** 1.482 0.250** -0.099 0.392 0.293 -1.347* 
 (0.794) (0.383) (1.029) (1.196) (0.103) (0.173) (0.255) (0.306) (0.760) 
Civil 
Engineering 
-0.376 -0.083 0.358 -0.033 0.227** 0.892*** -0.276 0.615** 0.056 
 (0.729) (0.353) (0.945) (1.099) (0.095) (0.159) (0.235) (0.282) (0.700) 
Electrical 
Engineering 
-1.486* -0.470 1.615 0.124 0.283*** 0.389** 0.370 0.758** 0.351 
 (0.783) (0.377) (1.012) (1.180) (0.102) (0.171) (0.251) (0.302) (0.750) 
Mechanical 
Engineering 
-1.469* -0.229 2.521** 1.037 0.049 0.502*** -0.689*** -0.187 -0.742 
 (0.754) (0.364) (0.978) (1.137) (0.099) (0.165) (0.243) (0.292) (0.724) 
Materials 
Engineering 
-2.243** -0.434 3.221*** 0.966 0.152 0.021 -0.080 -0.059 -1.740** 
 (0.876) (0.423) (1.136) (1.321) (0.114) (0.192) (0.282) (0.339) (0.841) 
Tenured -0.338 0.320 -0.074 -0.405 0.178*** 0.309*** 0.788*** 1.097*** 1.297*** 






-0.038* 0.005 0.028 -0.011 0.002 -0.016*** -0.056*** -0.072*** -0.090*** 




0.724** 0.031 0.117 0.839 -0.017 -0.221*** -0.082 -0.303** -0.197 
 (0.366) (0.177) (0.474) (0.552) (0.048) (0.080) (0.118) (0.142) (0.352) 
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0.022 0.002 -1.626*** -1.608*** 0.031 0.042 0.706*** 0.748*** 0.774** 









0.000 -0.001 -0.004 -0.004 0.000 0.003*** -0.001 0.002 0.128*** 








0.007 -0.000 -0.026*** -0.019*** 0.000 0.002 0.017*** 0.019*** 0.017*** 





-0.181 -0.128 -1.025*** -1.206*** 0.014 0.310*** 0.875*** 1.185*** 0.951*** 











0.277 0.197 -0.389 -0.105 0.086* 0.275*** 0.710*** 0.985*** 0.695** 











0.019 0.063 0.112 0.129 -0.002 0.038 -0.054 -0.016 -0.200 




-0.228 0.189 -0.037 -0.269 0.024 -0.036 -0.048 -0.084 0.837*** 
 (0.331) (0.160) (0.429) (0.499) (0.043) (0.072) (0.107) (0.128) (0.318) 
Constant 8.590*** 2.678*** 10.760*** 19.372*** 2.915*** 0.443*** 0.930*** 1.374*** 3.132*** 
 (0.778) (0.376) (1.008) (1.172) (0.102) (0.170) (0.251) (0.301) (0.747) 
Observations 1543 1543 1544 1543 1531 1548 1548 1548 1548 
R-squared 0.04 0.02 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.21 0.38 0.42 0.48 
Standard errors in parentheses          
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 12. Determinants of industrial involvement scale (nonstandardized coefficients) 













Male 0.197*** 0.207*** 0.193** 0.203*** 
 (0.064) (0.064) (0.089) (0.064) 
Tenured 0.130 0.143* 0.127 0.125 
 (0.087) (0.087) (0.118) (0.087) 
Biology -0.373** -0.361** -0.427* -0.377** 
 (0.160) (0.160) (0.225) (0.159) 
Mathematics -0.507*** -0.487*** -0.447* -0.517*** 
 (0.160) (0.160) (0.231) (0.160) 
Physics -0.554*** -0.537*** -0.516** -0.540*** 
 (0.154) (0.154) (0.210) (0.151) 
Earth and Atmospheric Sciences -0.512*** -0.537*** -0.418** -0.504*** 
 (0.144) (0.144) (0.192) (0.143) 
Chemistry -0.257 -0.217 -0.232 -0.249 
 (0.157) (0.157) (0.213) (0.154) 
Agriculture 0.522*** 0.502*** 0.558*** 0.524*** 
 (0.149) (0.149) (0.198) (0.148) 
Chemical Engineering 0.224 0.234 0.384* 0.241 
 (0.151) (0.153) (0.207) (0.150) 
Civil Engineering 0.306** 0.320** 0.298 0.312** 
 (0.140) (0.140) (0.183) (0.140) 
Electrical Engineering 0.060 0.069 0.284 0.063 
 (0.149) (0.150) (0.206) (0.149) 
Mechanical Engineering 0.427*** 0.439*** 0.348* 0.431*** 
 (0.144) (0.144) (0.192) (0.144) 
Materials Engineering 0.355** 0.380** 0.275 0.384** 
 (0.166) (0.167) (0.224) (0.163) 
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Table 12 (continued) 
 
Number of years since completing the PhD degree 0.004 0.003 -0.003 0.006 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) 
Total number of research collaborators (not including graduate 
students) 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.002 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Agrees that worrying about possible commercial applications 
distracts one from doing good research 
-0.130*** -0.131*** -0.065 -0.129*** 
 (0.034) (0.033) (0.046) (0.034) 
Had post-doctoral appointment -0.259*** -0.260*** -0.224** -0.257*** 
 (0.070) (0.070) (0.094) (0.069) 
Affiliated with university research center 0.219*** 0.234*** 0.197** 0.213*** 
 (0.068) (0.068) (0.090) (0.068) 
Has had industrial experience 0.065 0.058 0.050  
 (0.063) (0.063) (0.092)  
Number of active government grants 0.091** 0.099*** 0.054 0.094** 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.053) (0.038) 
Number of active industry grants 0.713*** 0.706*** 0.870*** 0.711*** 
 (0.071) (0.071) (0.098) (0.071) 
Total number of peer-reviewed journal articles (imputed) 0.001 0.001   
 (0.001) (0.001)   
Number of masters students supported currently by grants 0.100*** 0.095*** 0.071** 0.100*** 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.034) (0.022) 
Number of doctoral students supported currently by grants 0.087*** 0.076*** 0.048** 0.089*** 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.022) (0.015) 
Number of graduate students collaborated with on research 
during the past 12 months 
0.009* 0.008 0.027** 0.010* 





Table 12 (continued) 
 
Agrees that Interest in helping graduate students is important in 
my decisions t 
0.103*** 0.103*** 0.087* 0.104*** 
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.052) (0.038) 
Average hours per week devoted to teaching graduate students 
(including preparation time and meetings outside class) 
 -0.002   
  (0.005)   
Average hours per week devoted to teaching undergraduate 
students (including preparation time and meetings outside class) 
 -0.005   
  (0.004)   
Average hours per week devoted to advising graduate and 
undergraduate students on curriculum and job placement 
 0.014   
  (0.010)   
Total number of peer-reviewed journal articles   0.002  
   (0.001)  
Constant 0.298 0.334* 0.266 0.308* 
 (0.184) (0.193) (0.253) (0.180) 
Observations 1531 1525 776 1531 
R-squared 0.35 0.35 0.36 0.35 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
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Table 13. Linear probability models for the different types of industrial interactions (non-standardized OLS coefficients) 



























































Male 0.017 0.015 0.079*** 0.032 0.032*** 0.006 0.043** 0.016 
 (0.023) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) (0.010) (0.012) (0.019) (0.018) 
Tenured 0.095*** -0.024 0.043 0.079*** 0.000 -0.005 0.016 -0.015 
 (0.031) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.013) (0.016) (0.025) (0.025) 
Biology -0.129** -0.064 0.005 -0.144*** -0.014 0.004 -0.070 -0.081* 
 (0.057) (0.050) (0.050) (0.052) (0.024) (0.030) (0.046) (0.046) 
Mathematics -0.223*** -0.115** -0.036 -0.112** -0.019 -0.010 -0.090* -0.067 
 (0.057) (0.050) (0.050) (0.052) (0.024) (0.030) (0.046) (0.046) 
Physics -0.185*** -0.104** -0.108** -0.166*** -0.021 0.005 -0.076* -0.074* 




-0.152*** -0.109** -0.040 -0.141*** -0.026 -0.017 -0.095** -0.083** 
 (0.052) (0.045) (0.045) (0.047) (0.022) (0.027) (0.041) (0.041) 
Chemistry -0.069 -0.077 0.014 -0.041 -0.022 -0.001 -0.046 -0.084* 
 (0.056) (0.049) (0.049) (0.051) (0.024) (0.029) (0.045) (0.045) 
Agriculture 0.205*** 0.083* 0.071 0.041 0.004 0.034 0.210*** 0.029 
 (0.053) (0.047) (0.046) (0.048) (0.023) (0.027) (0.043) (0.042) 
Chemical 
Engineering 
0.101* 0.061 0.052 -0.028 0.002 0.044 0.077* -0.021 
 (0.054) (0.047) (0.047) (0.049) (0.023) (0.028) (0.043) (0.043) 
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0.139*** 0.009 0.154*** 0.128*** 0.024 -0.015 -0.055 0.032 
 (0.050) (0.044) (0.044) (0.045) (0.021) (0.026) (0.040) (0.040) 
Electrical 
Engineering 
-0.047 0.080* 0.019 -0.040 0.053** -0.007 -0.007 0.000 
 (0.054) (0.047) (0.047) (0.048) (0.023) (0.028) (0.043) (0.043) 
Mechanical 
Engineering 
0.224*** 0.083* 0.075* 0.061 0.003 0.064** 0.026 0.031 
 (0.052) (0.045) (0.045) (0.047) (0.022) (0.027) (0.041) (0.041) 
Materials 
Engineering 
0.130** 0.114** 0.092* 0.045 -0.005 0.049 0.000 0.036 






-0.002 0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.001* 0.001 0.002 









0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 

















-0.019 -0.016 -0.020* -0.021* -0.026*** -0.016*** -0.024** -0.015 




-0.064** -0.021 -0.090*** -0.045** 0.003 -0.015 -0.059*** -0.042** 






0.087*** 0.048** 0.012 0.063*** 0.002 0.004 0.019 0.056*** 




0.036 0.030 0.000 0.040* 0.014 -0.006 -0.023 -0.000 





0.037*** -0.002 0.024** 0.023* 0.001 0.004 0.022** 0.009 
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Table 13 (continued) 
 





0.144*** 0.156*** 0.068*** 0.149*** 0.012 0.076*** 0.119*** 0.172*** 








0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 







0.015* 0.022*** 0.004 0.033*** 0.003 0.014*** 0.018*** 0.015** 







0.018*** 0.013** 0.008* 0.020*** 0.007*** 0.007** 0.024*** 0.012*** 













past 12 mon 
0.002 0.001 0.001 0.005*** 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.001 









0.037*** 0.009 0.024** 0.049*** -0.000 0.005 -0.008 0.022** 
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.006) (0.007) (0.011) (0.011) 
Constant 0.123* 0.119** 0.009 -0.053 0.030 0.010 0.117** 0.023 
 (0.066) (0.058) (0.058) (0.060) (0.028) (0.034) (0.053) (0.053) 
Observations 1531 1531 1531 1531 1531 1531 1531 1531 
R-squared 0.27 0.16 0.12 0.26 0.07 0.09 0.19 0.15 
Standard errors in parentheses 




Table 14. Tobit estimates and marginal effects for the industrial involvement scale 
 (1) (2) (3) 




Male 0.327*** 0.122*** 0.067*** 
 (0.124) (0.046) (0.025) 
Tenured 0.261 0.095 0.054 
 (0.167) (0.062) (0.034) 
Biology -1.144*** -0.368*** -0.227*** 
 (0.329) (0.122) (0.068) 
Mathematics -1.873*** -0.548*** -0.347*** 
 (0.372) (0.138) (0.076) 
Physics -1.644*** -0.501*** -0.314*** 
 (0.323) (0.120) (0.066) 
Earth and Atmospheric 
Sciences 
-1.193*** -0.385*** -0.237*** 
 (0.285) (0.106) (0.059) 
Chemistry -0.516* -0.180 -0.106* 
 (0.300) (0.112) (0.062) 
Agriculture 1.005*** 0.426*** 0.198*** 
 (0.269) (0.100) (0.055) 
Chemical Engineering 0.520* 0.207** 0.105* 
 (0.270) (0.100) (0.055) 
Civil Engineering 0.705*** 0.286*** 0.142*** 
 (0.252) (0.094) (0.052) 
Electrical Engineering 0.235 0.090 0.048 
 (0.270) (0.100) (0.055) 
Mechanical Engineering 0.925*** 0.387*** 0.183*** 
 (0.258) (0.096) (0.053) 
Materials Engineering 0.641** 0.260** 0.129** 
 (0.297) (0.110) (0.061) 
Number of years since 
completing the PhD degree 
0.004 0.002 0.001 
 (0.008) (0.003) (0.002) 
Total number of research 
collaborators (not including 
graduate students) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) 
Agrees that worrying about 
possible commercial 
applications distracts one 
from doing good research 
-0.239*** -0.089*** -0.049*** 
 (0.065) (0.024) (0.013) 
Had post-doctoral 
appointment 
-0.479*** -0.178*** -0.098*** 
 (0.132) (0.049) (0.027) 
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Table 14 (continued) 
 
Affiliated with university 
research center 
0.437*** 0.166*** 0.089*** 
 (0.126) (0.047) (0.026) 
Has had industrial experience 0.146 0.055 0.030 
 (0.119) (0.044) (0.024) 
Number of active government 
grants 
0.186*** 0.069*** 0.038*** 
 (0.071) (0.026) (0.015) 
Number of active industry 
grants 
0.912*** 0.339*** 0.187*** 
 (0.121) (0.045) (0.025) 
Total number of peer-
reviewed journal articles 
(imputed) 
0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) 
Number of masters students 
supported currently by grants 
0.101** 0.038** 0.021** 
 (0.039) (0.015) (0.008) 
Number of doctoral students 
supported currently by grants 
0.117*** 0.043*** 0.024*** 
 (0.028) (0.010) (0.006) 
Number of graduate students 
collaborated with on research 
during the past 12 months 
0.015 0.005 0.003 
 (0.009) (0.004) (0.002) 
Agrees that interest in helping 
graduate students is important 
in my decisions t 
0.237*** 0.088*** 0.049*** 
 (0.074) (0.028) (0.015) 
Constant -1.161*** -0.431*** -0.239*** 
 (0.360) (0.134) (0.074) 
Observations 1531 1531 1531 
Standard errors in parentheses 
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